Applications of Credit Scoring Models by Chong, Mimi Mei Ling
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
12-1-2016 12:00 AM 
Applications of Credit Scoring Models 
Mimi Mei Ling Chong 
The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor 
Dr. Matt Davison 
The University of Western Ontario 
Graduate Program in Statistics and Actuarial Sciences 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of 
Philosophy 
© Mimi Mei Ling Chong 2016 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Statistical Models Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chong, Mimi Mei Ling, "Applications of Credit Scoring Models" (2016). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation 
Repository. 4259. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4259 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
Abstract
The application of credit scoring on consumer lending is an automated, objective and consistent
tool which helps lenders to provide quick loan decisions. In order to apply for a loan, applicants
must provide their attributes by filling out an application form. Certain attributes are then
selected as inputs to a credit scoring model which generates a credit score. The magnitude of
this credit score is proved to be related to the credit quality of the loan applicant. As such, it
is used to determine whether the loan will be granted, and also the amount of interest being
charged. Currently, little effort has been devoted to verifying the correctness of the reported
attributes provided by prospective borrowers. Moreover, with a long history of use of the
same credit scoring model, borrowers will learn about the characteristics being used by the
lender to make loan decisions, and may be motivated to lie about their attributes in order to
increase their chances of loan approval. This thesis examines the effect on consumer lending
if some borrowers strategically falsify their attributes on the application form. Under normal
circumstances, analysts believe that using a larger dataset to develop credit scoring models will
increase model accuracy. We will show that if some borrowers respond dishonestly to some
questions on the application form, using higher dimensional data to build models will increase
the associated accumulated error, and may result in having a more complex model but with
low predictive power compared against using a dataset with lower dimensions. Furthermore,
we will show that it is profitable for lenders to spend extra cost to directly eliminate lies in the
dataset. In particular, we will examine the optimal amount of effort that lenders should spend
on identifying liars in order to equilibrate between risk and return. However, we will also show
that it is still possible for fraudulent loan applicants to eventually adjust their lies to escape from
credit checks and get loans. Indeed the business of consumer lending may usefully be modeled
as a game performed between the lender and the borrower. We will explore the cost to make a
clever lie on the attributes and the cost to verify the correctness of the reported data towards the
interaction between the lender and bad liars. The impact of having liars in the business not only
affects the profitability of lenders, but also lowers the utility of those borrowers who always
repay their loans and the utility of the economy as a whole. The proposed issues will be studied
using discriminant analysis on simulated data, and then further assume the characteristics of
borrowers follow half triangular distribution to present theoretical results. This research shows
the importance of enriching data before making loan decisions. It can help lending financial
institutions to reduce risk and maximize profit, and it also shows that it is feasible for customers
to lie intelligently so as to evade credit checks and get loans.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Note that banking terms used in this thesis are defined in Appendix C.
1.1.1 Consumer Credit
Economists define consumer credit as “short and intermediate-term credit extended to individ-
uals through regular business channels, usually to finance the purchase of consumer goods and
services or to refinance debts incurred for such purposes”. The academic study of consumer
credit dates back at least as far as 1929 [2]. In simple terms and as described by Anderson
[5], credit allows borrowers to buy now and pay later. A loan is a legal contract in which a
borrower receives resources or wealth from the creditor and promises to repay the borrowed
amount along with interest in the future. Chawla [11] stated that credit can be used to shift
day-to-day expenses in the short term, and can improve people’s living by allowing them to
invest in real assets or education which increase their purchasing power in the long term. For
example, people can use credit to buy their home when they are young, which allows them to
distribute their debt into a series of payments which they can make as their earnings and eq-
uity rises. Chang and Hanna [3] divided consumer credit into installment credit and revolving
credit, while Rea [9] further sub-divided each of them into secured and unsecured credit.
Chien and Devaney [4] defined installment credit as closed-end credit, in which the amount
borrowed must be repaid in a specific number of equal payments. Installment credit usually
involves larger sums of money and we refer to them as loans. Chien and Devaney [4] also
defined revolving credit as open-end credit, for which credit has been granted in advance and
with a specific credit limit, consumers can use their credit up to their credit limit any time they
prefer and do not have to reapply at the time of use. In addition, consumers can also choose
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to continue to use the granted credit while payments of previous debts are still in the process
of being paid off. Some revolving products allow borrowers to repay the owed amount and
interest at a later time, eg. a year after purchases have been made. The amount owed can also
be repaid in full or through a series of equal or unequal payments depending on the agreement
between the borrower and the credit grantor.
Credit can further be sub-divided into secured and unsecured loans. The major difference
between the two is that a secured loan is protected by one or more assets often termed collateral.
Debtors have legal possession of the collateral and in cases where borrowers fail to make
payments and default on their loan, debtors can take ownership of the collateral, selling it to
recover all or part of the debt. If the sale of the collateral does not raise enough money to pay
off the debt, lender can obtain a deficiency judgment against the borrower for the remaining
amount. This is the reason for John et al. [6] to refer to collateral as a protection of the
loan, which reduces risk and gives the lender a specific claim on an asset without reducing
her general claim against the borrower. Secured loans usually offer lower interest rates and a
longer repayment period but may required a longer processing time. Unsecured installment
loans, on the other hand, are loans that do not require the pledge of collateral and the lender
relies on the borrower’s promise to repay the loan. They involve fewer credit checks, easier and
faster access to cash, but requires a higher interest rate and involve smaller amounts of money.
Wang [7] examined bank lending policies on unsecured loans and suggested that borrowers
with no collateral established their credit-worthiness through repeated interaction with banks.
In general, there are four types of consumer credits:
1. Secured installment credit
2. Unsecured installment credit
3. Secured revolving credit
4. Unsecured revolving credit
Mortgage loans are typical examples of secured installment loans, where the amount bor-
rowed will be used to purchase a house and the property will be used to pledge as a collateral.
Typically, the value of the house must be verified by a legal appraiser which may lengthen the
processing time of the loan. Mortgage loans mostly offer at a relatively lower interest rate, very
close to prime rate1, and the repayment period can be up to 25 years or more. Student loans are
in the category of unsecured installment loans; lenders believe that borrowers pursuing their
1Prime rate is the best interest rate that banks charge their most credit-worthy customers. In Canada, prime
rate is set individually by different financial institutions according to the overnight rate set by the Bank of Canada.
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post-secondary education are creditworthy and do not require them to pledge any collateral to
secure their loans. Some financial institutions have unsecured personal loan products with in-
terest rate starting at 29.99% (EasyFinancial Canada, July 2016) 2, more than ten times higher
than Canada’s current prime rate of 2.7% (Bank of Canada, July 2016) 3. The high interest
rate charged on unsecured loans compensates the risk of the lender. In case of a default, the
lender does not have liens on any of the borrower’s assets and the process of collecting debt
on unsecured loans are very complicated and time consuming. Other examples of unsecured
installment loans includes unsecured personal loans and payday loans.
Home equity lines of credit are an example of secured revolving loan. Typically, the house
of the borrower is pledged as a collateral in which case the loan is called a second lien mortgage.
Since the house is a consumer’s most valuable asset, homeowners should use home equity lines
of credit for major items such as home renovations and medical bills. Consumers have flexible
terms of repayment, for example, they can choose to repay interest only and keep the loan
opened for as long as they want. A bank credit card is an example of unsecured revolving
credit. The credit card application can be done through the internet and the approval process
can be as fast as a few minutes. Consumers will be granted with a credit limit which they
can use for day-to-day purchases. They do not have to pay off the credit card debt right away,
instead, as described by Furletti [10], they can choose to continue to use the credit card as
long as they make a minimum monthly payment and stay within their assigned credit limit.
However, the interest charged on overdue payments on credit cards are usually very high,
ranging from 5% to 25% as of July 2016, depending on the agreement between the issuer and
the borrower.
There has been an enormous amount of growth in the consumer credit industry in the past
35 years. Credit will be converted to a debt as soon as the consumer accepted and used the
granted credit. We examine the growth of consumer credit in the form of debts. Total household
debt is defined as the sum of mortgage debt and consumer debt. Mortgage debt includes loans
on all residences and real estate property. Consumer debt includes debt on outstanding credit
cards, personal and home equity lines of credit, loans from banks and unpaid bills. Scott
[16] revealed the tremendous growth of consumer credit card debt in the United States, where
revolving credit card debt has increased at an average annual rate of almost nine percent over
the past ten years. On average each US household has eight credit cards in circulation. These
2EasyFinancial Canada has their unsecured installment loan starting with an interst rate of 29.99% as of July
2016.
3http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/daily-digest/
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Figure 1.1: This plot shows that Canada’s total household debt, mortgage debt and consumer
debt have been increasing from 1980 to 2015.
cards were used to purchase nearly $2 trillion of goods and services annually. In Canada, there
was a roughly twelve times increase in total household debt between 1980 to 2015. Figure
1.1 shows the plot of Canada total household debt, mortgage debt and consumer debt from
1980 to 20154. Canadian consumer debt increased from $44 billion to $540 billion, while
mortgage debt increased from $92 billion to $1,318 billion from 1980 to 20155. To put this
into perspective, the Canadian GDP deflator index approximately doubled from 44.24 Index
Points in 1980 to 109.92 in 2015. Furthermore, there is a 1.44 times increase in the population
in Canada, from 25 million people in 1980 to 36 million in 2015. So, even excluding the
effect of inflation and increase in population size, we can still see the dramatic increase in the
demand of credit and loans. In 2015, the ratio of household debt to disposable income rose from
85.2% in 1990 to 165.4% in 2015 6. This means that as of 2015, Canadian households owed
more than $1.65 in debt for every dollar of annual disposable income. Figure 1.2 showed the
upward trend of the ratio of Canada household debt to disposable income from 1990 to 2015.
The increasing demand for different types of loans urge the development of an automated, low
cost, simple and accurate tool, which can effectively and efficiently fulfill the needs of loan
request, and can maximize profit from the lending of money. This quantitative tool is called
credit scoring.
4Sources: Statistics Canada, CANSIM vectors v36408 (total debts), v122698 (consumer debt) and v122736
(mortgage debt), 1980 to 2015.
5Numbers provided by Statistics Canada
6Sources: Statistics Canada, Table 378-0123, National Balance Sheet Accounts, financial indicators, house-
holds and non-profit institutions serving households
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Figure 1.2: This plot shows the ratio of household credit market debt (mortgages plus consumer
credit) to disposable income in Canada from 1990 to 2015. The ratio of household debt to
disposable income rose from 85.2% in 1990 to 165.4% in 2015. This means that as of 2015,
Canada households owed more than $1.65 in debt for every dollar of annual disposable income.
1.1.2 What is Credit Scoring
According to Thomas, Edelman and Crook [21], the idea of credit scoring was introduced more
than 60 years ago based on even older statistical ideas. In 1936, Sir Ronald Fisher was the first
to identify different groups in a population when one cannot see the characteristic that can
clearly defines the groups but only related ones. He segmented two varieties of iris by mea-
suring the physical size of plants; in addition, he also grouped skulls of various origins using
their physical measurements. In 1941, David Durand realized that Fisher’s work can be further
applied to distinguish good and bad loans. This is how credit scoring techniques were first
introduced into banking. In 1956, engineer Bill Fair and mathematician Earl Isaac founded the
firm Fair, Isaac and Corporation in San Francisco, which was the first credit scoring consul-
tancy company. It is now known as FICO and is still the leading provider of credit analytics and
decision management technology in the world. Over the years, FICO and other credit agencies
such as Equifax, TransUnion and Experian have convinced the banking community that math-
ematical formulas and statistical models can do a faster and/or less expensive job of predicting
the probability of default of borrowers than most experienced loan officers. The invention of
credit cards in the late 1960s magnified the usefulness of credit scoring. The high demand for
credit cards, and the relatively small amount borrowed, made it impossible in both economic
and manpower terms to handle all the applications without the use of an automated lending
system. Financial institutions found that using credit scoring methods to predict credit risk is
much better than other judgment based methods and default rates dropped by 50% or more
[13]. In the 1980s and 1990s, the successful use of credit scoring in the credit card industry
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triggered the application of credit scoring techniques to other financial products, like personal
loans, house mortgages and small business loans. Nowadays, the application of credit scoring
has become a huge industry which has been widely expanded to many different uses during the
last few decades.
According to Thomas et al. [21] credit scoring refers to the use of a numerical tool to
rank borrowers according to their desirability as loan counterparty. This desirability reflects
their probability of making repayments as well as the probability of default (PD), that is the
likelihood that a borrower will not be able to meet its debt obligations over a particular time
horizon. It also reflects the fraction of loan expected to be recovered in the event of a default,
and in opposite terms, the loss given default (LGD) which is the fraction of exposure that
cannot be recovered in the event of a default [31]. To build a scoring model, developers require
sufficient historical data covering both good and bad economic conditions and reflecting the
performance of previously made loans, to determine which borrower characteristics are useful
in predicting whether the loan performed well. Data such as the applicant’s monthly income,
outstanding debt, financial assets, how long the applicant has been in the same job, whether the
applicant has defaulted or was ever delinquent on a previous loan, whether the applicant owns
or rents a home, and the type of bank account the applicant has are all potential factors that may
be related to loan performance, delinquency and default rates of borrowers, and may consider
to be used to forecast the probability of default of prospective borrowers. Developers will then
come up with a credit scoring model, which is a mathematical formula that can be used to
combine the value of the selected characteristics. According to FICO, 50 to 60 variables might
be considered when developing a typical scoring model, but 8 to 12 might end up in the final
model as yielding the most predictive combination. A credit scoring model will return a credit
score for each borrower. For example a common credit score known as the FICO 7 score is a
measure of consumer credit risk. This score ranges from 300 to 850; the higher the score the
more creditworthy the applicant is deemed to be. As mentioned in Frankel [9], lower credit
scores are systematically associated with a higher probability of default on mortgage loans.
A good credit scoring model should clearly distinguish between good borrowers who always
repay their loans and bad borrowers who default. Therefore, a well-designed model should
assign more applicants to high and low scores, while minimizing the number of applicants with
scores in the middle range. However, no models are perfect, there will be some good borrowers
classified as bad and some bad borrowers classified as good, and a credit scoring model is built
to minimize this error. Depending on the amount of risk that the financial institution is willing
to take and the amount of return that is expected to obtain, a cutoff score will be set to determine
7The acronym FICO is derived from “Fair Issac & Co”. This firm is a leading analytics software company
which produces statistical models to predict consumer behavior.
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whether prospective borrowers will be granted credit.
To apply for a loan, prospective borrowers must provide their attributes by filling out an
application form, and also to sign off on a consent form which allows the lender to obtain a
copy of their credit history from the credit bureaus. A credit bureau is a company that collects
and maintains individual credit information and sells it to lenders, creditors and consumer in the
form of a credit report. Chandler and Parker [14] studied the value of credit bureau reports and
stated that detailed analysis of the credit report can increase the creditor’s ability on predicting
risk of loan applicants. With all applicants’ information gathered, credit analyst will then input
the required attributes into the invented credit scoring model to generate a credit score, and use
it to determine the granting decision. Applicants with scores higher than the cutoff score will be
granted credit while applicants with sub-cutoff scores will be denied credit. The performance
of the credit scoring model must be monitored and validated periodically to make sure that
the generated score continue to rank-order borrowers according to their credit quality. Mays
[15] stated that change in lending policies, application population and economic conditions are
factors that may affect the performance of the scoring model. Different statistical measures
such as Kolmogorov Smirnov statistics, probability stability index and characteristic stability
analysis have been commonly used to back-test the performance of the credit scoring model
and to detect shifts of applicants’ characteristics, so as to guarantee that the model continues to
return promising granting decisions.
1.1.3 Benefits of Credit Scoring
There are several advantages to both lenders and borrowers of using credit scoring. Credit
scoring techniques shorten the processing time for the loan approval processes. The use of
high performance computers together with credit scoring systems automated the granting of
credits and loans. The use of traditional human-judgment methods to grant such loans can
take from a few hours to a few days. After the implementation of credit scoring systems, the
granting of small business loans and credit cards fell to as little as a few minutes. In cases where
an online application is available, approval of loans or credit can be nearly instantaneous. The
introduction of credit scoring reduces the time and cost spent on management. Borrowers can
easily have access to the amount of credit they can get from different banks; they can compare
and choose the bank which offers the most credit, together with the lowest interest rate and the
most suitable repayment terms. The reduction in processing time can minimize the cost and
effort to accessing credit, while the manpower saved by both banks and borrowers in processing
applications can be effectively allocated to handle more complex issues.
Secondly, credit scoring provides a fair lending process among different borrowers. Under
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the United States Equal Credit Opportunity Act [32], variables which reflect gender, race, re-
ligion and age cannot be included in credit scoring models, because of their possible link with
discrimination against groups of borrowers. Only information that is both non-discriminatory
in nature and has been proven to provide predictive power on repayment behavior can be in-
cluded in the model. Furthermore, since by using credit scoring systems the criteria used to
classify good and bad payers have already been set, no human intervention can alter the results
of the system. The results of loan requests from different borrowers can be standardized across
vast branch networks allowing greater quality control. While human-judgment methods are
associated with subjectivity, inconsistency and the common sense of the credit analyst, it is
very difficult to apply the same standards to all borrowers. However, a human credit analyst
will still take part in the granting of credit if there is evidence that the credit scoring system
used is not sufficient to guide the lending decision, and collateral will still be required if the
amount of loan is so large that it is questionable whether the customer will be able to repay in
full.
Thirdly, credit scoring improves the effectiveness and accuracy of the lending process.
Many characteristics are related to the repayment behavior of a borrower but not all of them
are important. Credit scoring techniques provide statistical tests to find significant variables
which are important in determining the default probability of potential borrowers. Moreover,
with the use of computer programs, credit scoring models can be built using larger datasets
than a credit analyst can handle and so increase the accuracy of prediction. The invention of
high-speed internet service made it possible to request loans from a distance with minimal
customer contact; borrowers now have access to many alternative loan products and delivery
channels. Also, changes in borrower characteristics can be quickly captured and strategies can
be updated accordingly in a fast changing lending environment in which new products are often
introduced.
Furthermore, credit scoring helps financial institutions to maximize profit and enabled the
development of the sub-prime lending industry. Credit scoring methods have been used to
determine the appropriate interest rate that banks should charge different borrowers. High risk
borrowers should be charged a higher interest rate compared against low risk borrowers. On
the other hand, credit limits can be set differently according to the predicted default probability
of potential borrowers. Sub-prime borrowers, who have credit impairment, missing values in
their credit histories, (some of the records in their credit histories have no measurements) and
difficulties in verifying their income, may be considered to have a higher default risk. As a
result, their loan applications may be rejected. The invention of credit scoring allows banks
to impose higher interest rate and lower credit limits on sub-prime borrowers. Banks can earn
more profit by lending money to sub-prime borrowers despite the occasional loss, meanwhile,
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sub-prime borrowers who do not have a strong credit history can still get credit to fulfill their
investment or consumption needs.
1.1.4 Other Applications of Credit Scoring
Credit scoring has been applied in areas beyond the lending environment. It techniques have
proved to be very useful for targeting customers in direct mailing and other marketing strate-
gies. In the 1950s, Sears [17] used credit scoring techniques to decide whom to send its cat-
alogues. Before sending out a mailing, the name and address of potential customers were
prescreened and matched with customers with bad credit histories. Previous bad debtors were
filtered out from the mailing group. Moreover, similar techniques as those used to build credit
scoring models have been applied to build response models, which can exclude customers who
are unlikely to respond and hence reduced the cost by improving the response rate in adver-
tising campaigns. Similar methods can also applied to predict the behaviors of employees; to
determine who is likely to be loyal and who is likely to move to a job with another company.
A target population may be segmented into several groups and models for predicting which
marketing strategy would be better to use on that particular group of customers may be built.
In addition, the preapproval processes on issuing of credit cards and the management of
credit card limits can be constructed through the use of credit scoring. According to the Cana-
dian Bankers Association [19], there were 73.9 million credit cards in circulation in Canada in
2012. The high interest rate charged on overdue payments triggered credit card companies to
issue preapproved credit cards to customers who have high credit ratings, in order to maximize
their profits. Credit card companies regularly review customer’s credit limits and amend them
according to their credit performance.
Credit scoring has been used by insurance companies to assess risk levels and loss ratios.
In the United States, the Circuit Court has found considerable actuarial evidence that credit
scores are a good predictor of the risk of loss [18]. A recent actuarial study has concluded that
credit scores are one of the most powerful predictors of risk; they are also the most accurate
predictor of loss seen in a long time [20]. There is evidence showing that insurance risk and
credit scores are strongly correlated with one another. Insurance companies believe that cus-
tomers with lower credit scores have a higher chance of making insurance claims. According
to recent findings, 90% of homeowners and auto insurers use credit scoring to determine in-
surance premiums and the amount of coverage [21]. The use of credit scoring to predict the
risk of loss by insurance companies speeds the process of insurance applications and renewal
processes.
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1.2 Research Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to study the effect of fraud towards the lending business.
Rezaee [22] defined fraud as a generic term, embracing all multifarious means which human
ingenuity can devise, which are resorted to by one individual to get advantage over another
by false suggestions, and by suppression of truth. It includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dis-
sembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated. There are different types of fraud
within the banking industry. As stated in Sullivan [23], fraud prevention has become a cen-
tral concern to banks, customers and public policy makers. Most academic research papers
focus on third-party fraud and financial statement fraud. Third-party fraud refers to identity
theft in which a person’s identity has been stolen to commit crimes. Examples of third-party
fraud relate to the use of stolen credit cards and stolen bank accounts. Hoffmann and Birnbrich
[30] studied the impact of third-party fraud on the relationship between banks and customers.
They showed that customers with better relationships with their banks are less skeptical about
anti-fraud measures and thus lower the chance of being an identity fraud victim. Financial
statement fraud refers to fraud committed to falsify financial statements, usually committed by
management and normally involving overstating income or assets. Rezaee [24] presented fraud
prevention and detection strategies in reducing financial statement fraud incidents.
The fundamental theme of this thesis is to focus on the effect of one type of first-party fraud:
“bust-out fraud” in the content of consumer lending. Experian [27] explains that bust-out fraud
usually involves a long-term planning, fraudsters deliberately borrow and repay money on-
time to maintain a good credit history. Additional lines of credit and extended credit limits
will be offered to the fraudsters, then eventually, the fraudsters will use all the available credit
and abandon the accounts. According to Kitten [25], first-party fraud ranks among the top
three fraud events that financial institutions face. In particular, Sumner [28] stated that US
card issuers estimate losses from bust-out fraud to be over $1.5 billion annually (Credit Risk
International, September 2004). In 2013, FICO analysts [26] estimated that between 10% and
15% of all banks’ unsecured bad debt is actually bust-out fraud, resulting in tens of billions
in losses every year. It is very difficult to detect this type of fraud and we believe that taking
extra precaution on verifying prospective borrowers’ characteristics can prevent this type of
fraud at the time of loan application. Currently, little effort has been spent on studying whether
attributes provided by prospective borrowers should be verified for correctness. Canada’s main
banking regulator [29], the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, has recently
suggested Canadian banks should verify borrowers’ income for mortgage loans. This thesis
will look into the effect on consumer lending, in the context of credit scoring, if some borrowers
fraudulently falsify their attributes on their loan application form. Note that our methods are
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well suited to studying bust-out fraud but are not limited to that.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This research comprises both theoretical and numerical investigations in the context of credit
scoring on the effect on eliminating fraud. This thesis is composed of six chapters including
this Introduction. The main objectives and contents of the subsequent chapters are organized
as follows.
Chapter 2 studies the methods used in credit scoring. In particular, we introduce the con-
cept of discriminant analysis, a classification method we employ throughout this thesis. This
method has been used in different research literatures to classify borrowers into two groups
of good and bad payers. We use simulated data to demonstrate the prediction accuracy of
this method. In particular, we show the application of discriminant analysis by assuming the
classification model only uses one attribute, which follows a normal distribution to distinguish
borrowers. We will further study the prediction power of this method if two attributes both
following normal distribution are used in the classification model. In addition, we provide an
overview of logistic regression analysis, an alternative method that has been widely applied in
credit scoring.
Chapter 3 demonstrates the effect of credit fraud on prediction accuracy. It is reasonable
to believe that using larger datasets will improve the predictive power of the resulting credit
scoring models. Currently, all credit scoring models are built using as much historical data as
possible. We will show that if some borrowers lie in their responses to one or more questions,
using higher dimensional data to build credit scoring models may lower the prediction power,
compared with using lower dimensional data. This chapter uses simulated data as discussed in
Appendix A to show that the improper use of data and models will lead to inaccurate prediction,
potentially contributing to big losses.
Chapter 4 further demonstrates that it is profitable for lending institutions to spend extra
effort to directly eliminate lies in the dataset. Applicants learn about the characteristics that are
used to build credit scoring models, and may have a strong motivation to alter the answers on
their application form to improve their chance of loan approval. We develop a credit scoring
model which takes into account the potential for borrowers to falsify information. The optimal
amount of effort that lenders should spend on identifying liars will be examined to balance risk
and return. In addition, we show that fraudsters will eventually educate themselves to adjust
their lies, escape from credit checks and obtain loans. The proposed issue will be studied using
simulated data as discussed in Appendix A. This chapter can help lending financial institutions
to reduce risk and maximize profit, and it also shows that it is feasible for customers to lie
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intelligently so as to evade credit checks and get loans.
In Chapter 5, we model the consumer loan approval process as a game between the lender
and the borrower. Particularly, we explore the cost for fraudsters to make a clever lie on their
attributes and the cost to verify borrowers’ characteristics towards different behaviors of lenders
and borrowers. We present the equilibrium state of the economy between the lender and the
borrower. We show that having successful fraudsters in the loan mix not only affect banks’
profitability, but also impact the utility of good borrowers who always repay their loans on time.
This research will be studied using discriminant analysis and assume credit scores of borrowers
follow a particular class of half triangular distribution. This chapter shows the importance of
enriching data before making loan decisions and can help financial institutions to reduce risk
and maximize profit.
A summary of the findings of this thesis is presented in Chapter 6. Business insights as
well as possible future work motivated by this research is also discussed.
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Chapter 2
Methods used in Credit Scoring
In this chapter, we introduce and explain in detail the statistical methods used in this thesis.
Different statistical methods have been applied in the building of credit scoring models. Ac-
cording to Lee et al. [1], the objective of credit scoring models is to assign credit applicants to
either a ‘good credit’ group that is likely to repay financial obligation or a ‘bad credit’ group
whose application will be denied because of its high probability of defaulting on the financial
obligation. Bravo et al. [2] further separate the group of ‘bad credit’ into a group who do not
pay because of cash flow problems, and another group that do not pay simply because they
are unwilling to pay. Characteristics such as the applicant’s monthly income, outstanding debt,
financial assets, how long the applicant has been in the same job, whether the applicant has de-
faulted or was ever delinquent on a previous loan, whether the applicant owns or rents a home,
and the types of bank account the applicant has are all potential factors that may be included in
the building of credit scoring models.
There are several advantages of applying statistical methods to build credit scoring mod-
els. We can use hypothesis testing to identify and incorporate characteristics which reflects
repayment behavior, while removing unimportant characteristics from the model. The use of
regression analysis shows the relative importance of the characteristics and assigns weights
accordingly. The Gini coefficient and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve are two
popular methods which show the discriminating power of the model. With the use of different
statistical techniques, a lean and accurate credit scoring model can be built efficiently.
All the credit scoring models in this thesis will be developed based on the idea of dis-
criminant analysis. Section 2.1 will state the background and examine the predictive power
of discriminant analysis. In Section 2.1.1, we assume that applicants may be divided into two
groups of good versus bad borrowers using only a single, normally distributed, characteristic.
In Section 2.1.2, we extend the assumption to use two characteristics which follow bivariate
normal distribution to determine the granting decisions. We will explore in detail the method
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used and show the accuracy of discriminant analysis. Section 2.2 gives a brief introduction on
the use of logistic regression analysis. Conclusions are drawn in Section 2.3.
2.1 Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant analysis is a well-known classification technique which has been applied to cor-
porate bankruptcies by Altman [4] since 1968. According to Thomas, Edelman and Crook
[7] and Thomas [5], the objective of discriminant analysis is to find a model that classifies all
borrowers into two subsets, AG and AB, representing the groups of good and bad payers respec-
tively. In some literature, for example Steenackers and Goovaerts [6], borrowers are classified
into three different groups, the group of good borrowers, bad borrowers and a third indetermi-
nate category. Borrowers in the indeterminate group require further information for their loan
approval and will eventually be separated into two groups of good and bad payers. The group
of good payers refers to all the borrowers who repay their loans on time, while the group of bad
payers has slightly different definitions in different literature. Avery et al. [7] define bad payers
as those delinquent for more than 60 days, while the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
[8] defines defaulters as those who have any overdue payment of 90 days or more.
In this thesis, we classify all the borrowers into the two categories of good and bad payers,
and define the group of bad payers as those who have at least one missed payment. The idea of
using discriminant analysis to build credit scoring models is to maximize the expected profit
by minimizing the expected credit loss. A model will be built using past payers with known
repayment performance, and will be used to determine the granting decisions of new borrowers.
Let Pred and Obs be the binary random variable which represents the model’s predicted result
and the observed result of historical borrower respectively. Let G represent good payers and B
represent bad payers. We are interested in finding four different probabilities:
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = G}), (2.1)
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = B}), (2.2)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = G}), (2.3)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = B}), (2.4)
to reflect the predictive power of the model.
Notice that there is an inherent bias in this approach. Only borrowers who have been
granted credit will be considered in the sample used to build models. There is no information
about the performance of the applicants whose loan request has been rejected. In other words,
18 Chapter 2. Methods used in Credit Scoring
the sample of borrowers used to build a model is representative of those accepted for credit in
the past but does not represent all the applicants who applied for credit. According to Hand
and Henley [9], this distortion of the distribution of applicants clearly has implications for
the accuracy and general applicability of any new credit scoring model that is constructed.
Methods used to handle this problem are termed as reject inference. Hand [10] suggests to
compare the characteristics of rejected applicants with borrowers whose repayment outcome
are known and conclude the outcome of the rejected applicants accordingly. Anderson et al.
[11] propose three different reject inference methods for which a weight variable will be created
and used to assign the good or bad groups to rejected applicants. In real situations, some
financial institutions will purchase data from the credit bureaus 1, for which the repayment
behavior of rejected applicants with another lending company will be shared and used as a
reference to predict their repayment performance as if credit was granted.
A vector of variables X = (X1,X2, ...,Xp), representing the application characteristics of
each past payer, will be used to construct the model. In credit-scoring terminology, the actual
value of the characteristics for a particular borrower is denoted as x = (x1, x2, . . . , xp) and are
called the attributes of the characteristics. Attributes are the answer to the application form
questions, and characteristics are the questions that were asked, i.e., X is a random variable and
x is the realization of the random variable. Suppose A is the set of all possible attributes that the
application variables X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xp) can take, i.e., all the different ways the application
form can be answered. The objective is to find a rule that separate the set A into two groups of
AG and AB, representing two groups of good and bad payers correspondingly.
We assumed that pG is the proportion of applicants who are good payers, and pB the pro-
portion of applicants who are bad payers, and these quantities are unknown to the lender. We
further assume that X has a finite number of continuous attributes. Let f (x|G)dx be the proba-
bility density that a good borrower will report an attribute between x and x + dx, and f (x|B)dx
be the probability that a bad borrower will report an attribute between x and dx. Notice that
applicants’ reported attributes may not have the same value as their true attributes, for instance,
there may be some noise in the reported data, either due to human error or to applicants pur-
posely altering their attributes to increase their chances of loan approval. In this chapter, we
will assume all applicants’ reported attributes to be the same as their true attributes. Later in
this thesis, we will further distinguish the differences between these two types of attributes and
study their effects towards the lending business. Two types of costs correspond to the two types
of errors that can be made in this classification method. The first type of error occurs if a good
payer was classified as a bad payer. In this case, the potential profit that the lender might have
1Credit bureaus are agencies that collects information from various sources and provides consumer credit
information on individual consumers for a variety of uses.
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been able to earn is lost. The second type of error occurs if a bad payer was classified as a good
payer. In this case, losses will be incurred when the borrower defaults on her loan. We assume
that the expected misclassification profit and loss incurred, denoted as Q and L respectively,
are the same for all borrowers. The purpose of this credit scoring model is to determine the
cutoff score used to make granting decisions; borrowers with credit score higher than the cutoff
score will be granted credit, otherwise declined.
Again, the intention of the lender is to maximize the expected profit by minimizing the
expected credit loss. If a borrower was classified into group AG, then there is only a loss if the
borrower is a bad payer, and the expected loss per borrower is LP(x|B)pB. On the other hand, if
a borrower was put into AB, there is only a loss if she a good payer, and the corresponding loss
per borrower is QP(x|G)pG. Therefore, we should classify a borrower into AG if LP(x|B)pB ≤
QP(x|G)pG. The solution of this inequality leads to the set:
AG = {x|LP(x|B)pB ≤ QP(x|G)pG}
=
{
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣ LpBQpG ≤ P(x|G)P(x|B)
}
=
{
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣ LpBQpG ≤ f (x|G)f (x|B)
}
, (2.5)
where the last equality follows if x is a vector of continuous characteristic variables, and f (x|G)
and f (x|B) are the probability distributions of XG and XB respectively. If we can find the
distribution of f (x|G) and f (x|B) , we can then substitute them into the above formula and find
the group of good borrowers.
2.1.1 Univariate Normal
Consider the case where there is only one continuous characteristic X, drawn from a normal
distribution. The probability density function for good and bad payers are f (x|G) and f (x|B)
respectively, where XG ∼ N(µG,σG) and XB ∼ N(µB,σB). Thus,
f (x|G) = 1√
2piσG
exp
−(x−µG)22σ2G
 and f (x|B) = 1√2piσB exp
−(x−µB)22σ2B
.
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Applying set condition (2.5), the right hand side of the inequality becomes
f (x|G)
f (x|B) =
1
σG
exp
{−(x−µG)2
2σ2G
}
1
σB
exp
{−(x−µB)2
2σ2B
} = σB
σG
exp
−12
 (x−µG)2
σ2G
− (x−µB)
2
σ2B

 set≥ LpBQpG .
From the last inequality we can deduce that
exp
−12
 (x−µG)2
σ2G
− (x−µB)
2
σ2B

 ≥ LpBσGQpGσB
=⇒ −1
2
 (x−µG)2
σ2G
− (x−µB)
2
σ2B
 ≥ log( LpBσGQpGσB
)
=⇒ (x−µG)
2
σ2G
− (x−µB)
2
σ2B
≤ −2log
(
LpBσG
QpGσB
)
. (2.6)
[Here log(x) denotes the natural logarithm.]
The model will therefore recommend the bank to grant loans to applicants with attributes
in the set AG, where
AG =
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (x−µG)2σ2G − (x−µB)
2
σ2B
≤ −2log
(
LpBσG
QpGσB
) . (2.7)
Furthermore, different values of σG and σB will generate different cutoff points. We will
consider three different scenarios based on the relationship of σG and σB. In each scenario, we
graphically show the group of good and bad payers, the cutoff points, and the regions where the
borrowers will be classified as good payers. We theoretically calculate the four probabilities
presented in Eq. (2.1) to (2.4), which represents the predictive power of the model. In addition,
we apply the simulation method described in Appendix A and provide a comparison between
the theoretical and simulated results.
Case I : σ2G = σ
2
B = σ
2
If we consider the special case where σ2G = σ
2
B = σ
2, the set condition (2.7) becomes (after
some algebra)
AG =
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣x ≥ 1(µG −µB)
µ2G −µ2B2 +σ2 log
(
LpB
QpG
)
 . (2.8)
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The set condition (2.8) implies the cutoff point is a vertical line with cutoff value
τ =
1
(µG −µB)
µ2G −µ2B2 +σ2 log
(
LpB
QpG
) , (2.9)
as depicted in Figure 2.1. Notice that when setting σG = σB = σ, the x2 term in Eq. (2.6)
canceled out, leading to only one cutoff line. Figure 2.1 shows the probability density function
(PDF) of XG ∼ N(8,1) displayed in the solid line, and the PDF of XB ∼ N(4,1) displayed as
the dashed line. Substituting the corresponding mean and standard deviation of XG and XB,
together with L = 10, Q = 2 and pG = pB = 0.5 into Eq. (2.9) gives the cutoff value τ = 6.40.
The shaded region shows the characteristic values for which customers will be classified as
good payers by set condition (2.8). The theoretical calculation of the four probabilities are:
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = G}) = pG
∫ ∞
τ
fxG(x)dx = pGP(XG ≥ τ) = pG
[
1−Φ
(
τ−µG
σG
)]
,
(2.10)
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = B}) = pB
∫ ∞
τ
fxB(x)dx = pBP(XB ≥ τ) = pB
[
1−Φ
(
τ−µB
σB
)]
,
(2.11)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = G}) = pG
∫ τ
−∞
fxG(x)dx = pGP(XG ≤ τ) = pGΦ
(
τ−µG
σG
)
, (2.12)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = B}) = pB
∫ τ
−∞
fxB(x)dx = pBP(XB ≤ τ) = pBΦ
(
τ−µB
σB
)
, (2.13)
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Setting the initial conditions
as µG = 8,µB = 4,σG = σB = 1, L = 10, Q = 2, pG = pB = 0.5 and τ = 6.40, we use Eq. (2.10)
to (2.13) to obtain the numerical results of the four probabilities that are stated in Table 2.1.
Furthermore, we applied the simulation method described in Appendix A to simulate 100
datasets each with 500 borrowers and reran the program 100 times. We classified the group
of good payers using set condition (2.8) and calculated the average mean values of the four
probabilities stated in Eq. (2.1) to (2.4). For each of the probabilities, we computed and sorted
the 100 average probabilities. Then, we found the 5th and 95th average probability, which gave
the 95% confidence interval of the mean average probability. The results are presented in Table
2.2. The first numerical value showed the average mean values (Avm), and the second row
entry showed the 95% confidence interval of each of these mean values. Finally, comparing the
values in Table 2.2 and 2.1, the probability calculated theoretically is inside the 95% confidence
interval obtained using simulation. We can conclude that both the theoretical and simulation
methods give similar results, so are consistent with each other.
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Figure 2.1: Data were simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = PB = 0.5. The
solid line showing the probability density function (PDF) of XG and dotted line showing the
PDF of XB. The vertical line shows the cutoff value τ = 6.40 obtained by putting L = 10, Q = 2,
µG = 8, µB = 4 and σG = σB = σ = 1 into Eq. (2.9). The shaded region shows all the borrowers
with characteristics X1 > τ, and will be classified as good payers by set condition (2.8).
Observed (Obs)
Bad Good
Prediction (Pred)
Bad 0.4959 0.0275
Good 0.0041 0.4725
Table 2.1: Using XG ∼ N(8,1), XB ∼ N(4,1), L = 10, Q = 2, pG = pB = 0.5 and τ = 6.40. We
obtain the theoretical results of the four probabilities presented in Eq. (2.10) to (2.13), showing
the model’s predictive power.
Case II : σ2B−σ2G > 0
Consider the case where σ2B−σ2G > 0. In this case the set condition (2.7) becomes
AG = {x|b ≥ x ≥ a}, (2.14)
where
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Observed (Obs)
Bad Good
Prediction (Pred) Bad
µˆ = 0.4919 µˆ = 0.0283
(0.4840, 0.5000) (0.0253, 0.0301)
Good
µˆ = 0.0040 µˆ = 0.4758
(0.0031, 0.0047) (0.4667, 0.4837)
Table 2.2: The model of Figure 2.1 with XG ∼ N(8,1), XB ∼ N(4,1), L = 10, Q = 2 and
pG = pB = 0.5. We apply the simulation technique described in Appendix A to obtain the
simulation results of the four probabilities presented in Eq. (2.10) to (2.13). The first numerical
value shows the average mean values, while the range in the second row entry shows the 95%
confidence interval of the average mean values.
b =
√
1
σ2B−σ2G
[
−2σ2Gσ2B log
(
LpBσG
QpGσB
)
−σ2Bµ2G +σ2Gµ2B
]
+
µGσ2B−µBσ2G
σ2B−σ2G
+ µGσ2B−µBσ2G
σ2B−σ2G
(2.15)
and
a = −
√
1
σ2B−σ2G
[
−2σ2Gσ2B log
(
LpBσG
QpGσB
)
−σ2Bµ2G +σ2Gµ2B
]
+
µGσ2B−µBσ2G
σ2B−σ2G
+ µGσ2B−µBσ2G
σ2B−σ2G
.
(2.16)
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Figure 2.2: Data were simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,2) with PG = PB = 0.5.
The solid line showed the probability distribution function (PDF) of XG, while the dotted line
showed the PDF of XB. The cutoff values were obtained by putting L = 10, Q = 2, µG = 8,
µB = 4, σG = 1 and σB = 2 into Eq. (2.15) and (2.16). Note that when σ2B > σ
2
G, there were two
cutoff points correspond to two vertical cutoff lines with values a = 7.17 and b = 11.49. The
shaded region showed all the borrowers with characteristic values between a and b and was
classified as good payers by set condition (2.14).
In order to satisfy the inequality σ2B −σ2G > 0, we changed the initial conditions to XG ∼
N(8,1), XB ∼ N(4,2), L = 10, Q = 2 and pG = pB = 0.5. After that, we substitute the initial
values into Eq. (2.16) and (2.15) to find the cutoff values a and b to be 7.17 and 11.49 re-
spectively. In the event when σG > σB, the model will classify borrowers with characteristic
values between a and b as good payers. Conversely, the model will classify borrowers with
characteristic values outside the range of a and b as bad payers. This suggest two cutoff lines
as displayed in Figure 2.2. In addition, we know that
µG + 4σG = 8 + 4×1 = 12 and µB + 4σB = 4 + 4×2 = 12. (2.17)
However, for all values of K > 4
µB + KσB > µG + KσG. (2.18)
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In particular,
µG + 5σG = 8 + 5×1 = 13 and µB + 4.5σB = 4 + 4.5×2 = 13. (2.19)
From the common properties of normal distribution, more observations that fall within 5σ of
the mean than within 4.5σ of the mean. In other words, the normal tail for bad payers contains
more observations than the tail representing good payers when x > 12. This contributes to
having two regions of bad borrowers as shown in Figure 2.2. This is a very interesting fact that
applicants with attribute value that is “too good to be true” will be classified as bad borrowers.
However, this is more of a theoretical curiosity than a practical outcome. Indeed, the proportion
of good payers with attribute value greater than 11.49 is
pGP(XG ≥ 11.49) = pG(1−Φ
(
11.49−8
1
)
) = 0.00012 (Rare). (2.20)
and the proportion of bad payers with attribute value greater than 11.49 is
pBP(XB ≥ 11.49) = pB(1−Φ
(
11.49−4
1
)
) = 1.72×10−14 ≈ 0 (Rare). (2.21)
We can conclude that there is a very low probability that applicants will have an attribute
value greater than 11.49. Again, we are interested in finding the four different probabilities to
determine the accuracy of the model. Under the given condition,
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = G}) = pG
∫ b
a
fxG(x)dx = pG
[
Φ
(
b−µG
σG
)
−Φ
(
a−µG
σG
)]
, (2.22)
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = B}) = pB
∫ b
a
fxB(x)dx = pB
[
Φ
(
b−µB
σB
)
−Φ
(
a−µB
σB
)]
, (2.23)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = G}) = pG
[∫ ∞
b
fxG(x)dx +
∫ a
−∞
fxG(x)dx
]
= pG
[
1−Φ
(
b−µG
σG
)
+Φ
(
a−µG
σG
)]
, (2.24)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = B}) = pB
[∫ a
−∞
fxB(x)dx +
∫ −∞
b
fxB(x)dx
]
= pB
[
1−Φ
(
b−µB
σB
)
+Φ
(
a−µB
σB
)]
, (2.25)
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
We substitute the initial values into Eq. (2.22) to (2.25) to compute the four probabilities,
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and present the findings in Table 2.3. Note that the P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = G}) ≈ 0.1, although
quite high, is consistent with Figure 2.2, which is the area under the solid line in the non-
shaded region. This means that many good payers are misclassified as bad under the given
condition.
Observed (Obs)
Bad Good
Prediction (Pred)
Bad 0.4719 0.1022
Good 0.0281 0.3978
Table 2.3: In order to satisfy the inequality σ2B −σ2G > 0, we substitute the initial conditions
XG ∼ N(8,1), XB ∼ N(4,2), L = 10, Q = 2 and pG = pB = 0.5 into Eq. (2.22) to (2.25) to obtain
the values of the four probabilities, showing the model’s predictive power.
Moreover, we applied the simulation method described in Appendix A to simulate 100
datasets each with 500 borrowers and reran the program 100 times. We used set condition
(2.14) to classify the group of good payers, obtained the simulated results of average mean
values of the four probabilities, calculated the 95% confidence interval and presented the results
in Table 2.4. By comparing the values in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, we can conclude that the
simulated results are consistent with the theoretical results.
Observed (Obs)
Bad Good
Prediction (Pred) Bad
µˆ = 0.4669 µˆ = 0.1041
(0.4591, 0.4754) (0.0995, 0.1094)
Good
µˆ = 0.0290 µˆ = 0.4000
(0.0267, 0.0315) (0.3880, 04095)
Table 2.4: The model of Figure 2.2 with XG ∼ N(8,1), XB ∼ N(4,2), L = 10, Q = 2 and
pG = pB = 0.5. We apply the simulation technique described in Appendix A to obtain the
simulated results of the four probabilities presented in Eq. (2.22) to (2.25). The first numerical
value shows the average mean values, while the range in the second row entry shows the 95%
confidence interval of the average mean values.
Case III : σ2B−σ2G < 0
Consider the case where σ2B−σ2G < 0. Here the set condition (2.7) becomes:
AG = {x|x ≥ b or x ≤ a}, (2.26)
where
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b =
√
1
σ2B−σ2G
[
−2σ2Gσ2B log
(
LpBσG
QpGσB
)
−σ2Bµ2G +σ2Gµ2B
]
+
µGσ2B−µBσ2G
σ2B−σ2G
+ µGσ2B−µBσ2G
σ2B−σ2G
(2.27)
and
a = −
√
1
σ2B−σ2G
[
−2σ2Gσ2B log
(
LpBσG
QpGσB
)
−σ2Bµ2G +σ2Gµ2B
]
+
µGσ2B−µBσ2G
σ2B−σ2G
+ µGσ2B−µBσ2G
σ2B−σ2G
.
(2.28)
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Figure 2.3: Data were simulated from XG ∼ N(8,2) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = PB = 0.5. The
solid line displayed the probability distribution function (PDF) of XG, while the dotted line
displayed the PDF of XB. The cutoff values were obtained by putting L = 10, Q = 2, µG = 8,
µB = 4, σG = 2 and σB = 1 into Eq. (2.27) and (2.28). Note that when σ2G > σ
2
B, there were
two cutoff points with values a = −0.97 and b = 6.31. The shaded region showed the borrowers
with characteristics that will be classified as good payers by set condition (2.26).
In order to satisfy the inequality σ2B −σ2G < 0, we changed the initial conditions to XG ∼
N(8,2), XB ∼ N(4,1), L = 10, Q = 2 and pG = pB = 0.5. Using Eq. (2.27) and (2.28), we
calculated the cutoff values a and b to be -0.97 and 6.31 respectively. In the event when
σG < σB, the model classified borrowers with characteristic values between a and b as bad
payers, while borrowers having characteristic values outside the region as good. This suggest
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two cutoff lines as shown in Figure 2.3. In addition, we know that
µG −4σG = 8−4×2 = 0 and µB−4σB = 4−4×1 = 0. (2.29)
However, for all values of K < 4
µB + KσB > µG + KσG. (2.30)
In particular,
µG −5σG = 8−5×2 = −2 and µB−6σB = 4−6×1 = −2. (2.31)
From the common properties of normal distribution, more observations fall within 6σ of the
mean than within 5σ of the mean. In other words, the normal tail represented by bad payers
contains fewer observations than the tail represented by good payers when x < −0.97. This
implies that there are two regions of good borrowers as depicted in Figure 2.3. Note that the
proportion of good and bad payers with attribute value less than -0.97 is
pBP(XB ≤ −0.97) = 0.5Φ
(−0.97−4
1
)
= 1.67×10−5 (Rare) (2.32)
and
pGP(XG ≤ −0.97) = 0.5Φ
(−0.97−8
1
)
= 1.48×10−19 ≈ 0 (Rare) (2.33)
respectively. Again, we are interested in finding the four different probabilities to determine
the accuracy of the model. Under the given condition,
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = G}) = pG
[∫ a
−∞
fxG(x)dx +
∫ ∞
b
fxG(x)dx
]
= pG
[
Φ
(
a−µG
σG
)
+ 1−Φ
(
b−µG
σG
)]
, (2.34)
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = B}) = pB
[∫ a
−∞
fxB(x)dx +
∫ ∞
b
fxB(x)dx
]
= pB
[
Φ
(
a−µB
σB
)
+ 1−Φ
(
b−µB
σB
)]
, (2.35)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = G}) = pG
∫ b
a
fxG(x)dx = pG
[
Φ
(
b−µG
σG
)
−Φ
(
a−µG
σG
)]
, (2.36)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = B}) = pB
∫ b
a
fxB(x)dx = pB
[
Φ
(
b−µB
σB
)
−Φ
(
a−µB
σB
)]
, (2.37)
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
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We graphically showed the cutoff lines, the probability distribution function of XG and
XB, and the region where the model will classify borrowers as good payers in Figure 2.3.
On the other hand, we show the model’s predictive power by inserting the initial values into
Eq. (2.34) to (2.37), and stated the results of the four probabilities in Table 2.5. Notice that
P({Pred = B} ∩ {Obs = G}) ≈ 0.1, although quite high, is consistent with Figure 2.2, which is
the area under the solid line in the non-shaded region.
Observed (Obs)
Bad Good
Prediction (Pred)
Bad 0.4947 0.0993
Good 0.0053 0.4007
Table 2.5: To satisfy the inequality σ2B −σ2G < 0, we substitute XG ∼ N(8,2), XB ∼ N(4,1),
L = 10, Q = 2 and pG = pB = 0.5 into Eq. (2.34) to (2.37) to obtain the predictive power of the
model.
Again, we applied the simulation technique introduced in Appendix A to simulate 100
datasets each with 500 borrowers. We reran the program for 100 times and used set condition
(2.26) to classify the group of good payers. We presented the simulated results and calculated
the 95% confidence intervals in Table 2.6. By comparing the values in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6,
we can conclude that the simulated results are consistent with the theoretical results.
Observed (Obs)
Bad Good
Prediction (Pred) Bad
µˆ = 0.4906 µˆ = 0.1015
(0.4829, 0.4984) (0.0968, 0.1070)
Good
µˆ = 0.0053 µˆ = 0.4026
(0.0042, 0.0062) (0.3917, 0.4121)
Table 2.6: The model of Figure 2.2 with XG ∼ N(8,2), XB ∼ N(4,1), L = 10, Q = 2 and pG =
pB = 0.5. We apply the simulation technique described in Appendix A to obtain the simulated
results of the four probabilities presented in Eq. (2.34) to (2.37). The first numerical value
shows the average mean values, while the range in the second row entry shows the standard
error interval of the average mean values.
2.1.2 Bivariate Normal
Now, consider another case where there are two continuous normally distributed character-
istics X1 and X2, where X1G ∼ N(µ1G,σ1G), X1B ∼ N(µ1B,σ1B), X2G ∼ N(µ2G,σ2G), X2B ∼
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N(µ2B,σ2B) and corr(X1,X2) = ρ. Therefore, the variance covariance matrix of the good and
bad payers are:
ΣG =
 σ21G ρσ1Gσ2G
ρσ1Gσ2G σ
2
2G
 and ΣB =  σ21B ρσ1Bσ2B
ρσ1Gσ2G σ
2
2B
 .
The corresponding density function for good payers and bad payers are
f (x|G) = 1
2pi|ΣG | 12
exp
{−1
2
(x−µG)T Σ−1G (x−µG)
}
and
f (x|B) = 1
2pi|ΣB| 12
exp
{−1
2
(x−µB)T Σ−1B (x−µB)
}
.
Applying set condition (2.5), the right hand side of the inequality becomes
f (x|G)
f (x|B) =
1
2piσ1Gσ2G
exp
{−1
2 (x−µG)T Σ−1G (x−µG)
}
1
2piσ1Bσ2B
exp
{−1
2 (x−µB)T Σ−1B (x−µB)
}
=
σ1Bσ2B
σ1Gσ2G
exp
{−1
2
(x−µG)T Σ−1G (x−µG)− (x−µB)T Σ−1B (x−µB)
}
set≥ LpB
QpG
.
From the above, we conclude the model showing the set of good payers is
AG =
{
x | xT (Σ−1G −Σ−1B )x−2x(Σ−1G µG−Σ−1B µB) ≤ µTBΣ−1B µB−µTGΣ−1G µG−2log
(
σ1Gσ2GLpB
σ1Bσ2BQpG
)}
.
(2.38)
From the above set inequality, we know that different choices of variance covariance matrix
will generate different types of cutoff lines. When the model contains only one characteristic
X, drawn from a normal distribution, all the cutoff lines are straight lines. However, when the
model contains two characteristics X1 and X2, from a bivariate normal, the cutoff lines can be
a straight or a curved line depending on the values of the variance covariance matrix of the
good and bad payers. We further illustrate the bivariate normal case by assuming good and bad
borrowers share the common variance covariance matrix Σ. Then Eq. (2.38) becomes
AG =
x|x Σ−1(µG −µB)T ≥ µGΣ−1µTG −µGΣ−1µTB2 + log
(
LpB
QpG
) . (2.39)
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We further assume that
Σ−1 =
 σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
−1 = 1
σ21σ
2
2−σ212
 σ22 −σ12−σ12 σ21
 ,
where σ12 = ρσ1σ2 and we know that x = (x1, x2). Then Eq. (2.39) becomes
αx1 +βx2 ≥ γ,
where
α =
σ22(µ1G −µ1B)−σ12(µ2G −µ2B)
σ21σ
2
2−σ212
,
β =
σ21(µ2G −µ2B)−σ12(µ1G −µ1B)
σ21σ
2
2−σ212
,
and
γ =
f (µ1G,µ2G,σ1,σ2,σ12)− f (µ1B,µ2B,σ1,σ2,σ12)
2(σ21σ
2
2−σ212)
+ log
(
LpB
QpG
)
,
where
f (µ1G,µ2G,σ1,σ2,σ12) = (σ22µ1G −σ12µ2G)µ1G + (σ21µ2G −σ12µ1G)µ2G,
and
f (µ1B,µ2B,σ1,σ2,σ12) = (σ22µ1B−σ12µ2B)µ1B + (σ21µ2B−σ12µ1B)µ2B. (2.40)
In order to have a clear understanding of the way the cutoff line classifies the set of good
borrowers, we conduct a simulation study. We generate random bivariate normal numbers, X1
and X2, using the function mvrnorm() in R [3] package MASS [12]. We set µ1G = µ2G = 8,
µ1B = µ2B = 4, σ1G =σ2G =σ1B =σ2B = 1 and assume the correlation between X1 and X2 to be
zero. Four different combinations of X1 and X2 compose of (X1B,X2B), (X1B,X2G), (X1G,X2B)
and (X1G,X2G) are generated. Figure 2.4 shows the contour plots of the probability density
functions of each pair of X1 and X2. The solid contour on the top right corner represents
borrowers with both characteristics taking the “good” values X1G and X2G, the dotted contours
on the top left corner represents borrowers with X1B and X2G, the solid contours on the lower
left corner represents borrowers with both characteristics taking the “bad” values X1B and X2B,
and the dotted contours on the right bottom corner represents borrowers having X1G and X2B.
Using set condition (2.40), we know that the cutoff line for the bivariate case is αx1 +βx2 = γ,
where α,β and γ are as stated in the condition. Substituting the initial values stated above into
α,β and γ, together with L = 10 and Q = 2, the cutoff line becomes
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Figure 2.4: Data was simulated using X1G ∼ N(8,1),X1B ∼ N(4,1),X2G ∼ N(8,1),X2B ∼
N(4,1), pB = pG = 0.5,L = 10, Q = 2 and ρ = 0. The solid contour on the top right corner
of the plot represents borrowers with characteristics X1G and X2G, while the solid contour on
the lower left corner represents borrowers with characteristics X1B and X2B. The dotted con-
tour on the top left corner represents borrowers with characteristics X1B and X2G, and the dotted
contour on the lower right corner represents borrowers with characteristics X1G and X2B. The
diagonal line is the cutoff line plotted using Eq. 2.41 and the shaded region shows borrowers
having characteristics that will be classified as good payers by the set condition 2.39.
x2 = 12 +
1
4
log(
L
Q
)− x1, (2.41)
which is linear and is shown as the diagonal line in Figure 2.4. The shaded region showed
the borrowers with characteristics X1 and X2 who will be classified as good payers. In ad-
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dition, Figure 2.4 shows the discriminating power of set condition (2.40). The cutoff line
in Eq. (2.41) gives accurate classification to borrowers having characteristics (X1B,X2B) and
(X1G,X2G), while borrowers having characteristics (X1B,X2G) and (X1G,X2B) will be classified
as good payers depending on their actual X1G or X2G values. For example, X1 may represent
the income of the borrower, while X2 represents the age of the credit history of the borrower.
Higher income and longer credit history favors the borrowing of money. The pair of character-
istics (X1B,X2G) represents borrowers with low income but long credit history, while the pair
of characteristics (X1G,X2B) represents borrowers with high income but short credit history.
Whether the borrower will be classified as a good payer depends on how high their income is
if they have characteristics (X1G,X2B), and how long they have their credit history if they have
characteristics (X1B,X2G).
Again, we are interested in evaluating the four different probabilities in Eq. (2.1) to (2.4) to
determine the accuracy of the model. Under the given condition, the four probabilities become:
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = G}) = pG
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
fX1G,X2G(x1 , x2)dx1 dx2, (2.42)
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = B}) = pB
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
fX1B,X2B(x1 , x2)dx1 dx2, (2.43)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = G}) = pG
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ γ−βx2
α
−∞
fX1G,X2G(x1 , x2)dx1 dx2, (2.44)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = B}) = pB
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ γ−βx2
α
−∞
fX1B,X2B(x1 , x2)dx1 dx2, (2.45)
where fX1,X2(x1 , x2) is the probability distribution function of bivariate normal with correlation
ρ. In order to evaluate Eq. (2.42) to (2.45), notice that∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2 (2.46)
=
∫ −E
−∞
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2 +
∫ R
−E
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2 +
∫ ∞
R
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2,
where R > 0 and E > 0. We want to choose the smallest R and E consistent with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ −E
−∞
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ <<
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ R
−E
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
and also ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ ∞
R
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ <<
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ R
−E
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
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then we can state that∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
DI
≈
∫ R
−E
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
AD
. (2.47)
Note that ∫ ∞
R
∫ ∞
−∞
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
(BB1)
>
∫ ∞
R
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2
and ∫ −E
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
(BB3)
>
∫ −E
−∞
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2.
We want to find R and E such that (BB1), (BB3) and also the bounded error in evaluating (AD)
are small. Then we can apply the corresponding R and E using Eq. (2.47) to approximate the
double integral (DI).
To approximate the value of P({Pred = G} ∩ {Obs = G}), we have to first evaluate (BB1)
and (BB3). Under the condition that both the predicted and observed values are good, (BB1)
becomes
C
∫ ∞
R
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
 −12(1−ρ2)
 (x1−µ1G)2
σ21G
+
(x2−µ2G)2
σ22G
− 2ρ(x1−µ1G)(x2−µ2G)
σ1Gσ2G

 dx1 dx2,
where C =
1
2piσ1Gσ2G
√
1−ρ2
.
(2.48)
By completing the square in the inner integral and canceling the common terms, Eq. (2.48)
equals
1√
2piσ2G
∫ ∞
R
exp
−(x2−µ2G)22σ22G
 dx2 =
[
1−Φ
(
R−µ2G
σ2G
)]
.
Similarly, (BB3) becomes
Φ
(−E−µ2G
σ2G
)
. (2.49)
Our purpose is to find R and E such that the total bounded error of the four probabilities
of interest are all small. Denote the error bound of P({Pred = G} ∩ {Obs = G}),P({Pred =
G} ∩ {Obs = B}),P({Pred = B} ∩ {Obs = G}) and P({Pred = B} ∩ {Obs = B}) as EBgg, EBgb,
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EBbg and EBbb respectively. Using the same technique as above we can conclude that
EBgg = pG
{[
1−Φ
(
R−µ2G
σ2G
)]
+Φ
(−E−µ2G
σ2G
)
+ Bounded Error in (AD)
}
, (2.50)
EBgb = pB
{[
1−Φ
(
R−µ2B
σ2B
)]
+Φ
(−E−µ2B
σ2B
)
+ Bounded Error in (AD)
}
,
EBbg = pG
{[
1−Φ
(
R−µ2G
σ2G
)]
+Φ
(−E−µ2G
σ2G
)
+ Bounded Error in (AD)
}
,
EBbb = pB
{[
1−Φ
(
R−µ2B
σ2B
)]
+Φ
(−E−µ2B
σ2B
)
+ Bounded Error in (AD)
}
.
Therefore,
Total Bounded Error(R,E) = EBgg + EBgb + EBbg + EBbb. (2.51)
In order to obtain the bounded error in (AD) we use the R package cubature [13], which
evaluates multidimensional integration using adaptive methods over hypercubes. For details
on using adaptive algorithms to solve multiple integrals, one can refer to Berntsen et al. [14].
There is only one function in the package cubature, called adaptIntegrate(), which returns
the value of the integral, the estimated relative error and the number of times the function
was evaluated. We used the function and equated the bounded error in (AD) as the estimated
relative error returned by the function. We put in different values of R and E to calculate the
corresponding total bounded error, then we chose the R and E which gave the smallest total
bounded error. In addition, we used the same R function and restricted the maximum number
of evaluations to 100 to approximate (DI) using (AD). If both the predicted and observed values
are good, then by completing the squares and canceling the common terms,
AD︷                              ︸︸                              ︷∫ R
−E
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
f (x1 , x2)dx1 dx2
=
pG
2piσ1Gσ2G
√
1−ρ2
∫ R
−E
∫ ∞
γ−βx2
α
exp
 −12(1−ρ2)
 (x1−µ1G)2
σ21G
+
(x2−µ2G)2
σ22G
− 2ρ(x1−µ1G)(x2−µ2G)
σ1Gσ2G

 dx1 dx2
=
pG√
2piσ2G
∫ R
−E
exp
−(x2−µ2G)22σ22G

1−Φ

γ−βx2
α −µ1G
σ1G
− ρ(x2−µ2G)σ2G√
1−ρ2

 dx2.
Therefore, we can conclude that
P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = G}) ≈ pG√
2piσ2G
∫ R
−E
exp
−(x2−µ2G)22σ22G

1−Φ

γ−βx2
α −µ1G
σ1G
− ρ(x2−µ2G)σ2G√
1−ρ2

 dx2,
(2.52)
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P({Pred = G}∩ {Obs = B}) ≈ pB√
2piσ2B
∫ R
−E
exp
−(x2−µ2B)22σ22B

1−Φ

γ−βx2
α −µ1B
σ1B
− ρ(x2−µ2B)σ2B√
1−ρ2

 dx2,
(2.53)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = G}) ≈ pG√
2piσ2G
∫ R
−E
exp
−(x2−µ2G)22σ22G
Φ

γ−βx2
α −µ1G
σ1G
− ρ(x2−µ2G)σ2G√
1−ρ2
 dx2,
(2.54)
P({Pred = B}∩ {Obs = B}) ≈ pB√
2piσ2B
∫ R
−E
exp
−(x2−µ2B)22σ22B
Φ

γ−βx2
α −µ1B
σ1B
− ρ(x2−µ2B)σ2B√
1−ρ2
 dx2.
(2.55)
With initial conditions X1G ∼ N(8,1),X1B ∼ N(4,1),X2G ∼ N(8,1),X2B ∼ N(4,1), pB = pG =
0.5,L = 10 and Q = 2, we again used the function adaptIntegrate() and found that the smallest
R and E values which give the smallest bounded error to be 15.2 and 9.7 respectively. By
setting R = 15.2 and E = 9.7 in Eq. (2.52) to (2.55) and applying adaptIntegrate() with different
ρ values which varies from −0.9 to 0.9 with increment 0.1, we obtained the theoretical results
stated in Table 2.7. The row “sum” in Table 2.7 was evaluated using PBB + PBG + PGB + PGG
and was equal to 1, satisfy the condition that the four probabilities had to sum to 1. “ErrorBD”
was calculated using Eq. (2.51) and is approximately 0 in all the entries, consistent with our
theory that the total bounded error has to be close to 0. Furthermore, we used the same initial
conditions, simulated both X1 and X2 using the method described in Appendix A and applying
the set condition in Eq. (2.39) to find the set of good payers. We simulated 100 datasets each
with 1000 borrowers and reran the program for 100 times to obtain the average mean values of
the four probabilities. The simulated results of the average mean values of the four probabilities
are provided in Table 2.8. Table 2.9 shows the standard deviation of the mean values of PBB,
PBG, PGB and PGG. In order to obtain the confidence interval estimate of the mean values of
the four probabilities for different values of ρ, we sorted the 100 mean probabilities. Then,
we found the 5th and 95th mean probability, which gave the 95% confidence interval of the
mean probabilities. Table 2.10 shows the lower standard error bars of the mean values of PBB,
PBG, PGB and PGG, while Table 2.11 shows the upper standard error bars of the mean values.
For each ρ, the theorectical values of the four probabilities as stated in Table 2.7 are within
the standard error bars, which provide evidence that simulation and theoretical approach are
mutually consistent.
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ρ X1 Only 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
PBB 0.4959 0.4964 0.4968 0.4972 0.4976 0.4980 0.4984 0.4987 0.4990 0.4993
PBG 0.0275 0.0242 0.0211 0.0180 0.0152 0.0125 0.0100 0.0078 0.0058 0.0041
PGB 0.0041 0.0036 0.0032 0.0028 0.0024 0.0020 0.0016 0.0013 0.0010 0.0007
PGG 0.4725 0.4758 0.4789 0.4820 0.4848 0.4875 0.4900 0.4922 0.4942 0.4959
Sum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Error BD 0.0279 0.0192 0.0144 0.0136 0.0135 0.0085 0.0060 0.0049 0.0044
PBG + PGB 0.0316 0.0279 0.0243 0.0208 0.0175 0.0144 0.0116 0.0090 0.0067 0.0048
ρ 0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9
PBB 0.4973 0.4997 0.4998 0.4999 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
PBG 0.0027 0.0017 0.0009 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PGB 0.0005 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PGG 0.4995 0.4983 0.4991 0.4996 0.4998 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
Sum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Error BD 0.0042 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041
PBG + PGB 0.0032 0.0020 0.0011 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2.7: With initial conditions X1G ∼ N(8,1),X1B ∼ N(4,1),X2G ∼ N(8,1),X2B ∼
N(4,1), pB = pG = 0.5,L = 10,Q = 2,R = 15.2,E = 9.7, and varies ρ from -0.9 to 0.9 with
increment 0.1. We obtain the four probabilities stated in Eq. (2.52) to (2.55). Note that “Er-
rorBD” is calculated using Eq. (2.51) and is approximately equals to 0 in different values of ρ,
consistent with our theory that we want the total bounded error to be very close to 0. “Sum”
represents PBB + PBG + PGB + PGG which equals to 1, satisfies the sum of the four probabilities
has to be 1. “PGB + PBG” represents the misclassification rate of the model.
2.2 Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is another most frequently used statistical modeling method in the context
of credit scoring. One of the earliest use of logistic regression on credit scoring dates back to
1980, where Wiginton [15] showed that logistic regression yields higher accuracy in predicting
consumer credit behavior than discriminant analysis, however, neither method was sufficiently
good to be cost effective for the dataset that he employed. Bensic et al. [16] compared the
classification power of logistic regression, neural networks and CART decision tree on small
business loans using a relatively small dataset, they revealed that logistic regression showed
higher discriminatory power than decision tree, but not as good as neural networks. Efron [18]
compared the efficiency of logistic regression with discriminant analysis and concluded that
logistic regression is shown to be between one half or two thirds as effective as discriminant
analysis. In addition, Press and Wilson [19] also compared the use of logistic regression with
discriminant analysis, they stated that when the data are normally distributed with identical
covariance matrices, the prediction accuracy of discriminant analysis is higher than that of
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ρ X1 Only 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
µPBB 0.4960 0.4965 0.4969 0.4973 0.4977 0.4982 0.4985 0.4989 0.4992 0.4994
µPBG 0.0275 0.0241 0.0210 0.0180 0.0152 0.0125 0.0100 0.0078 0.0058 0.0041
µPGB 0.0041 0.0036 0.0032 0.0028 0.0024 0.0019 0.0016 0.0012 0.0009 0.0007
µPGG 0.4724 0.4758 0.4789 0.4819 0.4847 0.4874 0.4899 0.4921 0.4941 0.4958
Sum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
µPBG+PGB 0.0315 0.0278 0.0242 0.0208 0.0175 0.0144 0.0115 0.0090 0.0067 0.0048
ρ 0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9
µPBB 0.4996 0.4998 0.4999 0.5000 0.5001 0.5001 0.5001 0.5001 0.5001 0.5001
µPBG 0.0028 0.0016 0.0009 0.0004 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0
µPGB 0.0005 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0 0
µPGG 0.4971 0.4983 0.4990 0.4995 0.4998 0.4999 0.4999 0.4999 0.4999 0.4999
Sum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
µPBG+PGB 0.0032 0.0019 0.0011 0.0005 0.0002 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2.8: Applying the simulation technique in Appendix A and with initial conditions X1G ∼
N(8,1),X1B ∼ N(4,1),X2G ∼ N(8,1),X2B ∼ N(4,1), pB = pG = 0.5,L = 10 and Q = 2. We vary
ρ from -0.9 to 0.9 with increment 0.1 and apply the set condition (2.39) to classify the group
of good payers. We simulate 100 datasets each with 1000 borrowers and rerun the program
100 times to obtain the average mean values of PBB,PBG,PGB and PGG. “Sum” represents
PBB + PBG + PGB + PGG which equals to 1, satisfies the theory that the four probabilities have
to sum up to 1. “PGB + PBG” represents the misclassification rate of the model and is quite low
for all values of ρ.
ρ X1 Only 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
σµPBB 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
σµPBG 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
σµPGB 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
σµPGG 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0016 0.0015 0.0016 0.0015 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
ρ 0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9
σµPBB 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
σµPBG 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
σµPGB 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
σµPGG 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
Table 2.9: This table shows the standard deviation of the mean values of Table 2.8. Applying
the same initial conditions X1G ∼ N(8,1), X1B ∼ N(4,1), X2G ∼ N(8,1), X2B ∼ N(4,1), pB =
pG = 0.5, L = 10, Q = 2 and ρ varies from -0.9 to 0.9 with increment 0.1. We simulate 100
datasets each with 1000 borrowers and rerun the program for 100 times to obtain the standard
deviation of the mean values of PBB,PBG,PGB and PGG.
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ρ X1 only 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
5thµPBB 0.4933 0.4938 0.4943 0.4946 0.4953 0.4955 0.4958 0.4963 0.4964 0.4968
5thµPBG 0.0265 0.0233 0.0201 0.0174 0.0146 0.0119 0.0094 0.0072 0.0054 0.0037
5thµPGB 0.0038 0.0033 0.0030 0.0025 0.0021 0.0017 0.0013 0.0011 0.0008 0.0006
5thµPGG 0.4695 0.4731 0.4762 0.4792 0.4821 0.4849 0.4873 0.4894 0.4913 0.4930
ρ 0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9
5thµPBB 0.4970 0.4971 0.4973 0.4974 0.4974 0.4974 0.4974 0.4974 0.4974 0.4974
5thµPBG 0.0025 0.0014 0.0007 0.0003 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0
5thµPGB 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5thµPGG 0.4945 0.4955 0.4964 0.4968 0.4971 0.4972 0.4973 0.4973 0.4973 0.4973
Table 2.10: Applying the simulation technique in Appendix A and with initial conditions X1G ∼
N(8,1),X1B ∼ N(4,1),X2G ∼ N(8,1),X2B ∼ N(4,1), pB = pG = 0.5,L = 10 and Q = 2. We vary
ρ from -0.9 to 0.9 with increment 0.1 and apply the set condition (2.39) to classify the group of
good payers. We simulate 100 datasets each with 1000 borrowers and rerun the program 100
times. We sorted the 100 mean values of PBB, PBG, PGB and PGG. This table shows the 5th
mean value, which is the lower endpoint of the 95% confidence interval.
ρ X1 only 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
95thµPBB 0.4986 0.4992 0.4996 0.4998 0.5004 0.5008 0.5011 0.5015 0.5019 0.5020
95thµPBG 0.0283 0.0249 0.0217 0.0186 0.0159 0.0131 0.0105 0.0082 0.0062 0.0045
95thµPGB 0.0044 0.0040 0.0035 0.0030 0.0026 0.0022 0.0018 0.0014 0.0011 0.0008
95thµPGG 0.4749 0.4784 0.4814 0.4844 0.4871 0.4900 0.4924 0.4946 0.4966 0.4982
ρ 0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9
95thµPBB 0.5021 0.5023 0.5025 0.5026 0.5026 0.5027 0.5027 0.5027 0.5027 0.5027
95thµPBG 0.0031 0.0019 0.0010 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0 0 0 0
95thµPGB 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0
95thµPGG 0.4997 0.5007 0.5014 0.5020 0.5021 0.5023 0.5023 0.5023 0.5023 0.5023
Table 2.11: Applying the simulation technique in Appendix A and with initial conditions X1G ∼
N(8,1),X1B ∼ N(4,1),X2G ∼ N(8,1),X2B ∼ N(4,1), pB = pG = 0.5,L = 10 and Q = 2. We vary
ρ from -0.9 to 0.9 with increment 0.1 and apply the set condition (2.39) to classify the group of
good payers. We simulate 100 datasets each with 1000 borrowers and rerun the program 100
times. We sorted the 100 mean values of PBB, PBG, PGB and PGG. This table shows the 95th
mean value, which is the upper endpoint of the 95% confidence interval.
logistic regression. Different researchers have their own preferences on the modeling method
used to study their research. We choose discriminant analysis as our modeling method in
this thesis, but we would like to provide an overview of logistic regression, an alternative
method that can be use in most classification problems. We will discuss about our preference
on discriminant analysis over logistic regression at the end of this section.
Logistic regression is a special type of generalized linear model which allows the use of a
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Figure 2.5: An example of logistic function.
binary dependent variable. The predicted values of a logistic regression model are probabilities
that predicts the probability of a certain outcome, and are therefore restricted to be contained
in [0,1]. Logistic regression measures the relationship between a binary dependent variable
and one or more independent variables by estimating probabilities using a logistic function as
presented as the S-shape curve in Figure 2.5. In our case, the dependent variable Y equals 1 for
bad payers and equals 0 for good payers. The curve as presented in Figure 2.5 can be defined
by the equation
p(x) =
exp(βx)
1 + exp(βx)
,
where p(x) is the proportion of borrowers that are bad payers. The probabilities that Y = 1 and
Y = 0 can be expressed as in Eqs. (2.56) and (2.57):
P(Y = 1|X) = p(x) = exp(βx)
1 + exp(βx)
(2.56)
P(Y = 0|X) = 1− p(x) = 1
1 + exp(βx)
. (2.57)
Here exp(·) denotes the exponential function, β represents a vector of parameters and x repre-
sents the attributes of each borrower. Rearranging Eq. (2.56) gives:
p(x)
1− p(x) = exp(βx)
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Taking the natural logarithm on both sides, it becomes
G(x) = ln
(
p(x)
1− p(x)
)
= βx. (2.58)
This transformation, G(x) is called the logit transformation. Notice that G(x) has many of
the desirable properties of a linear regression model. It is linear in its parameters, and G(x)
can have values ranging from −∞ to ∞, depending on the values of x. Notice that logistic
regression is trying to fit ln
( p(x)
1−p(x)
)
by a linear combination of the attributes. Just as when using
discriminant analysis, the logistic regression model will be developed using historical data with
known repayment performance. In most ordinary regression, least-squares approach will be
applied to calculate the coefficients β, however, for logistic regression, there is no mathematical
solution that will produce explicit expressions for least square estimates of the parameters. The
approach that will apply to estimate the parameters is called maximum likelihood. A method
that yields values for the unknown parameters that maximize the probability of obtaining the
observed set of data. A likelihood function which express the probability of the observed data
as a function of the unknown parameters will be constructed, then the maximum likelihood
estimators of these parameters will be chosen so as to maximize the likelihood function. Again,
p(x) gives the conditional probability P(Y = 1|X) and 1− p(x) gives the conditional probability
P(Y = 0|X). For an observation (yi,xi) where yi = 1, the contribution to the likelihood function
is p(x) and where yi = 0, the contribution to the likelihood function is 1− p(x). Therefore, for
the observation (yi,xi), we know that
P(Y = yi) = p(xi)yi(1− p(xi))1−yi
With the assumption that all the observations are independent, the likelihood function can be
expressed as
l(β) =
n∏
i=1
p(xi)yi(1− p(xi))1−yi
The log likelihood function can be defined as:
L(β) = ln(l(β)) =
n∑
i=1
[yi ln(p(xi)) + (1− yi) ln(1− p(xi))] (2.59)
Notice that the above log likelihood function is nonlinear with the parameters β, therefore
numerical methods must be use to obtain their solutions. We will not go into the details on
estimating the parameters for logistic regression models. However, we suggest the use of the
statistical software R, to generate logistic regression models by using the function glm() and
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set family equals to binomial. For further information on using R to develop logistic regression
models, one can refer to Hothorn and Everitt [17].
Note that logistic regression is more of a data-driven approach, for which a given dataset
will be fitted to the logistic function as presented in Figure 2.5. Then a model will be developed
regardless of the distribution of the underlying data. The application of maximum likelihood to
estimate the parameters is not direct, instead, numerical methods must be applied to solve for
a solution for the parameters. In this thesis, we model the interaction between the banks and
borrowers, particularly examining the effect of bad borrowers’ added lies onto their reported
attributes. We study our research by assuming the distribution of the characteristics of borrow-
ers are known. We then imagine the effect of bad borrowers who add lies and the resulting
effect by the banks to eliminate these lies by altering the distribution of the characteristics.
With full knowledge about the distribution of the data and the parameters used in the model,
we choose discriminant analysis, a model-driven approach, as the modeling method that will
be used throughout this thesis. Discriminant analysis provides a clear picture on directly clas-
sifying borrowers into two groups of good or bad payers. We can fully understand the change
of data and model when lies are included. Therefore, we can focus on analyzing the effect of
borrowers lies towards the profitability of banks.
2.3 Conclusions
Many different statistical techniques are applied in the context of credit scoring. This chapter
specifically detailed the use of discriminant analysis, a method that will be applied through-
out succeeding chapters of this thesis. We analyzed the discriminatory power of discriminant
analysis by assuming the characteristics of borrowers follows univariate and bivariate normal
distribution. Discriminant analysis can be extended to higher dimensional data. Indeed, as
long as the probability density functions of the characteristics of good and bad payers are
known, discriminant analysis can be applied whatever the dimension of the attributes set. Later
in Chapter 5 we apply discriminant analysis ,by assuming the underlying distribution follows
right triangular distribution, to classify good and bad borrowers. In addition, we provided an
overview of logistic regression analysis, another well-known method used in the application of
credit scoring. The development of more advanced and accurate statistical models to classify
borrowers present challenging opportunities for future statisticians.
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Chapter 3
More Attributes May Lead to More
Inaccurate Credit Scoring
3.1 Introduction
Existing credit scoring models are built using as much historical data as possible from past
borrowers with known repayment performance. Analysts believe that using more attributes to
build credit scoring models will always increase model accuracy. However, Oates and Jensen
[1] show that increasing the amount of data used to build models may result in a more complex
model with no significant increase in accuracy. We will show that contrary to the model, if some
borrowers respond untruthfully to some questions, using higher dimensional data may even
reduce the model’s predictive power compared against using a dataset with lower dimensions.
Using more data to build the model will increase the associated accumulated error and results in
an overestimated model with low accuracy. The proposed issue will be studied using simulated
data and discriminant analysis based on the credit scoring context. In fact, knowing the optimal
amount of data that is required to produce accurate predictions, the questionnaire used to collect
information from borrowers can be shortened, which reduces the time cost associated with
collecting, checking and processing the data. This research can enhance the efficiency of the
granting decisions and help the lending financial institutions to maximize profit in their loan
activities.
The succeeding sections are organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the method and
model used for this problem. In Section 3.3, the data used to analyze the problem was simu-
lated. In Section 3.4, we applied classification techniques to Section 3.3’s data to support the
results and provide an explanation on how to visualize the results. Conclusions are drawn in
Section 3.5.
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3.2 Method and Model
This chapter uses discriminant analysis as presented in Section 2.1 of this thesis. Three dif-
ferent models have been considered. The first model considers only one continuous normally
distributed characteristic X. We presented the model as equation (2.7) of the previous chapter,
showing that the set of good payers must have characteristics x satisfying the inequality below.
Model 1
AG =
x | (x−µG)2σ2G − (x−µB)
2
σ2B
≤ −2log
(
LpBσG
QpGσB
) .
The second model considers two continuous normally distributed characteristics X1 and X2.
We built our second model based on equation (2.14). In order to simplify our calculations, we
set ρ = 0. The corresponding density function for good and bad payers are:
f (x1G, x2G) =
1
2piσ1Gσ2G
exp
−(x1−µ1G)22σ21G
exp
−(x1−µ2G)22σ22G

and
f (x1B, x2B) =
1
2piσ1Bσ2B
exp
−(x1−µ1B)22σ21B
exp
−(x1−µ2B)22σ22B
.
Applying set condition (2.5), the right hand side of the inequality becomes
f (x|G)
f (x|B) =
1
2piσ1Gσ2G
exp
{−(x1−µ1G)2
2σ21G
}
exp
{−(x1−µ2G)2
2σ22G
}
1
2piσ1Bσ2B
exp
{−(x1−µ1B)2
2σ21B
}
exp
{−(x1−µ2B)2
2σ22B
}
≥ LpB
QpG
.
From the above, we conclude our second model showing the set of good payers must have
characteristics x1 and x2 satisfying the inequality below.
Model 2
AG =
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
2piσ1Gσ2G
exp
{−(x1−µ1G)2
2σ21G
}
exp
{−(x1−µ2G)2
2σ22G
}
1
2piσ1Bσ2B
exp
{−(x1−µ1B)2
2σ21B
}
exp
{−(x1−µ2B)2
2σ22B
} set≥ LpB
QpG
 . (3.1)
3.3 Simulation of Data
We use simulated data to illustrate our proposed issue, that of prospective borrowers lying
about one or more of their attributes. We apply the technique presented in Appendix A, with
certain modifications to simulate our dataset. In particular, we want to simplify our calculations
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and results by assuming X1 and X2 are independent, hence, ρ= 0. The procedure for simulating
the dataset is described below:
Step 1. X1 = µ1 +σ1Z1, where Z1 ∼ N(0,1)
Step 2. X2 = µ2 +σ2Z2, where Z2 ∼ N(0,1) and Z1 ⊥ Z2
We make the (strong) assumption that only bad payers will lie about their information
and can only alter their characteristics through X2B, with the objective of making themselves
indistinguishable from the good payers. To model this we added noise to X2B only. We believe
that not all bad payers choose to lie about their characteristics; and modeled this by introducing
another Bernoulli random variable Noi, which takes the value one when a particular bad payer
lies, otherwise taking the value zero. We equate the probability that a bad payer will lie to pN
(or Noi takes the value 1). We further assume that all bad payers who intend to lie do so by
adding a fixed constant amount A to their attribute. For example, a liar might say they earned
10K more than they actually did. As a result,
X2Bnew = X2B + Noi×A (3.2)
µ1G σ1G µ1B σ1B µ2G σ2G µ2B σ2B L Q p pN A
8 1 4 1 8 1 6 1 5 2 0.5 0.9 20.9
Table 3.1: Parameters used in the case study described in Section 3.4
3.4 Results and Analysis
Notice that model 1 and model 2 can be applied to do prediction if f (X|G) and f (X|B) are
normally distributed. However, our data is not in fact normal, rather a mixture of normals. So
we see if our data nonetheless appear normal enough that a busy credit quant might model it
as normal. A proportion of lies is added to X2B as described in Section 3.3. To ensure the
plausibility of an incorrect normal assumption for X2Bnew, we generated a histogram and a Q-Q
plot for X2Bnew, and performed Anderson-Darling (Stephens, 1986 [2]; Thode, 2002, Sec. 5.1.4
[3]) and Cramer-von Mises (Stephens, 1986 [2]; Thode, 2002, Sec. 5.1.3 [3]) normality tests to
show that the possibility that X2Bnew still follows a normal distribution cannot be rejected. The
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Q-Q plot in Figure 3.1 and the two test results in Table 3.2 ensured that X2Bnew is sufficiently
close to a normal distribution to fool many observers.
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Figure 3.1: Data was simulated using the method described in Section 3.3 and the parameters
in Table 3.1. Constant amount of lies was added to X2B according to equation (3.2) to generate
X2Bnew. The plot of histogram and Q-Q plot provide evidence that it is possible to misinterpret
X2Bnew as normally distributed.
Using the parameters of Table 3.1, we simulated 100 datasets each with 500 borrowers and
reran the program 100 times. Therefore, the total number of simulations is 10,000. We use
model 1 and model 2 to find the accuracy of the prediction and the profit earned. Note that,
in an attempt to keep historical computation representative, classes may have relatively few
members. Let GG be the number of predicted good payers that are truly good payers, BB be
the number of predicted bad payers that are truly bad payers, GB be the number of predicted
good payers that are truly bad payers and BG be the number of predicted bad payers that are
truly good payers. The average values of the output from the program are stated in Table
3.3. The accuracy of classification was defined as (GG+BB)Total number of borrowers . The profit earned was
defined as Q×GG − L×GB, where Q is the expected profit that the lender will earn if the
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Anderson-Darling Test Cramer-von Mises Test
P-value = 0.101 P-value = 0.134
Table 3.2: Both normality tests provide p-value bigger than 0.05. There is not enough evidence
to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that X2Bnew is normally distributed.
borrower is a good payer, and L is the expected loss that the lender will incur if the borrower is
a bad payer. We computed the average accuracy and profit of the 100 datasets and also found
the standard error of those values. From the results shown in Table 3.3, there is evidence that
using only one characteristic to do prediction is on average 1.74% better and earns $57 more
than using two characteristics.
In fact X2Bnew is not normally distributed; we can find the true distribution of X2Bnew and
insert that into discriminant analysis to obtain the correct results. We know that ρ = 0, X1B and
X2Bnew are independent and Noi is independent of X1B , therefore
f (x|G)
f (x|B) =
f (x1G, x2G)
f (x1B, x2B)
=
f (x1G) f (x2G)
f (x1B) f (x2B)
.
Through the way we generated X2Bnew, we can deduce that
f (x2Bnew) = f (x2Bnew|Noi = 0)P(Noi = 0) + f (x2Bnew|Noi = 1)P(Noi = 1)
= (1− pN) 1√
2piσ22B
exp
−(x2−µ2B)22σ22B
+ pN 1√
2piσ22B
exp
−(x2−µ2Bnew)22σ22B
 ,
where µ2Bnew equals µ2B + A.
Applying inequality (2.5), we found our third model presenting the correct set condition
and giving the set of good payers as below.
Model 3
AG =
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
σ1Gσ2G
exp
{−(x1−µ1G)2
2σ21G
}
exp
{−(x2−µ2G)2
2σ22G
}
1
σ1Bσ2B
exp
{−(x1−µ1B)2
2σ21B
}[
(1− pN)exp
{−(x2−µ2B)2
2σ22B
}
+ pN exp
{−(x2−µ2Bnew)2
2σ22B
}] ≥ LpB
QpG
 .
(3.3)
Using the above inequality, the correct accuracy of using two characteristics is 97.46% and it
earns $469.19, which is 0.05% better and earns $0.66 more than using only one characteristic.
This coincides with the well accepted intuition that using more information produces better
performance. Note that when comparing model 1 and model 3, the simple one-attribute classi-
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fier did not show significant degradation in the accuracy: model 3 gives an accuracy of 97.46%
and profit of $469.19, while the significantly simpler model 1 gives an accuracy of 97.41%
and profit of $468.52. According to those figures, using two variables only shows minor im-
provements on the accuracy of prediction and profit earned, compared against using only one
variable. Even here, it is likely wise to use only one variable to lower the cost and speed the
analysis process.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (Corrected Model)
Attribute X1 only X1 and X2 X1 and X2
BB 244.72 ± 2.45 231.42 ± 2.40 244.79 ± 2.40
BG 9.70 ± 0.67 5.08 ± 0.52 9.55 ± 0.65
GB 3.24 ± 0.38 16.53 ± 0.74 3.16 ± 0.36
GG 242.35 ± 2.51 246.97 ± 2.39 242.50 ± 2.47
Accuracy 97.41% ± 0.15% 95.68% ± 0.19% 97.46% ± 0.16%
Profit 468.52 ± 5.11 411.26 ± 6.37 469.19 ± 5.30
Table 3.3: Using the parameters in Table 3.1 and the simulation method described in Section
3.3. The results are generated using model 1, 2 and 3 are presented above. The first values
shows the average value of the 100 datasets, the value after the “±” sign shows the standard
error of the average value.
In order to have a clear understanding of the results, we try to visualize the performance of
the cutoff line on classifying the good and bad payers. We evaluated the cutoff lines for model
2 and model 3 numerically. Inserting the initial conditions from Table 3.1 into equation (3.1)
of model 2, the set condition becomes
AG =
{
x | x1 ≥ 14
[
38 + log
(
5
2
)
−2x2
]}
,
which leads to the cutoff line
x1 =
1
4
[
38 + log
(
5
2
)
−2x2
]
. (3.4)
Putting the initial conditions into equation (3.3) of model 3, the set condition becomes
AG =
x | x1 ≥
1
4
24 + log

5
2
[
0.1exp
{
−(x2−6)2
2
}
+ 0.9exp
{−(x2−6− 20.9 )2
2
}]
exp
{
−(x2−8)2
2
}


 ,
and that leads to the cutoff line
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x1 =
1
4
24 + log

5
2
[
0.1exp
{
−(x2−6)2
2
}
+ 0.9exp
{−(x2−6− 20.9 )2
2
}]
exp
{
−(x2−8)2
2
}

 . (3.5)
We divide all the borrowers into two groups of good and bad payers, and plot the contours of
the two characteristics X1 and X2 of the two groups, together with the cutoff lines of model
2 and 3 in Figure 3.2. The right hand side of the cutoff lines represent the region where the
model will classify the payers as good, while the left hand side of the cutoff lines represent
the region where the model will classify the payers as bad. From Table 3.3, it shows that there
are more borrowers who are predicted to be bad while actually being good in model 3 than in
model 2, and there are more borrowers who are predicted to be good while truly being bad in
model 2 than in model 3. Those results are reflected in the region between the solid line and
the dotted line in Figure 3.2. There are more bad payers classified as good using the solid line,
and there are more good payers classified as bad using the dotted line.
3.5 Conclusions
Many researchers believe that using more attributes to develop classification model will always
increase model accuracy. In this chapter, we showed that using fewer attributes to predict
good or bad borrowers is more reasonable and produce more accurate results due to the fact
that people misused prediction models in the classification process. More effort should be
expended on examining the data to detect fraud and on whether the prediction models are
statistically valid. In Chapter 4, we will further study the effect on banks’ profitability of bad
borrowers purposely adding lies onto their reported attributes in order to obtain. The correct
usage of credit scoring models can effectively and efficiently fulfill the needs of processing
loan requests and can maximize the profit from the lending of money.
52 Chapter 3. More Attributes May Lead to More Inaccurate Credit Scoring
2 4 6 8 10 12
4
6
8
10
x1
x2
 0.01 
 0.02 
 0.03 
 0.04 
 0.05 
 0.06 
 0.07 
 0.08 
 
0.09
 
 0.1 
 0.11 
 0.12 
 0.13 
 0.14 
 0.01 
 0.02 
 0.03 
 0.04 
 0.05 
 0.06 
 0.07 
 0.08 
 0.09 
 0.1 
 0.11 
Model 2
Model 3
Figure 3.2: The gray contour on the left displays the characteristic values of the bad payers,
while the black contour on the right displays the characteristic values of the good payers. The
solid line is the cutoff line plotted using equation (3.4), while the dotted line is the cutoff line
plotted using equation (3.5).
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Chapter 4
How Much Effort Should Be Spent to
Detect Fraudulent Applications When
Engaged in Classifier-Based Lending?
This chapter is based on the paper [1] that we published in the Intelligent Data Analysis Journal.
It contains an additional set of calculations and some reordering of ideas for clearer exposition.
The details on the method and model used in this research can be found in Chapter 2 of this
thesis and will not be explicitly repeated again in this Chapter. The succeeding sections are or-
ganized as follows. Section 4.1 gives a brief introduction of this chapter. Section 4.2 presents
the method and model used for this problem. In Section 4.3, the data used to analyze the prob-
lem was simulated. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we considered two different choices on the amount
of loan granted to borrowers, we discuss and compare the results from the banks’ prospective.
Section 4.6 presents and analyzes the results from borrowers’ prospective. Conclusions are
drawn in Section 4.7.
4.1 Introduction
In recent years the use of machine learning or classifiers on credit applications has become
a killer app for retail and small commercial lending. Many classifier algorithms are used for
credit scoring, as reviewed in Baesens et al. [1] and in Lessmann et al. [5]. However, as always,
the classifier can only do a good job if the attributes it employs to make its classifications are at
least nearly correct. As discussed in Dejaeger et al. [4], the accuracy and reliability of data is of
high importance, and in the cases of insufficient data quality, quantitative analysis may fail to
provide the desired results, even leading to incorrect decisions being drawn. This is particularly
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a problem for the use of classifiers to grant loans, where prospective borrowers may have a
strong motivation to make a fraudulent application by falsifying one or more of the attributes
they report on their application forms. It is generally expensive to check credit applications
for lies. In Chapter 1, we introduced the concept of bust-out-fraud, where borrowers purposely
build up and maintain a good credit history, they will then use all the available credit in one
time to borrow a large amount of loan, and then abandon the account. We consider this in some
sense to be like lying about the attribute since behavior is modified to get a desired score rather
than for its own intrinsic rewards.
In this chapter, we will look into the problem of having prospective borrowers fraudu-
lently falsify one or more of the attributes they report on their application form. Applicants
learn about the characteristics that are used to build credit scoring models, and may alter the
answers on their application form to improve their chance of loan approval. Few automated
credit scoring models have considered falsified information from borrowers. We will show that
sometimes it is profitable for financial institutions to spend money and effort to identify dis-
honest customers. We will also find the optimal effort that banks should spend on identifying
these liars. Furthermore, we will show that it is possible for liars to eventually adjust their lies
to escape from credit checks. This research uses simulated data and discriminant analysis as
presented in Section 2.1 of this thesis to study the proposed issue.
For simplicity, we will restrict our studies on lies that borrowers placed on one numerical
attribute used in the classifier. Indeed, we assume the loan application involves only one at-
tribute. In our case, a larger attribute value is better for getting a loan. Not all attributes are
like this (for instance applicants’ total existing debt), in which case multiply the attribute by -1
to get our convention. We make an assumption that the size of lie is the difference between the
correct value and the reported value. In real situations, customers do not know whether they
will be identified as a good or a bad payer. On the other hand, lenders do not know the future
performance of borrowers. Therefore, there are four different cases:
1. Good borrowers who are honest on their loan application form and will always repay
their loans.
2. Good borrowers who lie on their loan application form but always repay their loans.
3. Bad borrowers who are honest on their loan application form but do not repay their loans.
4. Bad borrowers who lie on their loan application form and do not repay their loans.
Since we build our model using simulated data meant to model historical data, we have
precise information about whether a given borrower repaid her loans (good) or failed to repay
(bad). In addition, we assume we know whether the borrowers lied about their characteristics.
56 Chapter 4. What is Best Effort to Detect Fraudulent Applications?
In particular, we assume all good borrowers are honest and all borrowers who lied defaulted.
In other words, we assumed our dataset contains borrowers from cases 1, 3 and 4.
It is straightforward to see that the effort which should be devoted to checking lies depends
on the size of the lies, the importance of the attribute lied about to the classifier, the cost of
reducing the magnitude of lies through better checking, and the proportion of bad liars in the
population. In this chapter, we present a proof of concept model which incorporates all these
elements. A simulation study applied to this model answers the questions: 1) For a given lie
strength and lie detection cost, can it be worthwhile to expand effort to decrease lies? If yes,
2) What level of lie elimination effort is optimal? In order to answer 1) and 2) the related
question 3) What is the optimal level of lies for an unscrupulous borrower? is also discussed.
In particular, this research shows that when considering the optimal effort required to reduce
fraud, the financial institution should consider the optimal degree to which borrowers lie.
Misreporting, that is, the impact of manipulation in credit risk, is a topic that has recently
attracted attention from the research community. Most studies focus on corporate lending and
securitized loans, such as Griffin and Maturana [8] and Graham and Qiu [7]. On unsecuritized
consumer loans, the work of Garmaise [14] centers on the increase in delinquency that arises
from misreporting, rather than the incentives that are in place when requesting loans.
Other studies have focused more on the reasons that drive default. The work of Bravo et
al. [4] suggested that defaulters behave strategically, and divides defaulters into a group that
cannot repay due to financial problems and another group who perhaps never intended to repay.
Guiso et al. [11] also found that borrower default is not rational; rather it is caused by economic
and moral factors. In fact, borrowers can be strategic before requesting loans. Our work builds
from these themes.
Credit scoring models have been widely used in different lending industries. Borrowers
can learn about the characteristics that lending institutions will use to make granting decisions.
Borrowers may also determine how to alter their claimed characteristics so as to increase their
chance of loan approval. Spending money on detecting and eliminating the lies that borrowers
made in the data will increase the cost of implementing credit scoring models. The purpose
of this chapter is to show that, in the context of a detection cost model, it may be profitable to
reduce the magnitude of lies in the dataset. In fact, spending effort to reduce the magnitude
of lies in the dataset which was used to build credit scoring models can increase the accuracy
of prediction and lower the risk of lending money. However, verifying the accuracy of the
data is expensive, and the cost to improve the data should be considered. In addition, we will
show that liars will ultimately learn how to adjust their lies in order to escape from credit
checks. Therefore, regular updates of the scoring model are necessary to maintain accurate
credit decisions.
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4.2 Method and Model
This chapter uses discriminant analysis as presented in Section 2.1, and considers X to be
a single continuous attribute drawn from a normal distribution, where XG ∼ N(µG,σG) and
XB ∼ N(µB,σB) same as in Section 2.1.1. Again, the probability density function for good
payers is
f (x|G) = 1√
2piσG
exp
−(x−µG)22σ2G
. (4.1)
We assume that only bad payers will lie about their attribute and can alter their characteristic
through XB. We assume that good payers do not lie, and so added noise to XB only. Not all
bad payers choose to lie about their characteristics; we introduced another Bernoulli random
variable Noi, which takes the value one when a particular bad payer lies, otherwise taking the
value zero. The probability that a bad payer will lie is PN . We further assume that all bad payers
who intended to lie do so by adding a constant A to the correct attribute value. In addition, we
assume a parameter η which represents the effort spent on reducing lies in characteristic XB, to
reduce the magnitude of lies to A(1− η). Note that in our case η will be a value between 0 to
1. For example, a liar who earned $50,000 annually might say that he earned $60,000. In this
case, Noi equals 1, since the borrower lied and A would be $10,000. If the lender did not put
any effort to check the attribute value of the borrower (η = 0), then the reported attribute will
equal $60,000, if the lender put some effort (η= 0.5) on checking the attribute, then the reported
value will be $55,000, closer to the correct value. If η = 1, that refers to the case where the
lender carefully checks the attribute values reported by the borrowers and successfully changed
the reported value to its correct value. In real situations, it is extremely difficult for lenders to
exclude all the lies that borrowers make. However, the chances of having all the lies excluded
for a particular borrower is not impossible, and our model captures that. Furthermore, the
incorrect value of the attribute may not be the cause of an intended lie. For instance, it is
difficult to determine the value of a house: different appraisers might assign a slightly different
value for the same house. Therefore, even if the lender found some discrepancies between
the reported value and the true value of the borrower’s attribute, as long as the lender truly
thinks the borrower has a high chance of repaying, the loan should be approved. Note that we
simplified our chapter by assuming all discrepancies from the true value of an attribute are due
to a lie. As a result,
XBnew = XB + Noi×A(1−η), where Noi ∼ Bern(PN).
[Note that XB is independent of Noi.]
Notice that, after including the lies of the bad payers and the effort spent on eliminating
58 Chapter 4. What is Best Effort to Detect Fraudulent Applications?
lies, the cumulative distribution function
FXBnew(x) = P(XBnew ≤ x)
= P(XBnew ≤ x|Noi = 0)P(Noi = 0) + P(XBnew ≤ x|Noi = 1)P(Noi = 1)
= P(XB ≤ x)P(Noi = 0) + P(XB + A(1−η) ≤ x)P(Noi = 1)
= P(XB ≤ x)P(Noi = 0) + P(XB ≤ x−A(1−η))P(Noi = 1)
= (1−PN)
∫ x
−∞
1√
2piσ2B
exp
−(z−µB)22σ2B
dz
+ PN
∫ x−A(1−η)
−∞
1√
2piσ2B
exp
−(z−µB)22σ2B
dz.
Hence, by taking the derivative with respect to x the probability density function of XBnew
becomes
f (x|Bnew) = (1−PN) 1√
2piσ2B
exp
−(x−µB)22σ2B
+ PN 1√
2piσ2B
exp
−(x−µBnew)22σ2B
, (4.2)
where µBnew = µB + A(1−η).
For simplicity we assume no recovery in the event of default, so the expected loss L is the
loan granted to the borrower. In general, we denote Li as loan amount requested by borrower
i. Therefore, the amount that borrower i must repay is Qi = Li× I, where I is the interest rate.
Applying the set inequality in Eq. (2.5) of Section 2.1 and using the above information, we can
conclude our classification model giving the set of attributes reported by good payers is
AG =
{
xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Li pBQi pG ≤ f (xi|G)f (xi|Bnew)
}
, (4.3)
where f (xi|G) and f (xi|Bnew) are stated in Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) respectively. We consider
two different choices on the loan amount granted to borrowers and will explained in detail in
Section 4.3. Substituting Qi = Li× I into Eq. (4.3) resulted in
AG =
{
xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ pBI pG ≤ f (xi|G)f (xi|Bnew)
}
. (4.4)
Note that the above classification model is independent of the loan amount granted Li.
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4.3 Simulation of Data
We use simulated data to illustrate our proposed issue, that of prospective borrowers lying
about one of their attributes, and the effect of the corresponding effort spent on eliminating
lies. We apply the technique presented in Appendix A, with certain modifications to simulate
our dataset. In particular, this research only considers one attribute, therefore, we simulate X1
only.
Notice that we consider two different choices on the amount of loan granted to borrowers.
For simplicity, we first assume all borrowers will be granted with the same amount of loan L.
Furthermore, we know that certain attributes determine not just whether a loan is granted but
how much is lent. For example, the amount lent on a residential mortgage is determined in part
by the value of the property which secures the loan. In this case, however, the amount lent will
also depend on the applicants income which determines the maximum payment the borrower
can make. Thus, there is a nonlinear dependence of loan amount on salary. To make a very
stylized model of this non-linearity, we make our second choice to postulate a setting in which
the loan granted is proportional to the square of the attribute value: Li = xi×1,000. Note that
this model gives an incentive to lie about income not only to improve the chances of getting a
loan, but also, since as the amount of lie A increases, so does the amount Li that a bad payer
can borrow, to increase the amount borrowed.
Next we discuss the effect made by the bank in verifying the correctness of attribute re-
ported by the loan applicant. Some attributes, like the monthly salary of a salaried employee,
will always be checked. However, income for restaurant staff is strongly dependent on tips
which are self reported. Attributes such as this will only be checked if they seem quite unrea-
sonable. Furthermore, we assume that only some bad payers will lie about their information as
described in Section 4.2. We set XBnew to XB + Noi×A(1−η).
4.4 Results and Analysis: For the Banks (Single Loan Amount)
This section analyzes the results for the banks if the amount of loan granted are the same
amongst all borrowers and are fixed at L = $7.2K. We will examine the revenue and profit
of the banks if different values of A and η are used. In particular, we will obtain the optimal
amount of effort that banks should spend on eliminating lies. We will show that under certain
conditions, it is worthwhile to spend effort to eliminate lies. This depends on the strength of
lies made by bad borrowers and the cost required to fix the reported value to its correct value.
Using our classification model in Eq. (4.4) on past borrowers with known repayment behavior,
we can divide the borrowers into four different groups:
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(G1) The classification model predicts the borrower is good and in fact she did repay her loan.
(G2) The classification model predicts the borrower is good but in fact did not repay her loan.
(G3) The classification model predicts the borrower is bad but she did repay her loan.
(G4) The classification model predicts the borrower is bad and in fact she did not repay his
loan.
If borrower i was classified into the group G1, the expected profit that the bank will earn is
Qi. If borrower i was classified into the group G2, the expected loss that the bank will incur is
Li. We consider n loan applicants and simulated the performance of the resulted loan portfolio
using our classification model described in Eq. (4.4) for classifying good from bad borrowers.
The total amount of revenue that the bank will earn as a function of η is
Rev(η) =
n∑
i=1
Qi1G1(i)−
n∑
i=1
Li1G2(i). (4.5)
Here 1(·) denotes the indicator function.
Note that Eq. (4.5) indirectly captures the opportunity cost of not lending to good borrowers
through the fact that the classifier balances type I (a good payer was classified as a bad payer)
versus type II (a bad payer was classified as a good payer) error. If the lending criteria are
too strict, 1G1(i) will usually be zero; few loans will be issued with a corresponding low sum.
Notice that the borrower will lie depending on the value of η this in turn relates to total loans
granted and hence revenue. When η = 0, Rev(0) represents the total amount of revenue that the
bank will earn when no effort has been spent to eliminate lies. Hence, the increase in revenue
when the bank spent η amount of effort on eliminating lies is
Rev(η)−Rev(0). (4.6)
Loan application cost involved in processing the application includes credit checks, property
appraisals for mortgage loans or properties pledged as collateral, and basic administrative costs
[2].Thus, it is clear that more effort spent on eliminating lies will result in higher costs. To
simplify our model, we assumed that the total cost spent on granting loans and eliminating lies
to be linear in η. We define the total cost to be kη, where k is a proportionality constant. We are
interested in finding the increase in profit with respect to different levels of η, and equate it to
Rev(η)−Rev(0)− kη. (4.7)
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The increase in profit is the extra amount of money that banks will earn if an effort η has been
spent to correct the reported attribute value XB to a value which is closer to the attribute’s true
value, which we presented it as XBnew.
The effort parameter η varied from 0 to 1 with step size 0.01. Recall that η = 1 represents
effort corresponding to 100% elimination of lies. We simulated 100 datasets each with 500
borrowers and reran the program 100 times. We obtained the mean and standard deviation of
the average values to show the accuracy of the results. Note that, in the attempt to keep our
simulation consistent with real loan portfolio, classes may have relatively few members. We
did the following:
Step 1. Set η equal to 0.
Step 2. Simulated 500 borrowers using the method described in Section 4.3.
Step 3. Compute the total amount of revenue using Eq. (4.5).
Step 4. Compute the increase in revenue using Eq. (4.6).
Step 5. Compute the increase in profit using Eq. (4.7).
Step 6. Increment η by 0.01 and redo step 2 to step 5 for each dataset until η equals to 1.
Step 7. Calculate the average increase in revenue and the average increase in profit of the 100
datasets.
Step 8. Redo step 1 to step 7 100 times.
Step 9. Calculate the mean average increase in revenue and the mean average increase in profit.
µG σG µB σB n p I PN
8 1 4 1 500 0.8 20% 0.5
Table 4.1: Parameters used in Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.
4.4.1 Case I: A = 3, k = $390K
This case uses the parameters presented in Table 4.1, and sets A = 3 and k = $390K. Figure
4.1 show the mean average revenue for different levels of η, with the dashed lines showing
the 95% confidence interval of the mean average values. The average revenue was calculated
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Figure 4.1: Data was simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = 0.8, PB = 0.5
and n = 500 borrowers, η varied from 0 to 1 with step size 0.01. We applied the set condition
of Eq. (4.4) with initial values, I = 20%, A = 3, PN = 12 , L = $7.2K and k = $390K to classify
borrowers. We used Eq. (4.5) to calculate the revenue for each η. We computed the average
revenue of 100 datasets and reran the program 100 times to obtain the average mean values of
revenue, together with the 95% confidence interval of the mean values displayed in the plot as
the dashed lines. The lower right corner of the plot showed a zoom-in subplot to improve the
visualization of the plot.
from a random sample and, by the Central Limit Theorem [5], the sampling distribution can be
approximated with a normal distribution. We can calculate the 95% confidence interval of the
mean average revenue using
x±Z∗ S√
n∗
, (4.8)
where x is the mean average revenue, Z∗ = 1.96 is the critical value for a 95% confidence
interval, S is the standard deviation of the average revenues and finally n∗ is the number of
mean values, here equal to 100. The dashed lines in Figure 4.1 showed a very tight confidence
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interval, which implies that there was a very low variability among the mean average revenues,
stating that our results are very stable.
Furthermore, Figure 4.1 show a monotone increase in revenue with increasing values of η.
In other words, if we put effort toward eliminating lies in the dataset, the bank will generate
more revenue. In particular, if the bank devoted no effort (η = 0) to eliminate lies, the bank’s
revenue will equal $18.70K, compared to if maximal effort (η = 1) was spent on eliminating all
the lies from the dataset, the maximum amount of revenue that will be generated is $509.58K.
Figure 4.2 showed the mean average net increase in revenue (Rev(η)−Rev(0)), and mean av-
erage increase in profit (Rev(η)−Rev(0)− kη), as shown in the solid line and open square line
respectively, for different levels of η. The grey dashed lines showed the 95% confidence in-
terval of the mean values. As in Figure 4.1, the dashed lines showed a very tight confidence
interval, reflecting a very low variability among the mean average values, stating that our re-
sults are very accurate. The solid line in Figure 4.2 also showed that there is a monotone
increase in revenue when we increase the value of η. If η = 1, Rev(1)−Rev(0) = $490.88K,
stating that if the bank devotes a full amount of effort to eliminating all the lies in the data, and
if enriching the data does not bear any cost, then the bank will earn $490.88K more. However,
enriching the data requires time and effort, and it is expensive to identify liars. We have to
take into account the cost of eliminating lies. This depends on both the size of lies, and the
strength of effort spent on lie detection. In this case, we set A = 3 and k = $390K, so each unit
of lies costs $130K to eliminate. The open square line in Figure 4.2 reflected that the optimal
effort (ηopt), that should be spent on eliminating lies is 0.67. That corresponds to generate a
revenue of Rev(ηopt) = $428.85K, which requires a cost of kηopt = $261.3K, and contributes
to Rev(ηopt)−Rev(0)− kηopt = $428.85− $18.70K − $261.3K = $148.85K increased in profit,
when compared to no effort spent on eliminating lies. Notice that η = 0.01 corresponds to
generate a revenue of Rev(0.01) = $22.53K, which requires a cost of $k× 0.01 = $3.9K, and
contributes to generate a profit of Rev(0.01)−k×0.01 = $18.63K, which is $68 less than when
no effort was spend to identity liars. For all other values of η, it is profitable to put effort to
eliminate lies.
4.4.2 Case II: A = 3, k = $1080K
Consider the case when catching liars is very expensive. We set k = $1080K, corresponding
to about $360K to remove one unit of lies. All other parameters remain the same as in Case
I. The corresponding results obtained from the mean average revenue and the mean average
increase in revenue are the same as in Case I. However, since the cost to catch liars increased,
the increase in profit will be different. Figure 4.3 shows the plot of mean average increase in
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Figure 4.2: Data was simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = 0.8,PB = 0.2
and n = 500 borrowers,η varied from 0 to 1 with step size 0.01. We applied the set condition
of Eq. (4.4) with initial values, I = 20%, A = 3, L = $7.2K, k = $390K and PN = 12 to classify
borrowers. We used Eqs. (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) to calculate the increase in revenue and profit
for each η. We reran the program 100 times to obtain the average mean values of increase in
revenue and profit as stated in the solid and open square lines respectively. The grey dashed
lines displayed the 95% confidence interval of the mean values.
revenue (solid line) and profit (open square line) versus different levels of η, with the dashed
lines showing the 95% confidence interval of the mean values. This figure provided evidence
that for all values of η, the corresponding increase in net profit will be negative, stating that it
is too expensive to eliminate lies. Thus, banks should not spend effort to catch these liars.
4.4.3 Case III: A = 4, k = $520K
If borrowers can choose how much to lie, and if they assume that the bank is not checking their
lies (η = 0), they might lie so as to completely mimic good borrowers. Using the parameters of
4.4. Results and Analysis: For the Banks (Single Loan Amount) 65
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
−
60
0
−
40
0
−
20
0
0
20
0
40
0
η
M
ea
n 
Av
e
ra
ge
 In
cr
ea
se
d 
[$ 
Th
ou
sa
nd
]
Revenue
Profit
Figure 4.3: Data was simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = 0.8,PB = 0.5
and n = 500 borrowers, η varied from 0 to 1 with step size 0.01. We applied the set condition
of Eq. (4.4) with initial values, I = 20%, A = 3, L = $7.2K, k = $1080K and PN = 12 to classify
borrowers. We used Eqs. (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) to calculate the increase in revenue and profit
for each η. We reran the program 100 times to obtain the average mean values of increase in
revenue (solid line) and profit (open square line), together with the 95% confidence interval of
the mean values, displayed as the dashed lines.
Table 4.1 in which µB = 4 and µG = 8, this suggests liars might choose A = 4.
In this case it would be impossible to distinguish good borrowers from bad borrowers who
lie. But it remains possible to distinguish the group containing both good borrowers and bad
borrowers who lie from the group of truthful borrowers with bad credit prospects. Even assum-
ing that the bank could perfectly distinguish between these groups, it would still profit from
just 2/3 of its loans. (This is, of course, an upper bound to actual performance.) This is because
it would lend to all the good borrowers (half the applicants) and all the bad liars (half of the
remaining 50% of applicants). So the bank would lend to 75% of the borrowers, only 50% of
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which would be good borrowers. Sadly, the bank only charges an interest rate of 20%, so it
loses 5 times as much on each bad liar as it makes on each good borrower, causing it to lose
money on this loan book. At this point it would decide not to lend money at all.
It remains suboptimal to lend money at all, even with no cost of checking, until η = 0.25 (as
seen by the fact that Figure 4.4 has no increase in revenue as a function of η until η = 0.25). At
that stage the cost of checking the applicants is larger than the revenue earned and the net profit
is negative. We have to wait until η = 0.55 where the cost of checking equals the profit made;
further improvement in checking continues to yield benefits until η= 0.76 when the classifier is
nearly perfect at distinguishing liars from truthful good borrowers. After this point diminishing
returns in the profitability in lending mean that the added cost in lending is not worth it.
4.4.4 Case IV: A ∈ {1,1.25,1.5, ...,6}, Unit Cost = $130K
In order to obtain deeper insights about the model’s performance, we varied A from 1 to 5
with step size 0.25. To keep results comparable with case I and III, we assume that each lie
unit costs $130K to remove. For each value of A, we computed the corresponding values of k,
followed step 1 to step 5 discussed at the beginning of this section, and obtained ηopt. Tables 4.2
displayed different values of A with the corresponding values of k, ηopt, A(1− ηopt), required
cost and maximum profit. Notice that required cost = kηopt, and
maximum profit = Rev(ηopt)− kηopt.
Recall that A is the level of lies that bad borrowers added to their attribute values, and A(1−η)
is the actual amount of lies remaining in XBnew after accounting for the cost of reducing the
lies. Table 4.2 shows that for values of A between 1 to 4.25, the model suggested to set ηopt to
a value which reduced the difference between the reported and true value of the attribute by 1.
This explains the reason for having all the values in the column “A(1−ηopt)” in Tables 4.2 to be
approximately equal to 1. As A increases, the required cost to check for lies increase and leads
to lower profit. When A = 3.75,4 or 4.25 and if lenders did not spend any effort to eliminate
lies, the resulted revenue will be zero, and our model suggested lenders to set their effort to
ηopt so as to generate some profit. For A = 4.5,4.75,5 or 5.25, there will only be negative profit
generated for all values of η, stating that it is not profitable to grant money. To illustrate this
phenomenon, we set A to 4.5 to generate Figure 4.5, which shows that the entire profit curve
is below zero. The corresponding cost required to identify liars is too high, and our model
suggest not to do business. Particularly, if we set A = 4.5 and alter the unit cost required to
check for lies, we realized that if each unit of lies costs higher than $122K to eliminate, then
it is not profitable to do business. When A = 5.5,5.75 or 6, the lies are more than necessary,
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Figure 4.4: Data was simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = 0.8,PB = 0.2
and n = 500 borrowers, η varied from 0 to 1 with step size 0.01. We applied the set condition
of Eq. (4.4) with initial values, I = 20%, A = 4, k = $520K, L = $7.2K and PN = 12 to classify
borrowers. We used Eqs. (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) to calculate the increase in revenue and profit
for each η. We reran the program 100 times to obtain the average mean values of increase in
revenue and profit, together with the 95% confidence interval of the mean values, displayed as
the dashed lines.
paradoxically making them easier to detect again. The classification model itself works well
enough to distinguish bad liars and does not require additional effort spend on checking lies.
Figure 4.6 depicts the optimal effort ηopt which the banks should exert to correspond to lies of
level A by the bad liar loan applicants. This curve is increasing in A if bad liars increase their
lies, the banks will also need to devote more efforts to checking for lies. However, the effort
seems to flatten out with increased lie level (the second derivative of the curve is negative),
perhaps because diminishing returns are met once most liars make it through the screens.
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Figure 4.5: Data was simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = 0.8,PB = 0.2
and n = 500 borrowers, η varied from 0 to 1 with step size 0.01. We applied the set condition
of Eq. (4.4) with initial values, I = 20%, A = 4.5, k = $520K, L = $7.2K and PN = 12 to classify
borrowers. We used Eqs. (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) to calculate the increase in revenue and profit
for each η. We reran the program 100 times to obtain the average mean values of increase in
revenue and profit, together with the 95% confidence interval of the mean values, displayed as
the dashed lines.
4.4.5 Case V: A ∈ {1,1.25,1.5, ...,5}, Unit Cost = $260K
We double the unit cost required to check for borrowers’ lies and assume that each unit costs
$260K to remove. Table 4.3 shows that for all values of A, it is not optimal for lenders to
put effort to check for lies. When A is smaller than 3.5, lenders will still be profitable to lend
money, since the classification model in Eq. (4.4) provides very accurate results. For values
of A greater that 3.5, our model suggest not to do business. Note that lenders can decide the
amount of effort spend to check for lies, that was indeed affected by its cost, while bad liars
can determine the amount of lies to add onto the true attributes. A more detailed investigation
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Figure 4.6: The plot of ηopt versus A from Table 4.2.
A k ηopt A(1−ηopt) Required Cost Rev(0) Maximum Profit
1 $130,000 0.03 0.97 $3,900 $427,496 $427,603
1.25 $162,500 0.21 0.99 $34,125 $391,135 $395,064
1.5 $195,000 0.34 0.99 $66,300 $347,001 $362,554
1.75 $227,500 0.44 0.98 $100,100 $297,778 $330,087
2 $260,000 0.51 0.98 $132,600 $240,915 $297,587
2.25 $292,500 0.56 0.99 $163,800 $178,849 $265,054
2.5 $325,000 0.6 1.00 $195,000 $116,724 $232,496
2.75 $357,500 0.64 0.99 $228,800 $59,808 $200,054
3 $390,000 0.67 0.99 $261,300 $18,703 $167,554
3.25 $422,500 0.7 0.98 $295,750 $1,906 $134,987
3.5 $455,000 0.72 0.98 $327,600 $2 $102,587
3.75 $487,500 0.73 1.01 $355,875 $0 $70,030
4 $520,000 0.76 0.96 $395,200 $0 $37,505
4.25 $552,500 0.77 0.98 $425,425 $0 $5,060
4.5 $585,000 0 4.50 $0 $0 $0
4.75 $617,500 0 4.75 $0 $0 $0
5 $650,000 0 5.00 $0 $0 $0
5.25 $682500 0 5.25 $0 $0 $0
5.5 $715000 0 5.50 $0 $46,410 $46,410
5.75 $747500 0 5.75 $0 $129,437 $129,437
6 $780000 0 6.00 $0 $194,511 $194,511
Table 4.2: Comparison of results generated using different values of A for L = $7.2K and each
unit of lies costs $130K to remove.
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of the game between the borrowers and lenders, which takes into account of the unit cost of
checking lies and the unit cost to make a lie, is the main topic for next chapter.
A k ηopt A(1−ηopt) Required Cost Rev(0) Maximum Profit
1 $260,000 0 1.00 $0 $427,496 $427,496
1.25 $325,000 0 1.25 $0 $391,135 $391,135
1.5 $390,000 0 1.50 $0 $347,001 $347,001
1.75 $455,000 0 1.75 $0 $297,778 $297,778
2 $520,000 0 2.00 $0 $240,915 $240,915
2.25 $585,000 0 2.18 $0 $178,849 $178,849
2.5 $650,000 0 2.50 $0 $116,724 $116,724
2.75 $715,000 0 2.75 $0 $59,808 $59,808
3 $780,000 0 3.00 $0 $18,703 $18,703
3.25 $845,000 0 3.25 $0 $1,906 $1,906
3.5 $910,000 0 3.50 $0 $2 $2
3.75 $975,000 0 3.75 $0 $0 $0
4 $1,040,000 0 4.00 $0 $0 $0
4.25 $1,105,000 0 4.25 $0 $0 $0
4.5 $1,170,000 0 4.50 $0 $0 $0
4.75 $1,235,000 0 4.75 $0 $0 $0
5 $1,300,000 0 5.00 $0 $0 $0
Table 4.3: Comparison of results generated using different values of A for L = $7.2K and each
unit of lies costs $260K to remove.
4.5 Results and Analysis: For the Banks (Attribute Depen-
dent Loan Amount)
It is interesting to consider the case where the amount of loan granted is somehow dependent
on the value of the attribute of the corresponding borrower. To investigate this, we consider
Li = $xi × 1,000. Notice that XG ∼ N(8,1),XB ∼ N(4,1),PG = 0.8 and PB = 0.2, therefore,
E(X) = 8× 0.8 + 4× 0.2 = 7.2 and so this explains the reason for choosing a loan amount of
$7.2K in Section 4.4. If there are no liars in the lending business, the potential amount of
loan granted to all borrowers in both single loan amount and attribute dependent loan amount
will roughly be the same, at around $7.2K ×500 = $3.6MM. In this section, we keep all the
conditions same as in Section 4.4, and only change the amount granted to each borrower to
Li = xi × 1,000. We compare and analyze the difference between granting at a single loan
amount and at an attribute dependent loan amount in some of the cases described as in Section
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4.4. We will not repeat the discussion in cases which generates similar results as in Section
4.4.
4.5.1 Case I: A = 3, k = $390K
In section 4.4, we fixed the amount of loan granted to be the same amongst all borrowers at
$7.2K. Using the parameters as stated in Table 4.1 and setting A = 3, the potential amount of
loan grant to good payers as $7.2K ×500× 0.8 = $2.88MM, to bad true tellers and bad liars
are the same as $7.2K ×500×0.2×0.5 = $360K. Therefore, the total potential amount of loans
granted is $3.6MM, which compose of 80% to good payers, 10% to bad true tellers and another
10% to bad liars. By setting Li = $xi×1,000, we can roughly estimate the potential amount of
loans granted to all good payers as $8K ×500× 0.8 = $3.2MM, to bad honest payers as $4K
×500×0.2×0.5 = $200K and to bad liars as $7K ×500×0.2×0.5 = $350K. The total potential
amount of loans granted is $3.75MM, of which 85% to good payers, 5.3˙% to bad true tellers
and 9.3˙% to bad liars. Varying the loan amount granted by borrowers’ attribute value increases
the proportion of money granted to good payers and decreases the proportion of money granted
to bad payers. Comparing the two choices of L and taking into account of the three units of lies
added by bad liars, the attribute dependent scenario increased the potential amount of revenue
from good payers by $3.2−$2.88$2.88 ×100% = 11.11%, while decreased the potential amount of loss
to bad true tellers by $360−$200$360 ×100% = 44.44%, and to bad liars by $360−$350$360 ×100% = 2.77%.
Table 4.4 compared the banks’ revenue and profit of the two different choices of L. It
shows that setting the amount of loan granted to be attribute dependent will generate more
revenue and hence more profitable. This result is consistent with the fact that more loans will
be allocated to good payers in the attribute dependent scenario. Although, our model suggests
a higher ηopt for the attribute dependent scenario, which indeed increases the cost to check
for lies by 0.02× $390K = $7.8K, the mean average increase in profit is 43.82% higher than
the single loan amount scenario. Figure 4.7 showed a side by side plot of the mean average
revenue(Rev(η)) for different levels of η and for the two different choices of L, with the dashed
lines showing the 95% confidence interval of the mean average values. Both of the plots exhibit
very similar trend, with the attribute dependent scenario generates higher revenue. Figure 4.8
showed the mean average net increase in revenue (Rev(η)− Rev(0)), and the mean average
increase in profit (Rev(η)−Rev(0)− kη) as shown in the solid line and the open square line
respectively, for different levels of η and for the two different choices on loan amount granted.
Both of the curves show that the mean average increase in revenue and profit shifted up in
the attribute dependent loan scenario. In particular, when η equals to 0.01, the constant loan
scenario generates negative profit, due to the fact that the cost required to check for lies is higher
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than revenue, while in the attribute dependent loan scenario, positive profit was generated for
all values of η.
L = $7.2K Li = $xi×1,000 Percentage Increased
Rev(0) $18.07K $26.53K 46.82%
Rev(1) $509.58K $581.46K 14.11%
Rev(1)−Rev(0) $490.88K $554.93K 13.05%
ηopt 0.67 0.69 2.99%
Rev(ηopt) $428.85K $509.7K 18.85%
kηopt $261.3K $269.1K 2.99%
Rev(ηopt)−Rev(0)− kηopt $148.85K $214.07K 43.82%
Table 4.4: Comparison of the bank’s revenue and profit on the two different choices of loan
amount: (a) L = $7.2K and (b) L = $Xi×1,000.
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Figure 4.7: Data was simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = 0.8,PB = 0.2 and
n = 500 borrowers, η varied from 0 to 1 with step size 0.01. We applied the set condition of Eq.
(4.4) with initial values, I = 20%, A = 3, PN = 12 and k = $390K to classify borrowers. We used
Eq. (4.5) to calculate the revenue for each η. We computed the average revenue of 100 datasets
and reran the program 100 times to obtain the average mean values of revenue, together with
the 95% confidence interval of the mean values displayed in the plot as the dashed lines. The
lower right corner of the plot showed a zoom-in subplot to improve the visualization of the
plot.
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(b) Li = $xi×1,000
Figure 4.8: Data was simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = 0.8,PB = 0.2
and n = 500 borrowers, η varied from 0 to 1 with step size 0.01. We applied the set condition
of Eq. (4.4) with initial values, I = 20%, A = 3, k = $390K and PN = 12 to classify borrowers.
We used Eqs. (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) to calculate the increase in revenue and profit for each η.
We reran the program 100 times to obtain the average mean values of increase in revenue and
profit as stated in the solid and open square lines respectively. The grey dashed lines displayed
the 95% confidence interval of the mean values.
4.5.2 Case III: A = 4, k = $520K
In this case, bad liars set A to 4 and make them indistinguishable from good payers, the po-
tential amount of loan granted to good payers and bad true tellers will be the same as in case I
in this section. However, the potential amount of loan granted to bad liars will increase from
$350K to $400K. Since in this case, bank would lent 94.74% of loans to potential good payers,
while only 84.21% of them are actually good payers and 10.53% of them are bad liars. For the
two different choices of L, Figure 4.9 shows the mean average increased in revenue and profit.
In both scenarios, our model suggest to set ηopt to 0.76, however, in the attribute dependent
loan scenario, the increase in profit (Rev(ηopt)−Rev(0)−kηopt) is $110.55K, which is 194.72%
more than the single amount loan scenario at $37.51K.
Notice that case II, IV and V generate similar results using attribute dependent loan amount
and single loan amount. We will not repeat the analysis and discussion here.
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Figure 4.9: Data was simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = PB = 0.5 and
n = 500 borrowers, η varied from 0 to 1 with step size 0.01. We applied the set condition of
Eq. (4.4) with initial values, I = 20%, A = 4, k = $520MM and PN = 12 to classify borrowers.
We used Eqs. (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) to calculate the increase in revenue and profit for each η.
We reran the program 100 times to obtain the average mean values of increase in revenue and
profit, together with the 95% confidence interval of the mean values, displayed as the dashed
lines.
4.6 For the borrowers:
Here we show that, provided liars know the attributes being checked and provided a linear lie
elimination cost model as above, liars can always adjust the amount of lies A so as to escape
from credit checks. We varied A from 0 to 12 with step size 0.04 to capture several different
system behaviors. For each value of A, we fixed η and used the classification model in Eq.
(4.4), with parameters as stated in Table 4.1 to generate Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11. Recall
from Section 4.4 that G2 represents the group of borrowers who received a loan but did not
repay, while G4 represents the group of borrowers who correctly did not obtain a loan because
they would not repay. Using the information in Table 4.5, we can calculate odds ratio [15] to
determine the effect of bad borrower lying towards getting loans. From Lohr [17], we know
that odds ratio is the ratio of ab to
c
d , which is
a/b
c/d ,
a
b in turn gives the ratio of getting credit
to not getting credit for bad borrowers who lie, cd gives the same ratio for bad borrowers who
tell the truth. If this ratio is bigger than one, bad borrowers should lie to guarantee the best
odds of getting a loan. Of course bad borrowers can only implement this if they know the
4.7. Conclusions 75
values of the parameters in Table 4.1 as well as those selected by the lender; whether such
knowledge is realistic is open for debate. That the prospective borrower have this information
represents a worst case for the lender. The strategy of borrowers depend on odds ratio, in
addition, our classification model as presented in Eq. (4.4) is independent of the loan amount
granted. Therefore, no matter Li is fixed at $7.2K or dependents on the borrowers attribute
$xi×1,000, the results for the borrowers will be the same. We will not repeat the analysis for
borrowers in this section. However, in the next chapter, we will introduce a measure on the
utility of borrowers which is correlated to the loan amount granted.
We simulated 500 borrowers and computed the average odds ratio of 100 datasets. We
set η = 0, 0.2 and 0.4 to compare the effect of different amount of effort spent on eliminating
lies with the level of odds ratio that can be obtained. Figure 4.10 shows the plot of average
odds ratio using different values of η for different values of A. Note that we only considered
non-trival odds ratios, ignoring the data when either “b” or “c” or both “b” and “c” in Table
4.5 is zero and this contributes to the discontinuity observed in the curves shown in Figure
4.10. Furthermore, Figure 4.10 shows that higher values of η correspond to higher values of
A in order to obtain the same level of odds ratio. That is to say, if banks put more effort on
eliminating lies, bad borrowers must increase the size of their lies in order to maintain the same
chances to be classified into the group of good borrowers. Note that this result is seems strange
if we consider the massive lie required to get past η = 0.99 level checking; remember that our
model does not consider the original attribute reported and disqualify applicants for lying, we
only disqualify applicants for low corrected scores. Moreover, bad borrowers who decided to
lie in order to obtain credit should use the values A where odds ratio is greater than 1.
In order to obtain the confidence interval estimate of average odds ratio, we set η = 0.2
and varied A from 0 to 12. We simulated 100 datasets each with 500 borrowers and reran the
program 100 times. For each A, we computed and sorted the 100 average odds ratio. Then,
we found the 5th and 95th average odds ratio, which gave the 95% confidence interval of mean
odds ratio. Figure 4.11 shows the plot of the mean average of odds ratio and the confidence
interval of different values of A. It also shows that extremely large lies (A > 9.84) are counter
productive, and that very small lies (A < 0.28) are not worth the effort. This shows that the
behavior of a borrower that wishes to lie in a credit check has to be strategic, and therefore it
will take some effort from the bank’s point of view to detect them.
4.7 Conclusions
Improper handling of credit fraud can cause inaccurate loan decisions which contribute to
suboptimal loan book profitability. Bad borrowers may exaggerate (i.e. lie about) one or more
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G2 G4
Lied a b
Didn’t Lie c d
Table 4.5: A two by two table used to calculate odds ratio to determine whether bad borrowers
should lie in order to increase their chance of getting loans.
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Figure 4.10: Data was simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = PB = 0.5 and
n = 500 borrowers. We varied A from 0 to 12 with step size 0.04. We applied the set condition
of Eq. (4.4) with initial values, I = 20% and PN = 12 to generate the table shown in Table 4.5.
To compare the effect of η, we set η equals to 0, 0.2 and 0.4. For each value of η, we computed
the average odds ratio of 100 datasets. The above plot showed that bad borrowers should lie in
the values of A where odds ratio is greater than 1, in order to increase their chance of having
loan approval. Furthermore, it showed that increasing the value of η will require a higher value
of A to maintain the same level of odds ratio.
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Figure 4.11: Data was simulated from XG ∼ N(8,1) and XB ∼ N(4,1) with PG = PB = 0.5 and n
= 500 borrowers. We varied A from 0 to 12 with step size 0.04. We applied the set condition of
Eq. (4.4) with initial values, I = 20%, η = 0.2 and PN = 12 to generate the table shown in Table
3. We reran the program for 100 times to obtain the mean average of odds ratios. We found
the confidence interval estimates of the average odds ratio, as shown as the dashed lines in the
above plot.
of their attributes in order to obtain credit. In this chapter we presented a simple stylized model
of this phenomenon to investigate how banks might respond to these lies. In particular, we
studied the difference between granting a single loan amount versus an attribute dependent
loan amount. The overall results of these two different choices are roughly the same, which
gives us support that our analysis are “robust” to model specification.
From the bank’s perspective our study shows that while there are cases in which huge lies
are better left alone, intelligent effort spent on reducing lies usually increases revenue. Whether
this increased revenue corresponds to increased profit depends, of course, on the cost spent to
reduce the lies and the degree to which bad borrowers lie. In a real-world setting, the cost to
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banks comprises the cost of carrying out credit checks to verify the correctness of the attribute
values reported in the application form, and purchasing credit history and FICO scores of loan
applicants from the credit bureau. To cover the cost, banks can impose an up-front fee to loan
applicants to have their loan established. However, to secure business, many banks will waive
this application fee for their customers, instead incorporating it to the cost of loans through
the interest rate charged. The example discussed in this chapter suggests that, if eliminating
lies is not too expensive, a good strategy for a bank is to reduce the impact of lies only until
they are small enough that the classifier can take over and itself distinguish good from bad
borrowers. In this setting, very small lies are not worth removing while huge, ridiculous, lies
may actually help the classifier, always assuming that only bad borrowers lie. Of course, the
threshold between ‘small’, ‘normal’ and ‘huge’ need to be determined using the appropriate
classifier technique.
From the borrower’s point of view, we showed that it is possible for bad borrowers to lie
intelligently to pass credit checks and obtain loans. In particular, if the bad borrower is aware
of the attribute and the type of model used to classify prospective borrowers as well as the
bank’s cost of reducing lies, we show that it is possible for this clever bad borrower to select
a lie of optimal size to increase their chance of receiving credit while being small enough that
the bank’s credit easily deleted them. Moreover, in the case the loan amount granted depends
on borrower’s attribute, the amount of the lie affects the size of the loan that a bad borrower
would be granted. The optimum lie is therefore the result of a tradeoff between the chances of
getting a loan and the size of the loan so obtained.
In conclusion, the detection of lies in statistical classifier input data can bring important
gains for the bank. The problem is very complex, since liars have a strong incentive to behave
strategically. More research should be focused on identifying incorrect attributes. It would be
interesting to study how robust these results are in a model in which good borrowers as well
as bad ones lie, perhaps for reasons external to the loan-granting process. Another alternative
might be to attempt not to correct the attributes stated on forms as modeled here but to identify
liars and simply reject their applications.
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Chapter 5
Cost Effective Game of Banks and
Dishonest Borrowers
5.1 Introduction
In recent years the application of machine learning or classifiers on retail and small commercial
lending has become more and more popular. Many classifier algorithms are used for credit
scoring, as reviewed in Baesens et al. [1] and in Lessmann et al. [5]. According to Thomas
et al. [7] credit scoring refers to the use of a numerical tool to rank borrowers according to
their desirability as loan counterparty. This desirability reflects their probability of making
repayments as well as the fraction of a loan expected to be recovered in the event of a default.
To build a scoring model, developers analyze historical data on the performance of previously
made loans to determine which borrower characteristics are useful in predicting whether the
loan performed well. From this analysis the next step is to build a credit scoring model, which
is a mathematical formula that can be used to combine the value of the selected characteristics
to generate a credit score. A common credit score known as the FICO 1 score, is a measure
of consumer credit risk. This score ranges from 300 to 850; the higher the score the more
creditworthy the applicant is deemed to be. As mentioned in Frankel [9], lower credit scores
are systematically associated with a higher probability of default on mortgage loans.
To apply for a loan, prospective borrowers have to provide their attributes by filling out an
application form. The credit analyst will then input the required attributes into the credit scor-
ing model to generate a credit score. To balance the risk and return of the financial institution, a
pre-determined cutoff score will be used to obtain the granting decision. Applicants with scores
higher than the cutoff score will be granted credit; while applicants with scores lower than the
1The acronym FICO is derived from “Fair Issac & Co”. This firm is a leading analytics software company
which produces statistical models to predict consumer behavior.
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cutoff score will be denied credit. A Credit scoring model can correctly classify borrowers if
the attributes it employs to evaluate the credit score are at least nearly correct. As discussed in
Dejaeger et al. [4], the accuracy and reliability of data is of high importance, and in the cases
of insufficient data quality, quantitative analysis may fail to provide the desired results, even
leading to incorrect decisions being drawn. Canada’s main banking regulator [34], the Office
of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, has recently suggested Canadian banks should
verify borrower’s income for mortgage loans. With a long history of use of the same credit
scoring model, borrowers learn the characteristics being used to grant loans. Bad borrowers
are motivated to falsify their attributes in order to increase their chances of getting loans. In
Chapter 1, we introduced the concept of bust-out-fraud, where borrowers purposely build up
and maintain a good credit history, they will then use all the available credit in one time to
borrow a large amount of loan, and then abandon the account. We consider this in some sense
to be like lying about the attribute since behavior is modified to get a desired score rather than
for its own intrinsic rewards.
In this chapter, we will study different attitudes and behaviors of borrowers that affect loan
decisions made by the banks. We model the lending business as a game performed between
banks and borrowers. Borrowers can purposely report their characteristics in a way which
favors loan approval. On the other hand, banks can restrict their classifier and tighten credit.
We assume that both borrowers and lenders act so as to maximize their utility. Indeed, under
normal circumstances, there is an equilibrium between the utility of the bank and the borrowers.
At this equilibrium state, banks’ strategy of maximizing expected return and minimizing losses
is profitable and creates an optimal utility; on the other hand, all borrowers are treated fairly
and maintained at their own favorable utility level. Borrowers with credit score higher than the
cutoff score calculated by the bank will be granted credit, otherwise credit will be declined.
With the advent of knowledge on the attributes being used in the scoring model, bad borrowers
learn the best way to lie about their characteristics, which can increase their chances of getting
loans. However, having liars in the portfolio contribute to generating negative utility and profit
to the banks. We will study the stepwise reaction of the banks and borrowers in the following
order:
Step 1. Present the optimal utility level of good and bad borrowers in the equilibrium state.
Step 2. Study the effect of having bad liars on the bank’s optimal utility level.
Step 3. Present the primary remediation process of the bank to update the credit scoring model
in order to increase its utility.
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Step 4. Show that the bank can further increase its utility by exerting effort to verify the correct-
ness of borrowers’ reported attributes.
Step 5. Analyze the reaction of bad liars to maintain at their optimal utility level.
Step 6. Show that it is possible for the lending business to return to its equilibrium status.
Different statistical measures will be used to answer the questions: 1) How did the bank
first notice that there are liars in the portfolio? 2) What is the effect of having bad liars in
the portfolio? 3) Is it worth spending money to check for lies? If yes, 4) What is the optimal
amount to spend and is it worth to spend money as a precaution in case there are liars in the
portfolio?
In addition, we will examine two things: First, the cost required to make a clever lie, that is,
a lie that increases the chances of loan approval while reduces the chance of detection. Next,
the cost required to verify the correctness of borrowers’ reported attributes. Particularly, we
will look into these two costs towards the behavior of the banks and bad liars. We will also
examine if the cost for bad liars to make a clever lie affects their incentive to lie and the lie
intensity that they should add onto their attribute; if the cost required to verify the data of an
application alters the banks’ decision of spending money, and also the exact amount of money
that they should distribute to check for lies. We will show that the stepwise interaction stated
above will terminate and reach a steady state at one of the intermediate steps if either one
of these two costs are too high. In particular, different combinations of these two costs will
result in four different scenarios on the behavior of the bank and bad liars. We will present and
discuss our results in each of the scenarios.
Unlike Chapter 4, we model borrowers’ characteristics to come up with the granting deci-
sion. This chapter focus on modeling credit scores of borrowers to determine the cutoff score.
In Section 5.3, we present evidence from a real dataset that borrowers’ FICO score can be ap-
proximated by triangular distribution. We will assume credit scores of borrowers follow half
triangular distribution. A thorough discussion of this assumption will be presented in Section
5.3. The half triangular distribution has been widely used in different research areas. Woo [13]
considered inference on reliability, and derived the K-th moment of the ratio of two indepen-
dent half triangular distributions with different support. Kim et al. [10] applied half triangular
distribution on Bayesian estimation to derive shape parameter and computed the mean square
error.
The succeeding sections are organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the method and
model used in this research. In Section 5.3, we present data to suggest that a half triangular
distribution model might be reasonable. Section 5.4 presents the objective functions used to
explain the interaction between the banks and bad liars. In Section 5.5, we will present and
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analyze the parameters used in this research. Section 5.6 uses the data described in Section 5.3
to evaluate the objective functions mentioned in Section 5.4 to obtain our results. Conclusions
are discussed in Section 5.7.
5.2 Method and Model
This chapter uses discriminant analysis as presented in Section 2.1. Notice that this research
directly models credit scores of borrowers to determine the cutoff score. The method used to
come up with the credit score, the characteristics of borrowers involved in the calculation of
their respective credit score and the accuracy of the score on reflecting the repayment behavior
of borrowers are all not the focus of this chapter, but will be suggested in future studies. We
apply the set inequality in Eq. (2.5) of Section 2.1 and assume X to be the credit scores of
borrowers. Our dataset contains four different types of borrowers in the lending business:
1. Good borrowers who are honest on their loan application form and will always repay
their loans.
2. Good borrowers who lie on their loan application form but always repay their loans.
3. Bad borrowers who are honest on their loan application form but do not repay their loans.
4. Bad borrowers who lie on their loan application form and do not repay their loans.
We assume our dataset contains borrowers in 1, 3 and 4. In other words, we assume all good
borrowers are honest and all bad borrowers (bad liars and truth tellers alike) will default. Since
we build our model using historical data with known repayment performance, we assume we
have precise information on whether the borrowers lied about their characteristics and also
the amount of lies. We make an assumption that the size of the lie is the difference between
the credit score evaluated using all correct attributes and the credit score evaluated using the
reported attributes with borrowers’ lies.
To study the interaction between the bank and bad liars, we further segment bad payers
into truth tellers and liars. Bad truth tellers were honest on their attributes but they do not
have the ability to repay their loans. They were granted loans due to inefficiencies during the
credit evaluation process; or perhaps it was simply due to bad luck that they defaulted at the
end. Bad liars, on the other hand, falsified their attributes, successfully escaped from credit
checks to obtain loans but also defaulted. In our studies, we assume only bad payers will lie
about their attribute that can increase their credit score XB. We assume that good payers do not
lie, and added noise to XB only. Not all bad payers choose to lie about their characteristics; we
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introduced another Bernoulli random variable Noi, which takes the value one when a particular
bad payer lies, otherwise taking the value zero. The probability that a bad payer will lie is PN .
We further assume that all bad payers who intended to lie will result in adding a positive
constant A to the correct credit score. In addition, to illustrate the effect of eliminating lies,
we assume a parameter η which represents the amount of effort spent on enriching borrowers
reported attributes, and reduces the magnitude of lies in credit score XB from A to A(1− η).
Note that, in our case, η will be a value between 0 to 1. For example, a liar with credit score
600 might alter his attributes in a way which returns a credit score of 700. In this case, since
the borrower lied, Noi takes the value 1 and A would be 100. If the lender did not put any effort
to verify the attributes of the borrowers (η = 0), then the reported score will equal 700, if the
lender put some effort (η = 0.5) on checking the attributes, then the reported score will be 650,
closer to the correct value. If η = 1, that refers to the case where the lender carefully checks
the attribute values reported by the borrower and successfully changed the reported value to
its correct value. In real situations, it is extremely difficult for lenders to exclude all the lies
that borrowers make. However, the chances of having all the lies excluded for a particular
borrower is not impossible, and our model captures that. Furthermore, the incorrect value of
the attributes may not be the cause of an intended lie. For instance, it is difficult to determine
the value of a house: different appraisers might assign a slightly different value for the same
house. Therefore, even if the lender found some discrepancies between the reported value and
the truth value of the borrower’s attributes, as long as the lender truly thinks the borrower has
a high chance of repaying, the loan should be approved. Note that we simplified our research
by assuming all discrepancies from the truth value of attributes are due to a lie. As a result, the
credit score of all the bad payer is
XBnew =
XB, if the bad payer is a truth tellerXB + A(1−η), if the bad payer is a liar
= XB + Noi×A(1−η),where Noi ∼ Bern(PN). (5.1)
[Note that XB is independent of Noi.]
5.3 Data Description
This research directly model credit scores of borrowers to determine the cutoff score used to
classify good and bad payers. In order to have an insight of the distribution of FICO scores, we
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retrieve a consumer credit loan dataset in Lending Club Corporate website2 for loans issued in
2014. Lending Club is an example of a popular social lending media company, also known as
peer-to-peer lending, where lenders and borrowers can do business without the help of institu-
tional intermediaries such as banks. One can refer to Appendix B for more information. The
Lending Club dataset contains approximately 236K borrower records with credit information
normally used by credit agencies to come up with the granting decisions. The FICO scores in
the dataset are reported as two numbers in the form of FICO low and FICO high. Following
the approach of Malekipirbazari and Aksakalli [35], we averaged the two FICO numbers and
call the result the FICO score. Figure 5.1 shows the histogram of FICO scores which exhibit
a positively skewed normal trend. Notice that this dataset only contains applicants who have
successfully obtained their loans; as is all too typical, we have no information on borrowers
who have applied but got rejected on their loan application. Therefore, no reject inference anal-
ysis can be done to predict the performance of borrowers who have requested a loan but got
rejected. Furthermore, borrowers who got their loan approved normally have a higher FICO
scores compared to borrowers who have been declined. Therefore, one can expect the distri-
bution of FICO scores for all applicants to approximately follow a normal trend. Since many
of the records in the dataset have not reached maturity, we filter the data to only include loans
with a status of fully paid or defaulted. There are approximately 74K loans that are fully paid
and 21K loans that are defaulted. Borrowers who fully paid off their loans are good payers
and we found their average FICO score to be 696, while bad payers who defaulted have an
average FICO score of 687, which, as expected is lower than that of good payers. Note that
there is a very small difference between the average FICO score of good and bad payers, that
is due to the fact that the dataset only contains successful loan applicants. If reject inference
had been considered and included applicants who have their loan request rejected, the average
FICO score of bad payers should be lower than 687. Therefore, it is reasonable to approximate
FICO scores of good and bad payers as shown in Figure 5.2. Since granting decisions can eas-
ily be made for borrowers with FICO scores at the extreme ends (very high or very low FICO
scores), classifiers should focus on borrowers with FICO scores in the middle range. There-
fore, we consider using half triangular distribution to approximate credit scores of borrowers,
which captures the middle range and ignores the two tails at the extreme ends.
The rest of the sections are organized as follows. Section 5.3.1 presents an overview and
justifies the usage of the triangular distribution. In Section 5.3.2, we describe the credit scores
of good payers and derive the probability density function using half triangular distribution.
Section 5.3.3 describes and presents the probability density function of credit scores of bad
truth tellers and bad liars.
2http:\\www.lendingclub.com.
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Figure 5.1: The dataset in Lending Club website contains 236K borrowers’ records and re-
ported FICO scores as two numbers: FICO low and FICO high. FICO scores of borrowers
have been calculated as the average of FICO low and FICO high. This histogram exhibit FICO
scores with a positively skewed normal trend.
5.3.1 Overview of Triangular Distribution
This research uses a triangular distribution to illustrate the game between the banks and bor-
rowers in the lending industry. The earliest mention of the triangular distribution dates back
to Simpson [15] in 1755. Since then, the study of the triangular distribution seems to have
vanished in the statistical literature, until R. Schmidt [16] presented the probability density
function of symmetric triangular distribution in 1934. In 1941, Ayyangar [17] presented a brief
study of non-symmetric standard triangular distribution. In the past years, due to the over sim-
plicity of the modeling assumptions towards the application in real data, researchers somehow
neglected the statistical importance of triangular distribution. Recently, the benefit of using a
simpler distribution on research work provides a more obvious understanding on the analysis of
results, in addition, the ease of estimating parameters of the triangular distribution contributed
to more work on financial applications being done using this distribution. This motivates John-
son and Kotz [18] to revisit and provide more details of the triangular distribution. In particular,
Johnson [19] uses it as a proxy for beta distribution in risk analysis to leverage the difficulty
on parameter estimation. Different uses of the triangular distribution correspond to different
number of parameters and symmetry of the triangle can be found in past research works. Re-
search conducted by Clark [21], Grubbs [22], MacCrimmon and Ryaveck [23], Moder and
Rodgers [24], Vaduva [25], Williams [26], Keefer and Bodily [27] and D. Johnson [20] all use
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Figure 5.2: Approximate FICO trend of good and bad payers.
the asymmetric three-parameter triangular distribution presented in Figure 5.3. This asymmet-
ric triangle has base d− c and height 2d−c . The probability density function of this asymmetric
three-parameter triangular distribution is presented in Eq. (5.2).
f (x) =

2
d−c
x−c
m−c , if c ≤ x ≤ m
2
d−c
d−x
d−m , if m ≤ x ≤ d
0, otherwise.
(5.2)
Our research work on the stepwise change of the utility of different borrowers will be studied by
applying a simpler version of the triangular distribution stated in Eq. (5.2); the half triangular
distribution. By setting either the value of c or d to be equal to m, the triangle in Figure 5.3
becomes either a right or left half triangle respectively. As described at the beginning of this
section, credit scoring models should focus on classifying borrowers with their credit scores
in the middle range. By ignoring the extreme ends; left tail of bad borrowers and right tail of
good borrowers, it is reasonable to use half triangular distribution as presented in Figure 5.4 to
do our research.
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Figure 5.3: The probability density function of a asymmetric triangular distribution with sup-
port [c,d], mode m and height 2d−c .
5.3.2 Credit scores of good borrowers
We will focus on classifying good borrowers with a relatively low credit score, therefore, we
assume credit scores of good borrowers follow a left triangular distribution and with values
varying from 2a to 4a. In other words, we set c to 2a, and d to m to 4a in Figure 5.3. Notice
that left triangular distribution has higher density on larger values. The probability density
function of good borrowers can be found in Eq. (5.3). The solid lines in Figure 5.4 plot the
probability density function of the credit scores of various classes of borrowers, including good
borrowers.
f (x|G) =

0, if x < 2a
x−2a
2a2 , if 2a ≤ x ≤ 4a
0, if x > 4a
(5.3)
5.3.3 Credit scores of bad borrowers
As discussed in Section 5.2, bad borrowers can be further subdivided into the group of bad
truth tellers and bad liars. If bad liars did not lie, their correct score should have the same
distribution as the bad truth tellers. In this research, the effect of adding a lie of size A and
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Figure 5.4: This plot presents the probability density function (PDF) of the credit scores of
different borrowers. The solid line displays the PDF of the scores of good borrowers, which
follows left triangular distribution and has values varies from 2a to 4a. The dash line shows
the PDF of bad truth tellers, which follows right triangular distribution and has value varies
from a to 3a. The solid line with circle pattern shows the PDF of the credit scores of bad liars.
It follows right triangular distribution. A constant amount of A represents the amount of lies
that bad liars altered their attributes and resulted in an increase on their score. A parameter η
represents the amount of effort spend on eliminating lies. The mix effect of A and η causes the
credit scores of bad liars to vary from a + A(1−η) to 3a + A(1−η).
spending η amount of effort to correct the score, shifted the characteristic of bad liars from XB
to XB + A(1−η) as shown in Eq. (5.1).
Bad truth tellers
Again, we want to focus on classifying bad borrowers with relatively high credit scores, there-
fore, we assume the credit scores of bad truth tellers to follow right triangular distribution.
That is to say, we set c equal to m equal to a, and d equal to 3a in Figure 5.3. Notice that right
triangular distribution has higher density at its low values. The probability density function of
bad truth tellers are presented in Eq. (5.4). The dash line in Figure 5.4 plotted the probability
density function of the scores of bad truth tellers.
f (x|B) =

0, if x < a
3a−x
2a2 , if a ≤ x ≤ 3a
0, if x > 3a
(5.4)
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Bad liars
As discussed, the distribution of the scores of bad truth tellers and liars should be the same.
Therefore, the scores of bad liars also follows right triangular distribution. Since the score of
bad truth tellers varies from a to 3a, applying Eq. (5.1), the score of bad liars varies from
a+ A(1−η) to 3a+ A(1−η). Note that bad liars have scores larger than bad truth tellers, which
makes them more likely to receive loans. The probability density function of bad liars can
be found in Eq. (5.5). The solid line with circle pattern in Figure 5.4 plotted the probability
density function of the scores of bad liars.
f (x|Blied) =

0, if x < a + A(1−η)
3a+A(1−η)−x
2a2 , if a + A(1−η) ≤ x ≤ 3a + A(1−η)
0, if x > 3a + A(1−η)
(5.5)
Applying the relationship between the scores of bad truth tellers and liars in Eq. (5.1), the
probability density function of all the bad payers is:
f (x|Bnew) =

0, if x < a
(1−PN)3a−x2a2 , if a ≤ x < a + A(1−η)
(1−PN)3a−x2a2 + PN
3a+A(1−η)−x
2a2 , if a + A(1−η) ≤ x < 3a
PN
3a+A(1−η)−x
2a2 , if 3a ≤ x < 3a + A(1−η)
0, if x ≥ 3a + A(1−η)
=

0, if x < a
(1−PN)3a−x2a2 , if a ≤ x ≤ a + A(1−η)
3a−x+PN A(1−η)
2a2 , if a + A(1−η) ≤ x ≤ 3a
PN
3a+A(1−η)−x
2a2 , if 3a ≤ x ≤ 3a + A(1−η)
0, if x > 3a + A(1−η)
(5.6)
Referring to Figure 5.4 and Eq. (5.6), if the reported score is between a and a+ A(1−η), we
are certain that the applicant is a bad truth teller. However, if we know that the reported score
is from a bad borrower and is anywhere between a + A(1−η) to 3a, the applicant maybe a bad
true teller or a bad liar, with probability PN being a bad liar. Furthermore, if we know that the
reported score is from a bad borrower and has value greater than 3a, the borrower is a bad liar.
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5.4 Modeling Borrower and Lender Objective Functions
This section presents the objective functions used to quantify the behavior first of the bank and
next of the bad liars. We will evaluate the value of all these functions in each of the six steps
discussed in the introduction to explain the interactive game performed between the bank and
bad liars. We fix the number of loan applicants to be N in each step. In addition, we will
evaluate the objective functions for good borrowers and bad truth tellers to study how they
have been affected consequently. Notice that our research studies the amount of lies A that
bad liars added onto their attributes to positively affect their credit score and the corresponding
countervailing effort η that banks put to eliminate lies. All the objective functions discuss in
this section will depend on both A and η. Details of these functions are provided below:
5.4.1 The cutoff score
The set inequality stated in Eq. (2.5) of Section 2.1 presents the credit scoring model used in
this research, and we denote γ(η,A) to be the cutoff score of the scoring model. As in previous
chapters, we restrict our work on loans with a repayment of principal and interests, the retail
equivalent of a bullet bond [36]. Borrowers need not pledge any collateral on their loans, and in
case of a default, the bank will not be able to obtain any recovery (that is, the loss given default
is equal to 100%, in line with the guidelines for foundational Basel II credit risk systems [30]).
We denote L to be the amount of loan requested, assumed the same across all borrowers, and
will be charged with the same amount of interest i. Thus L× i is the total amount of interest
paid. In other words, the expected misclassification profit Q that the lender might have been
able to earn is lost if a good payer was classified as a bad payer is L× i. Furthermore, there are
only good and bad payers among all the borrowers, it implies that pB = (1− pG). Our research
captures two types of bad payers: bad truth tellers and bad liars. We derive the probability
density function of all the bad payers in Eq. (5.6) and denoted it as f (x|Bnew). Putting in all
these conditions, the set inequality in Eq. (2.5) of Section 2.1 becomes
AG =
{
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣L(1− pG)LipG ≤ f (x|G)f (x|Bnew)
}
. (5.7)
Note that the above set inequality gives the cutoff score γ(η,A) of our research. We will refer
to Figure 5.4 to determine the possible range for γ(η,A). If γ(η,A) is less than 2a, all the good
borrowers will be granted loans, violating the idea of using discriminant analysis to maximize
expected profit while minimizing expected loss, since if γ(η,A) changes, the expected profit
will remain constant. On the other hand, if γ(η,A) is greater than 3a, none of the bad truth
tellers will be granted loans, it will be more realistic to include a portion of bad truth tellers
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who will have their loans approved but defaulted at the end. Therefore, we decided to restrict
the cutoff score to be between 2a and 3a throughout the paper. By substituting Eq. (5.3) and
(5.6) into the R.H.S. of the set inequality of Eq. (5.7), it becomes
f (x|G)
f (x|Bnew) =
x−2a
2a2
3a−x+PN A(1−η)
2a2
=
x−2a
3a− x + PN A(1−η) . (5.8)
Putting the above back into the set inequality in Eq. (5.7), it gives
AG =
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣L(1− pG)LipG ≤
x−2a
2a2
3a−x+PN A(1−η)
2a2

=
{
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (1− pG)ipG ≤ x−2a3a− x + PN A(1−η)
}
=
{
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣x ≥ 3a(1− pG) + PN(1−η)A(1− pG) + 2aipGipG + (1− pG)
}
. (5.9)
From the above set inequality, we know that the cutoff score of our scoring model is
γ(η,A) =
3a(1− pG) + PN(1−η)A(1− pG) + 2aipG
ipG + (1− pG) . (5.10)
5.4.2 The number of loans granted
We will capture the number of loans granted and use this as a reference to detect any abnormal
behavior among different borrowers. As mentioned in Section 5.4, we assumed there are N
loans granted at each of the six steps that we will study, and if there is no change in any lending
policy to tighten or loosen credit, the total amount of loans granted should be similar in each
step. In real situations, banks should have a similar amount of ending net receivables and
origination volumes each month. Since we assumed the loan size and interest rate to be the
same amongst all borrowers, looking at the total number of loans issued is the same as looking
at the total dollar amount granted.
When bad liars change their correct attribute, there will be more bad payers with scores
greater than the cutoff value. This will result in more loans granted to bad payers and thus,
there will be an increase in the total number of loans granted. This acts as the first warning
signal for the banks to be aware that something might have gone wrong. We denote NG, NB
and NBlied to be the number of loans granted to good borrowers, bad truth tellers and bad
liars respectively. Notice that the number of loans granted to these borrowers is the number of
borrowers with their corresponding score greater than the cutoff score. Furthermore, we denote
NT to be the total number of loans issued. It follows that NT is the sum of NG, NB and NBlied.
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Applying the probability density functions in Eq. (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5), we know that
NG = N pG
∫ ∞
γ(η,A)
f (x|G)dx
= N pG
∫ 4a
γ(η,A)
x−2a
2a2
dx
= N pG
[
γ(η,A)
a
− γ
2(η,A)
4a2
]
, (5.11)
NB = N(1− pG)(1−PN)
∫ ∞
γ(η,A)
f (x|B)dx
= N(1− pG)(1−PN)
∫ 3a
γ(η,A)
3a− x
2a2
dx
= N(1− pG)(1−PN)
[
9
4
− 3γ(η,A)
2a
+
γ2(η,A)
4a2
]
, (5.12)
NBlied = N(1− pG)PN
∫ ∞
γ(η,A)
f (x|Blied)dx
= N(1− pG)PN
∫ 3a+A(1−η)
γ(η,A)
3a + A(1−η)− x
2a2
dx
= N(1− pG)PN
[
(3a + A(1−η))2
4a2
− (3a + A(1−η))γ(η,A)
2a2
+
γ2(η,A)
4a2
]
= N(1− pG)PN
[
(3a + A(1−η)−γ(η,A))2
4a2
]
(5.13)
and finally
NT = NG + NB + NBlied. (5.14)
5.4.3 The utility function of different parties
The interaction of the bank and bad liars affects the utility level of the different parties. Note
that higher utility value represents more satisfaction of each party. Bad liars increase their
utility level by adding a quantity A of lies to their score, however, this will lower the utility
level of the banks. The bank can then choose either to directly catch liars or to tighten credit
in the portfolio to remediate the amount of losses incurred, the results of those two actions will
increase the utility of banks, but may affect the utility of other parties in different directions.
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The following shows the derivation of the utility function of different parties.
For the banks
We define the utility function of the bank to be its profit per loan, which is the revenue earned
less the cost spent on giving out loans. We denote E[Rev(η,A)] to be the total expected revenue
of the bank. In our assumption, the bank earns only the interest amount of L× i from each good
payers, and loss the loan amount of L in the event of a default from bad payers. Therefore, the
expected revenue of the bank is the amount of interest earned from each good payer multiplied
by the number of loans granted to good payers, less the loss loan amount of L from each
defaulted bad payer multiplied by the number of loans granted to bad payers. Notice that the
number of loans granted to bad payers is the total of the number of loans granted to bad truth
tellers and bad liars. Therefore,
E[Rev(η,A)]
= Li NG −L [NB + NBlied]
= Li NG −L NB−L NBlied
= Li N pG
[
γ(η,A)
a
− γ
2(η,A)
4a2
]
−L N(1− pG)
[
9
4
− (3a + PN A(1−η))γ(η,A)
2a2
+
γ2(η,A)
4a2
+
(3a + A(1−η))2PN
4a2
− 9PN
4
]
, (5.15)
where the last equality holds if we substitute Eq. (5.11), (5.12) and (5.13) for NG, NB and NBlied
respectively. Notice that if the bank can correctly classify all the applicants, the maximum
potential gain is N pG i L , and the maximum potential loss is N (1− pG) L.
Loan application costs involved in processing all applications include credit checks, prop-
erty appraisals for mortgage loans or properties pledged as collateral, and basic administrative
costs [2]. Thus, it is clear that more effort spent on eliminating lies will result in higher costs,
and this cost will apply to all loan applicants. To simplify our model, we fix the unit cost of
checking lies and assume the magnitude of lies does not affect the cost of eliminating them. We
further assumed that the total cost spent on granting loans and eliminating lies to be linear in
η. We define the total cost to be Nkη, where k is the proportionality constant which represents
the unit cost of effort spent to eliminate lies. Therefore, the utility function of the bank is
UBK(η,A)
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= E[Rev(η,A)]−N kη
= Li NG −L NB−L NBlied −N kη
= Li N pG
[
γ(η,A)
a
− γ
2(η,A)
4a2
]
−L N(1− pG)
[
9
4
− (3a + PN A(1−η))γ(η,A)
2a2
+
γ2(η,A)
4a2
+
(3a + A(1−η))2PN
4a2
− 9PN
4
]
−N kη,
(5.16)
where the last equality follows if we substitute Eq. (5.15) for E[Rev(η,A)].
For the borrowers
As described by Anderson [8], credit allows borrowers to buy now and pay later. Borrowers
who were granted loans used the borrowed money to purchase goods and services to fulfill
their needs. Roberts and Jones [31] studied money attitudes of college students and referred to
money as a tool of power. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton [32] described money as a
form of power that consists of respect, consideration and envy from others and represents the
goals of a culture. Borrowers will obtain certain level of satisfaction through the use of the
money. Easterlin [37] stated that more money typically means more happiness. The utility of
borrowers should be correlated to the amount of loan that was granted. Furthermore, Fernald
et al. [38] studied the psychological effects on granting microcredit loans to poverty groups
in developing countries and concluded that individuals who were granted credit exhibit lower
levels of depressive symptoms. In other words, borrowers who applied but did not receive a
loan, either due to the misclassification of the credit scoring model or because they truly do
not have the ability to repay, should have negative utility. It is very difficult to measure the
dissatisfaction of borrowers who have their loan application rejected, therefore, to simplify our
research work, we assume borrowers who applied for the loan but did not get it granted have
zero utility.
Many, although not all, good borrowers were granted loans and in return must repay the
loan amount and interest to the bank. Denote I to be the percentage of benefit that good
borrowers gained with the use of the loan, where I is greater than the interest rate i, such that
the satisfaction that good borrowers obtained from using the loan is greater than the amount of
interest that they have to repay. Therefore, the amount of benefit that each good borrower gains
is L(I− i), and the total amount of utility for all the good borrowers is
UG(η,A) = L (I− i) NG = L I NG −Li NG = L (I− i) N pG
[
γ(η,A)
a
− γ
2(η,A)
4a2
]
, (5.17)
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where the last equality follows if we substitute Eq. (5.11) for NG. We need to model the utility
of good borrowers. Honest good borrowers perceive themselves to be better off with the loan
then without it; in other words they receive a utility of L (1 + I) by receiving a loan L and must
repay L (1 + i) for a relative utility of L (I − i). Later we will change I to 40% and i to 30% to
demonstrate the results.
Bad truth tellers were honest about their attributes and truly do not have the ability to repay
their loan. They were granted loan due to the misclassification of the credit scoring model.
After they received their loan, they will use it to satisfy their needs. We assume the utility of
each bad truth teller equals to the amount of loan that they received. Therefore, the total utility
for all the bad truth tellers is
UB(η,A) = L NB = L N(1− pG)(1−PN)
[
9
4
− 3γ(η,A)
2a
+
γ2(η,A)
4a2
]
, (5.18)
where the last equality follows if we substitute Eq. (5.12) for NB.
Bad liars exert effort to learn about the attributes used to make granting decisions in the
credit scoring model. Afterward, they have to figure out a safe way to lie effectively and
without being caught. In reality credit fraud, once detected, can cause very serious harm to a
borrower’s credit history. The liars name might be put onto a fraudulent list under all credit
bureaus system, such that all financial institutes who obtain credit information from the bureaus
before finalizing their granting decision will know about their previous fraudulent behavior
and likely decline their application. Equifax Canada Inc. launched a fraud prevention and
management tool in 2010; Citadel [33], to match new applications with a universe of previous
applications to uncover suspicious behavioral patterns of data that suggest fraudulent activity.
Thus, it is very important for bad liars to make a clever lie, and under our assumptions, a
larger amount of lie added to the correct attribute corresponds to higher risk. For instance, it
is possible for a waitress to earn $500 extra per month as tips in a busy high-end restaurant,
however, it is suspicious if the waitress reported $5000 as the extra amount of tips that she
earned each month. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the amount of lie added to the
correct attribute is linear to its cost. We define the total cost of lying to be Ah, where h is the
proportionality constant. Note that this cost applied to all the bad liars, no matter whether they
received their loans or not. We further fix the unit cost of lying to be the same amongst all
borrowers and assume that all borrowers lie at the same level. Therefore, the total utility of bad
liars is
UBlied(η,A) = L NBlied − (1− pG)PN N Ah
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= L N(1− pG)PN
[
(3a + A(1−η)−γ(η,A))2
4a2
]
− (1− pG)PN N Ah, (5.19)
where the last equality follows if we substitute Eq. (5.13) for NBlied. In general the overall
utility for all the borrowers is
UT (η,A) = UBK(η,A) + UG(η,A) + UB(η,A) + UBlied(η,A)
= Li NG −L NB−L NBlied −N kη+ L I NG −Li NG + L NB + L NBlied − (1− pG)PN N Ah
= L I NG −N kη− (1− pG)PN N Ah, (5.20)
where the second equality holds if we substitute Eq. (5.16), (5.17), (5.18) and (5.19) for
UBK(η,A),UG(η,A),UB(η,A) and UBlied(η,A). The last equality stated the overall utility of
the lending business, it equals to the total amount of interest earned from good borrowers less
the total amount banks spend on checking lies and the total amount bad liars spend to make
lies.
5.5 Parameters and Analysis
We focus on lending businesses that target customers in the sub-prime category. Borrowers
with higher credit risk [28] may choose to borrow loans from sub-prime lending institutions,
which demand higher interest rates, but in return require fewer credit checks and which provide
easier and faster access to cash. We will sub-divide this section into two parts. In the first part,
we will fix some of the parameters used in this research to correspond to the conditions of a sub-
prime lending institution. In the second part, we will analyze the unit cost to lie h and the unit
cost to check for lies k. In particular, we will show that there are four different combinations
of h and k which translate into four different scenarios.
5.5.1 Fixed Parameters
The fixed parameters used for this research are shown in Table 5.1. We fix the number of loan
applicants N to be 1MM. The loan amount L to be $1K and is the same across all borrowers.
Therefore, the entire portfolio consist of $1BN exclusive of interest charges3. We fix the in-
terest rate i to be at 30% per annum. Credit card and department store card issuers typically
range their interest rate from 7% to 36%, depending upon the bank’s risk evaluation methods
and borrowers’ credit history. As mentioned, we assume good borrowers gain benefit of 40%
with the use of the loan. In other words, good borrowers can gain $400 worth of benefit but
3Only principal is counted.
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Table 5.1: Parameters used to generate results for each of the six steps described in the intro-
duction .
N L i I pG PN a
1MM $1K 30% 40% 80% 50% 200
have to repay $300 as interest, therefore, the net gain of a good borrower is $100, which is 10%
of the amount borrowed. On the other hand, since interest rate has been fixed at 30%, banks
gain $300 if the customer is a good payer and lose $1K if the customer is a bad payer. The
Lending Club dataset discussed in Section 5.3 had 74K of good payers and 21K of bad payers,
so roughly 80% good payers. Therefore, we set pG to 80%; meaning that 80% of the loan
applicants are good payers, while 20% of them are bad payers. That is to say, if the bank can
perfectly classify all the applicants, the potential gain of the bank is 1MM×30%×$1K ×80%
= $240MM which is greater than the potential loss of 1MM×$1K×20% = $200MM. If the
bank granted loans to all applicants without the use of any classifier, the expected revenue gain
in this portfolio is 4%4. Since this research study the effect of borrowers lie to obtain loans,
we further assume half the bad payers added lies onto their attributes in order to increase their
chances of loan approval, therefore, we equate PN to 0.5. In reality, there are different ways
to examine whether borrowers lie to obtain loans from the historical dataset. For example, it
will be subspicious for an 18 year old person to have an income of $1MM per annum, in this
case, this person maybe a fraud. Research on distinguishing borrowers into bad liars and truth
tellers are mostly under development. Other applications on detecting liars include Walczyk et
al. [39], who uses employee’s response time and facial expressions to distinguish whether the
employee lied, similar techniques can be modify and apply in the context of credit scoring.
We (arbitrarily) assume the synthetic credit score in this chapter has value ranges from 200
to 8005. Referring to Figure 5.4, we set a to 200, and thus the scores of bad liars vary from
200+ A(1−η) to 600+ A(1−η). As η can take values between 0 to 1, this equates the maximum
score for bad liars to 600 + A. Together with the restriction that the maximum score has to be
less than or equal to 800, this implies that A must take values between 0 and 200.
5.5.2 Modeling Cost of Lying and Cost of Checking
This research studies the interaction of bad borrowers lie and the corresponding amount of
money that banks spend to validate the reported data. The unit cost of lying h can motivate
bad borrowers to lie and affect the lie intensity that bad liars added to their reported attributes
4Expected revenue of the bank if loans were granted to all applicants: 240−2001000 ×100% = 4%
5We chose this (200,800) range to make this synthetic credit score to be similliar to FICO score.
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which in turns affects their calculated credit score. Bad liars may have more incentive to lie
if h is low and may even choose not to lie if h is too high. On the other hand, the unit cost
of checking lies k affects the amount of effort that banks spend on verifying the correctness of
the reported attributes provided by applicants which can improve the accuracy of credit scores.
If k is small, banks may choose to put more effort to check for lies, and in cases where k is
very large, banks may even choose not to exert effort to check for lies. In this subsection, we
study the way in which the optimal behavior of bad liars to lie and of banks in checking for
lies depends on different values of h and k. We assume that h and k are both independent of the
lie magnitude and are identical across all loan applicants. We apply the fixed parameters stated
in Table 5.1 and arbitrarily set the range of h to vary from $0 to $3 and the range of k to vary
from $0 to $70, both with step size $0.01. We conclude that different combinations of h and
k will result in the following four different scenarios in the interactive game between the bank
and bad liars:
1. Not economical to lie
2. Economical to lie but
(a) Not economical to check for lies
(b) Always economical to check for lies
(c) Periodically check for lies
Figure 5.5 shows the plot of h versus k with each of the shaded regions representing one of the
scenarios mentioned above. The top dark gray region has h ranging from $2.62 to $3 and k can
be any value between $0 to $70. It represents the first scenario where it is not economical to lie
and there will be no liars in the lending business. The light gray shaded region on the right has
h ranging from $0 to $2.61 and k ranging from $65.9 to $70, represents the second scenario
where it is economical to lie but not economical to check for lies. The black region also has h
ranging from $0 to $2.61 and k ranging from $0 to $65.9, represents the third scenario where
liars should always lie and banks should always spend money to check for lies. The white
region has h ranging from $0 to $2.04 and k from $27.3 to $65.9, represents the fourth scenario
where bad liars and banks should periodically lie and check for lies respectively. Note that our
analysis limit the unit cost to check for lies to $3 and the unit cost to lie to $60, if we set h and
k to some higher values, we believe Scenario 1 and 2a will have their h and k values extended
to infinity respectively. We will discuss and analyze each scenario in detail in the next section.
Note that we study the interactive game between banks and bad liars with liars act first to
choose whether to lie and the lie intensity, banks will then respond to sustain their profitability.
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Figure 5.5: The plot above shows that different combinations of h and k results in four different
scenarios, each represents a different interaction between the bank and bad liars. We varied h
from $0 to $3 and k from $0 to $70 each with step size 0.1. The top dark gray region represents
the scenario where it is not economical to lie. The light gray region represents the scenario
where it is economical to lie but not to check for lies. The black and white regions both
represents the scenario where it is economical to lie and to check for lies, with the black region
representing lying and checking should be done periodically, and white region represents lying
and checking should always be carried out.
The strategy of the behavior appears to depend on the relative cost of the banks checking lies
and the cost of the liars to lie. When this relative cost is tilted in favor of the banks (cheap for
banks to check, expensive for liars to lie) liars sometimes “lose” the game by stopping their
lies, at least at some game cycles. When the relative cost is tilted in favor of the liars (cheap for
liars to lie, relatively expensive for banks to check), the liars will certainly lie, and sometimes
even the banks will stop checking. From bad liars’ point of view, when it is cheap that banks
can afford to check for lies, Figure 5.5 shows that bad liars will lie periodically and play a
game with the banks on the time period that they will lie. When it is relatively more expensive
to check for lies, Figure 5.5 shows that bad liars will always lie, since they know that it costs
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more for banks to catch them, and if k > $65.9, banks cannot even afford to spend any effort to
eliminate lies. On the other hand, when the unit cost of lying is too high (h > $2.61), bad liars
stop lying as they cannot afford to lie. When the unit cost of lying is less than $2.61, bad liars
will lie periodically if it is cheap for banks to catch them and will always lie if it is expensive
for banks to eliminate lies.
From the banks’ point of view, if it is very expensive to verify borrowers’ attributes, they
cannot afford to check for lies and won’t put effort on eliminating lies. If it is relatively cheap
to validate borrowers’ attributes, bad liars will always lie and banks will have to always exert
effort to check for lies. When it is cheap to check borrowers’ attributes for lies, bad liars will lie
and banks will check for lies periodically. If it is cheap for liars to lie but relatively expensive
for banks to check for lies, bad liars will always lie and banks will always check for lies. When
lying is very expensive, bad liars won’t be able to afford to lie, and banks do not have to spend
any effort to validate borrowers’ reported attributes. It is interesting to see that if the unit cost
to check for lies is low, our model suggests banks to check for lies periodically. When the cost
to check for lies increases, our model suggests banks to always exert effort to check borrowers’
reported attributes. Since the interactive game presented here studies bad liars lie and then
banks react to maintain its profitability, we have to look at the action of banks and bad liars at
the same time.
5.6 Results and Analysis
This section will be sub-divided into four subsections, each describing one of the scenarios
mentioned in Section 5.5.2. In each subsection, we will apply the parameters presented in
Table 5.1 and arbitrarily set a value for h and k, which is within the ranges in the scenarios as
described in Section 5.5.2 to imitate the interaction between the bank and bad liars. Table 5.2
provides the descriptions of the objective functions that will be presented in each of the six steps
of interaction between the bank and bad liars as mentioned in the introduction. In particular,
we will show that some scenarios produce fewer steps, indeed, the stepwise interaction will
converge to a steady state before reaching the last step. Thorough discussion of the results and
the impact of the utility of different parties will be provided.
5.6.1 Scenario 1: Not Economical to Lie
This scenario represents the situation where liars cannot afford to make lies and results in hav-
ing no liars in the lending business. Using the parameters presented in Table 5.1, we generated
the plot in Figure 5.5, and realized that it is not profitable for bad liars to lie if the unit cost of
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Notation Descriptions
η Bank’s effort to check for lies
A Amount of lies that bad lies added
γ The cutoff score
NG Number of good borrowers who were granted loans
NB Number of bad truth tellers who were granted loans
NBlied Number of bad liars who were granted loans
NT Total number of loans granted
LiNG Expected interest amount earned
LNB Expected loan amount loss to bad truth tellers
LNBlied Expected loan amount loss to bad liars
Nkη The cost for banks to check for lies
UBK The utility of the bank
LING Total benefits of good borrowers
LING Total cost of good borrowers
UG The utility of good borrowers
UB The utility of bad truth tellers
LNBlied Expected loan amount granted to bad liars
(1− pG)PN NAh The total cost for bad liars to lie
UBlied The utility of bad liars
UT Total utility of all parties
Table 5.2: Description of the objective functions that will be presented in the four scenarios
mentioned in Section 5.5.2.
lying is greater than $2.61 [we did not compute results for h > $3]. To illustrate this scenario,
we apply the parameters presented in Table 5.1 and arbitrarily set h to $3, calculated all the
objective functions as stated in Table 5.2 and presented the results in Table 5.3. Under normal
circumstances, there are no liars in the lending business, and banks do not have to put any effort
to check for lies in the reported attributes of applicants. Therefore, in Step 1 presented in Table
5.3, both η and A are set to be 0. Another point of view is that there are always potential liars in
the lending business, but in this scenario bad liars have not yet learned how to produce clever
lies and so choose not to lie, therefore, in the results presented in Table 5.3, we separate the
objective functions for bad payers into bad honest payers and bad liars independently.
Nevertheless, this results in having a cutoff score of γ(η = 0,A = 0) = 491, meaning that
if the credit score of the applicant is greater than 491, they will be granted loans, otherwise
declined. We substituted a = 200, A = 0, η = 0 and added the cutoff score γ = 491 into Figure
5.3 to generate Figure 5.6. Notice that the triangle presented with dash lines is overlapping
with the triangle presented in solid lines with circle patterns, they represent the PDFs of bad
truth tellers and bad liars respectively, both triangles have credit scores ranging from 200 to
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Step 1
η 0
A 0
γ 491
NG 759K
NB 7.44K
NBlied 7.44K
NT 774K
LiNG $228MM
LNB $-7.44MM
LNBlied $-7.44MM
Nkη $0
UBK 213MM
LING $303MM
LiNG $-228MM
UG 76MM
UB 7.44MM
LNBlied $7.44MM
(1− pG)PN NAh $0
UBlied 7.44MM
UT 303MM
Table 5.3: Table of results for Scenario 1 where it is not economical to lie.
600. The triangle with solid lines has scores ranging from 400 to 800 representing the PDF of
good borrowers. The vertical line with x = 491 represents the cutoff score. The gray shaded
region showed the density of the scores where the corresponding applicants will be granted
loans. In our assumption of having 1MM applicants, the methodology applied in this paper
resulted in granting 774K loans in total, of which 759K are granted to good payers and 14.9K
are granted to bad payers. Then the booking rate using this methodology is 77.4%6. The
bank’s revenue earned from good payers is $232MM7 and incurred losses of $14.9MM from
bad payers. Comparing to without the use of classifier to grant loans, the bank’s revenue
increased from $40MM to $217MM8, contribute to a 443%9 increase in revenue. The utility
of the bank, good payers and bad payers are 213MM, 75.9MM and 14.9MM respectively. The
total utility in this step is 304MM.
As times goes by, bad liars learn the methodology and characteristics that banks use to
6Booking rate = 7741000 = 77.4%
7Bank’s revenue earned from good payers = 774K×$1000×0.3 =232MM
8Bank’s revenue = $232MM - $14.9MM = $217.1MM
9Bank’s increased in revenue = 217−4040 ×100% = 443%
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Figure 5.6: This plot presents the probability density function (PDF) of the scores of different
borrowers. We set a to 200, A to 0 and η to 0 in Figure 5.3 and added the cut off line γ = 491.
The dash line overlapping the solid line with circle patterns have scores ranging from 200 to
600 represents the PDF of bad honest borrowers and bad liars respectively. The solid line with
scores ranging from 400 to 800 represents the PDF of good borrowers. The vertical line with
x = 491 showed the cutoff value. The gray shaded region showed the applicants with their score
greater than the cutoff value and will be granted loans.
grant loans. They will be motivated to add lies onto their attributes in order to increase their
chances of loan approval. As discussed in Section 5.5.1, and under the assumptions in this
chapter, the maximum amount of scores that bad liars can add onto their actual score is 200. In
this scenario banks haven’t put effort to check for lies and they keep using the same strategy to
grant loans, therefore, η equals 0 and γ equals 491. To investigate the possibility of bad liars
lie and the optimal amount of lies that they should add onto their attributes, we applied the
parameters presented in Table 5.1, set η = 0 and γ = 491, varied A from 0 to 200 with stepsize
0.01 and for each values of A we calculate UBlied as presented in Eq. (5.19). The plot of UBlied
versus A in Figure 5.7 showed that maximum utility of bad liars occurred when A equals to 0,
which implies that using the parameters in this step, it is not profitable for bad liars to lie and
they should set A to 0 in order to obtain their maximum utility of 7.44MM. Notice that the plot
of UBlied versus A in Figure 5.7 shows a concave up curve, stating that bad liars can only obtain
maximum utility at the end points, either at A = 0 or at A = 200. Indeed, the optimal lie that
bad liars should add onto their actual score follows Kolmogorov’s zero-one law [40], stating
that bad liars should either choose not to lie (set A = 0) or to produce maximum amount of lie
(set A = 200).
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Figure 5.7: The above plot showed the utility of bad liars (in millions) versus different values
of A. We applied the parameters in Table 5.1, set η = 0 and γ = 491, arbitrarily assigned h to
$3, varied A from 0 to 200 with stepsize 0.01, and for each values of A calculated UBlied. This
plot showed that maximum utility of bad liars occur at A equals 0, stating that bad liars should
not any generate lie in order to maintain at their maximum utility level.
5.6.2 Scenario 2a: Economical to Lie But Not Economical to Check for
Lies
This scenario represents the situation where it is economical for bad liars to lie but not for
banks to check for lies. Figure 5.5 shows that this scenario has h less than $2.61 and k can be
anywhere between $65.8 to $80 [we did not compute results for k > $80]. In this case, bad liars
can afford to add lies onto their actual attribute, however, it is not optimal for banks to spend
money to check for lies since the unit cost to check for lies is too high. We arbitrarily set h to
$1 and k to $70, evaluate all the objective functions as stated in Table 5.2 and presented the
results in Table 5.4. Notice that the numbers in Step 1 of Table 5.3 and 5.4 are the same, it
represents the situation where there are no liars in the lending business, and banks do not have
to spend money to check for lies. In Step 2, bad liars learned the way to lie but still have to
determine the appropriate amount of lies to add onto their attributes in order to escape from
credit checks and obtain loans. Figure 5.8 is constructed much like Figure 5.7, only changing
h from $3 to $1. The plot of UBlied versus A in Figure 5.8 suggested that bad liars should set A
to 200 in order to obtain their maximum utility of 39.7MM.
In addition, we substitute a = 200, A = 200, η = 0 and added the cutoff score x = 491 into
Figure 5.3 to generate Figure 5.9. Notice that the triangles presented by the dash lines and the
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Step 1 Step2 Step3
η 0 0 0
A 0 200 200
γ 491 491 536
NG 759K 759K 707K
NB 7.44K 7.44K 2.53K
NBlied 7.44K 59.7K 43.4K
NT 774K 826K 753K
LiNG $228MM $228MM $212MM
LNB $-7.44MM $-7.44MM $-2.53MM
LNBlied $-7.44MM $-59.7MM $-43.4MM
Nkη $0 $0 $0
UBK 213MM 160MM 166MM
LING $303MM $303MM $283MM
LiNG $-228MM $-228MM $-212MM
UG 75.9MM 75.9MM 70.7MM
UB 7.44MM 7.44MM 2.53MM
LNBlied $7.44MM $59.7MM $43.4MM
(1− pG)PN NAh $0 $-20MM $-20MM
UBlied 7.44MM 39.7MM 23.4MM
UT 303MM 283MM 263MM
Table 5.4: Table of results for Scenario 2a where it is economical to lie but not to check for
lies.
solid lines, representing bad true tellers and good payers respectively, have not changed when
compared to Figure 5.6. The triangle presented by solid lines with circle patterns, representing
bad liars, moved to the right and has scores ranging from 400 to 800. The increase in scores of
bad liars is due to the added lies on their reported attributes. The shaded region in Figure 5.9
has a higher density compared to the shaded region in Figure 5.6, meaning that more applicants
will be granted loans, consistent with the results presented in Table 5.4 that NBlied increased
by 702%10, while NT increased by 6.76%11 from Step 1 to Step 2. The booking rate increased
by 77.4% to 82.6%12 from Step 1 to Step 2, contributed to an increase of roughly 5.22%. In
normal situations, if there is no change in granting strategy or open credit, the number of loans
granted in each period and booking rate should be about the same. An increase of 6.76% and
5.22% in the total number of loans granted and booking rate respectively from Step 1 to Step
2 should draw the bank’s attention that some conditions might have changed and they may
10Number of loans granted to bad liars increased by 59.7−7.447.44 ×100% = 702%
11Total loans granted increased by 826−774774 ×100% = 6.76%
12Booking rate = 8261000 ×100% = 82.6%
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want to validate their existing granting strategy. Moreover, from the bank’s point of view, the
incurred losses from bad payers increased by 301%13. The overall utility of the bank decreased
by 24.6%14. Although there is a cost of $20MM for bad liars to make an appropriate lie, UBlied
in general increased by 434%15. The utility of good payers and bad honest payers remain the
same as in Step 1, but the total utility decreased by 6.59%16.
The primary remediation that the bank should consider is to update the classification model,
which is under this framework, to recalibrate the cutoff score γ. We substitute η = 0, A = 200
and the parameters as presented in Table 5.1 into Eq. (5.10) to recalculate the cutoff score γ
to be 536. We regenerated Figure 5.9 by moving γ from 491 to 536 and presented the new
plot in Figure 5.10. Comparing Figure 5.9 and 5.10, the shaded region decreased in density,
stating that the density of applicants with scores higher than the cutoff score has decreased.
This result can also been seen in Step 3 of Table 5.4. The number of loans granted to good
payers, bad honest payers, and bad liars have all been decreased. The total number of loans
granted decreased by 8.82%17and booking rate decreased to 75.3%. The bank’s revenue earned
from good payers decreased by 7.30%18 Step 1 to Step 3. The total incurred loss of the bank
from bad payers decreased by 54%19. In general, the utility of the bank in Step 3 is higher than
that in Step 2 but not as high as in Step 1. The utility of good payers, bad honest payers and
bad liars all decreased. Note that the utility of bad liar is still relatively higher than that in Step
1. Overall utility in the lending environment decreased by 7.29%20.
From the above results, it is obvious that changing the cutoff score of the classifier severely
affects good and bad honest borrowers who have credit scores between 491 to 536. This group
of borrowers have their loan request rejected due to the change of the cutoff score, and indeed
is because of the existence of bad liars’ lies. In addition, the utility of all parties decreases,
banks should investigate other remediation process which can lower the utility of bad liars but
maintain the utility of good payers and the bank to be at a similar level as stated in Step 1. We
examine the possibility for banks to put effort to directly eliminate lies in applicants’ attribute.
We set A = 200, k = $70 and varied η from 0 to 1 with step size 0.001. For each value of
η, we first evaluate the corresponding γ by using Eq. (5.10), then calculate UBK by applying
the formula as stated in Eq. (5.16). Figure 5.11 presents the plot of UBK versus η, which
13Bank’s incurred loss from bad payers increased by 59.7+7.44−14.914.9 ×100% = 301%
14Bank’s utility decreased by 160.5−213213 ×100% = 24.6%
15Increased in bad liars’ utility = 39.7−7.447.44 = 434%
16Decreased in total utility = 283−303303 ×100% = 6.6%
17Decreased in total number of loans granted = 753−826826 ×100% = 8.82%
18Decreased in bank’s revenue earned from good payers in Step 1 to Step 3 = 212−228228 ×100% = 7.30%
19Bank’s incurred loss to bad payers = (43.4+2.53)−(59.7+7.44)(59.7+7.44) ×100% = −54%
20Decreased in total utility = 263−283283 ×100% = 7.29%
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Figure 5.8: The above plot showed the utility of bad liars (in millions) versus different values
of A. We applied the parameters in Table 5.1, set η= 0 and γ = 491, arbitrarily assigned h to $1,
varied A from 0 to 200 with step size 0.01, and for each values of A calculated UBlied. This plot
showed that maximum utility of bad liars occur at A equals 200 , stating that bad liars should
lie at their maximum to obtain at their maximum utility level.
Figure 5.9: This plot presents the probability density function (PDF) of the attributes of differ-
ent borrowers. We set a to 200, A to 200 and η to 0 in Figure 5.3 and added the cut off line
γ = 491. The dash line with attribute values ranging from 200 to 600 represents the PDF of bad
honest borrowers. The solid line with circle patterns with attribute values ranging from 400 to
800 represents the PDF of bad liars, while the solid line with attribute values ranging from 400
to 800 represents the PDF of good borrowers. The gray shaded region showed the applicants
with their attribute value greater than the cutoff value and will be granted loans.
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Figure 5.10: The cutoff value has been recalculated by substituting A = 200, η = 0 into Eq.
(5.10) and resulted with γ = 536. This plot presents the probability density function (PDF) of
the attributes of different borrowers. We set a to 200, A to 200 and η to 0 in Figure 5.3 and
added the cut off line γ = 536. The dash line with attribute values ranging from 200 to 600
represents the PDF of bad honest borrowers. The solid line with circle patterns with attribute
values ranging from 400 to 800 represents the PDF of bad liars, while the solid line with
attribute values ranging from 400 to 800 represents the attributes of good borrowers. The gray
shaded region showed the applicants with their attribute value greater than the cutoff value and
will be granted loans.
shows a monotone decreasing curve, stating that the bank should set η to 0 in order to maintain
at its maximum utility of 166MM. In this scenario, banks should not put effort to check for
lies in applicants’ attribute due to the fact that the unit cost to check for lies is too high. In
the succeeding scenarios, we will lower the unit cost to check for lies, examine the effect of
directly checking liars, and determine the optimal amount of effort that banks should spend to
check for lies.
5.6.3 Scenario 2b: Always Economical to Lie and Check for Lies
This scenario represents the situation where it is always economical for bad liars to lie and for
banks to check for lies. The white region in Figure 5.5 shows the values of h and k which
contribute to this scenario. To illustrate this scenario, we keep h = $1 which is the same as in
Scenario 2a, arbitrarily set k = $50 and presented the results in Table 5.5. Notice that all the
values in Steps 1, 2, and 3 stated in Table 5.5 are the same as in Table 5.4. The first three steps in
both the scenarios have the same results. Again, Step 1 shows the original lending environment
where there are no liars in the industry, and banks do not have to spend extra effort to verify
borrowers’ attributes. In Step 2, since the unit cost to lie (h) was set to be $1, liars can afford to
lie, it presents the environment where liars started to add lies onto their attributes, successfully
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Figure 5.11: The above plot showed the utility of the bank (in millions) versus different values
of η. We applied the parameters in Table 5.1, set A = 200, assigned k to $70, varied η from
0 to 1 with step size 0.001, and for each values of η calculated UBK . This plot showed that
maximum utility of the bank occur at η equals 0 , stating that banks should not spend money to
check for lies in applicants’ attribute.
escaped from regular credit checks and obtained loans. The shift in the distribution of bad liars’
credit score lead to increase in bank’s losses. Banks will then update their classification model
so as to equalize risk in Step 3. However, when comparing bank’s utility in Step 1, changing the
classifier alone does not generate a high enough utility. Therefore, in Step 4, banks consider to
directly put effort to check for lies in applicants’ attribute, indeed, they determine the optimal
amount of effort that should be included on top of their regular credit check process which can
minimize cost and maximize return.
In Step 4, given the initial conditions in Table 5.1, banks want to determine whether it is
profitable to put extra effort to check for lies in applicants’ attribute. We apply the parameters
presented in Table 5.1, set A = 200, k = $50 and varied η from 0 to 1 with step size 0.001.
For each value of η we calculate the corresponding UBK . Figure 5.12 presents the plot of
UBK versus η and suggests banks to set η to 0.412 in order to obtain the maximum utility
of 170MM. Although it costs the bank $20.6MM over and above their regular credit check
process, it lowers the bank’s incurred losses to bad payers by 56.5%21 and increases bank’s
utility by 1.97%22. We then substitute η = 0.412 and A = 200 into Eq. (5.10) to update the
21With extra effort added to check for lies in borrowers’ reported attributes, bank’s incurred losses lower by
(4.24+25.0)−(7.44+59.7)
(7.44+59.7) ×100% = 56.5%
22Banks’ increased in utility when 0.412 afford was added to check for lies: 169−166166 ×100% = 1.97%
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Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4
η 0 0 0 0.412
A 0 200 200 200
γ 491 491 536 518
NG 759K 759K 707K 731K
NB 7.44K 7.44K 2.53K 4.24K
NBlied 7.44K 59.7K 43.4K 25.0K
NT 774K 826K 753K 760K
LiNG $228MM $228MM $212MM $219MM
LNB $-7.44MM $-7.44MM $-2.53MM $-4.24MM
LNBlied $-7.44MM $-59.7MM $-43.4MM $-25.0MM
Nkη $0 $0 $0 $-20.60MM
UBK 213MM 160MM 166MM 169MM
LING $303MM $303MM $283MM $292MM
LiNG $-228MM $-228MM $-212MM $-219MM
UG 75.9MM 75.9MM 70.7MM 73.1MM
UB 7.44MM 7.44MM 2.53MM 4.24MM
LNBlied $7.44MM $59.7MM $43.4MM $25.0MM
(1− pG)PN NAh $0 $-20MM $-20MM $-20MM
UBlied 7.44MM 39.7MM 23.4MM 4.99MM
UT 303MM 283MM 263MM 252MM
Table 5.5: Table of results for Scenario 2b where it is always economical to lie and check for
lies.
cutoff score of the classifier to 518. Notice that putting effort η = 0.412 to check for lies will
change the classifier to generate a smaller cutoff score when compared to Step 3. Figure 5.13
showed the PDF of different borrowers and the cutoff score in Step 4. According to Figure 5.4,
the credit scores of bad liars vary from a + A(1− η) to 3a + A(1− η), substituting A = 200 and
η = 0.412 resulted in having bad liars’ scores vary from 318 to 718 in Step 4. The additional
effort η shifted the PDF of bad liars and the cutoff score of the classifier more towards the
left. Notice that the addition of lies and extra effort to check for lies in the lending business
did not change the PDF of good borrowers and bad honest borrowers. However, shifting the
cutoff line more towards the left increased the number of loans granted to good and bad honest
borrowers. As one can see in Table 5.5, the number of loans granted in Step 4 is higher than
that in Step 3, except for bad liars that the number of loans granted decreased by 42.5%23 and
actually the number of loans granted to bad liars reduced by 58.2%24 when compared to Step 2.
Therefore, the effect of spending η amount of effort to directly check for lies reduces 58.2% of
23Number of loans granted to bad liars decreased by 25.0−43.443.4 ×100% = 42.5%.
24Number of granted to bad liars reduced by 25.0−59.759.7 ×100% = 58.2%
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Figure 5.12: The above plot showed the utility of the banks (in millions) versus different values
of η. We applied the parameters in Table 5.1, set A = 200, k = $50, and varied η from 0 to 1
with step size 0.001. For each values of η we calculated the corresponding UBK . The dash line
showed that maximum utility of the banks occurs at η = 0.412 stating that banks should put
0.412 amount of effort to check for lies in applicants’ attribute.
the loans granted to bad liars. Adding η amount of effort to check for lies in applicants’ attribute
requires a cost of $20.6MM. However, banks still obtained at a utility level of 170MM which
is the highest amongst Step 2 to Step 4. Since there are more good and bad honest borrowers
granted loans, the utility of good and bad honest borrowers are also higher when compared to
Step 3. The introduction of η provides a mixed effect to bad liars utility. While it shifts the
PDF more towards the left which decreases the number of loans granted to bad liars, it also
moves the cutoff score more towards the left, which indeed increases the total number of loans
granted. Overall, the utility of bad liars decreased by 78.7% 25 with the introduction of η. The
mixed effect of η and A makes the lending environment not as efficient and contributed 17.1%26
decrease in overall utility when compared to Step 1.
With the extra η amount of effort added onto banks’ regular credit check process, bad liars
have to revise their strategy to obtain loans. In particular, they have to reconsider whether it
is still profitable for them to lie and may have to alter the amount of lie that should be added
onto their actual attribute. We apply the parameters in Table 5.1, set η = 0.412, γ = 518, h = $1
and varied A from 0 to 200 with step size 0.001, and for each value of A, we calculate the
corresponding UBlied using Eq. (5.19). Figure 5.14 shows the plot of UBlied versus A. This plot
25Utility of bad liars decreased by 4.99−23.423.4 ×100% = 78.7%
26Overall utility decreases by 252−303303 ×100% = 17.1%.
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Figure 5.13: This plot shows the PDF of different borrowers in Step 4. The cutoff value has
been calculated by substituting A = 1, η = 0.412 into Eq. (5.10) and resulted with γ = 2.59.
This plot presents the probability density function (PDF) of the scores of different borrowers.
We set a to 1, A to 1 and η to 0.412 in Figure 5.4 and added the cut off line γ = 2.59. The dash
line with scores ranging from 1 to 3 represents the PDF of bad honest borrowers. The solid
line with circle patterns with scores ranging from 1.59 to 3.59 represents the PDF of bad liars,
while the solid line with scores ranging from 2 to 4 represents the scores of good borrowers.
The gray shaded region showed the applicants with their scores greater than the cutoff value
and will be granted loans.
suggests that bad liars should set A to 200 in order to maintain at their maximum utility level
of 4.99MM. Therefore, bad liars should continue to lie, while banks should continue to check
for lies in this scenario.
5.6.4 Scenario 2c: Economical to Lie But Check for Lies Periodically
This scenario represents the situation where it is economical for bad liars to lie but banks should
only periodically check applicants’ attributes for lies. The black shaded region in Figure 5.5
shows the values of h and k which contribute to this scenario. To illustrate this scenario, we
keep h = $1 same as in Scenario 2a and 2b, arbitrarily set k = $20 and presented the results of
each step in Table 5.6. Notice that setting h to 1 contributes to having all the values in Steps 1,
2 and 3 to be the same as in Table 5.4 and 5.5. The analysis of those three steps are exactly the
same as in previous scenarios and will not be repeated here. Note that this scenario assumes
the unit cost required to check for lies are lower than in other scenarios, which indeed increases
the affordability of the banks. In Step 4, we applied the parameters in Table 5.1, set A = 200,
k = $20, and varied η from 0 to 1 with step size 0.001. For each values of η we calculated the
corresponding UBK . The plot of UBK versus η in Figure 5.15 suggests banks to set η to 1 and
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Figure 5.14: This plot showed the utility of bad liars (in millions) versus different values of A
in Step 4 of Scenario 2b. We applied the parameters in Table 5.1, set η = 0.412 and γ = 518,
arbitrarily assigned h to $1 and k to $50, and varied A from 0 to 200 with step size 0.01. For
each values of A we calculated UBlied. This plot showed that maximum utility of bad liars
occurred at A equals 1 , stating that bad liars should keep adding maximum amount of lies onto
their actual score in order to obtain at a utility level of 4.99MM.
put full amount of effort to check for lies in applicants’ attribute in order to obtain 193MM of
utility.
In this scenario, bad liars lied at an maximum amount and banks put full effort to eliminate
all the lies in applicants’ reported attributes, we substitute both η to 1 and A to 200 into Eq.
(5.10) to evaluate the cutoff score of the classifier to be 491 as presented in Step 4 of Table
5.6. Notice that when both η and A are set at their maximum value, the cutoff score and
the distribution of the credit scores of bad liars are the same value as in Step 1. Indeed, the
probability density functions of all the borrowers and the cutoff score in Step 4 is the same as in
Step 1 and is presented in Figure 5.6. The Bank’s strategy of putting 100% of effort to validate
applicants’ attribute can fully eliminate all the lies and correct bad liars reported attribute to its
actual value. In reality, it is very difficult to clean data and the chances of having data that does
not contain any noise is very low, however, it is not impossible to have all the lies removed in
the dataset and our research captures this.
In Step 4, banks put full amount of effort to remove all the lies in the data. The distribution
of borrowers’ attribute and the cutoff score of the classifier remains the same as in Step 1.
Therefore, the number of loans granted to borrowers remains the same as in Step 1. However,
it costs the banks an addition of $20MM in their credit check process but contribute to an
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Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 Step5 Step6
η 0 0 0 1 1 0
A 0 200 200 200 0 0
γ 491 491 536 491 491 491
NG 759K 759K 707K 759K 759K 759K
NB 7.44K 7.44K 2.53K 7.44K 7.44K 7.44K
NBlied 7.44K 59.7K 43.4K 7.44K 7.44K 7.44K
NT 774K 826K 753K 774K 774K 774K
LiNG $228MM $228MM $212MM $228MM $228MM $228MM
LNB $-7.44MM $-7.44MM $-2.53MM $-7.44MM $-7.44MM $-7.44MM
LNBlied $-7.44MM $-59.7MM $-43.4MM $-7.44MM $-7.44MM $-7.44MM
Nkη $0 $0 $0 $-20MM $-20MM $0
UBK 213MM 160MM 166MM 193MM 193MM 213MM
LING $303MM $303MM $283MM $303MM $303MM $303MM
LiNG $-228MM $-228MM $-212MM $-228MM $-228MM $-228MM
UG 75.9MM 75.9MM 70.7MM 75.9MM 75.9MM 75.9MM
UB 7.44MM 7.44MM 2.53MM 7.44MM 7.44MM 7.44MM
LNBlied $7.44MM $59.7MM $43.4MM $7.44MM $7.44MM $7.44MM
(1− pG)PN NAh $0 $-20MM $-20MM $-20MM $0 $0
UBlied 7.44MM 39.7MM 23.4MM -12.6MM 7.44MM 7.44MM
UT 303MM 283MM 263MM 263MM 283MM 303MM
Table 5.6: Table of results for Scenario 2c where it is economical to lie and check for lies
periodically.
increased of 16%27 in utility. The utility of good borrowers and bad honest borrowers remain
the same as in Step 1. It costs $20MM for bad liars to produce lies, the success on removing all
the lies in the data canceled the effect of lying, and this contributes to generate negative utility
for bad liars. The total utility in the lending business in Step 4 is slightly higher than in Step 3
but still lower than that in Step 1.
The negative utility that bad liars generate in Step 4 provided them a sign that it is necessary
to reconsider whether it is beneficial for them to lie. We regenerate the plot of UBlied versus
A by reassigning η to 1 and γ to 491 as calculated in Step 4, varied A from 0 to 200 with step
size 0.01, and for each values of A substitute the fixed parameters in Table 5.1 into Eq.(5.19)
to calculate UBlied. Figure 5.16 showed that UBlied decreases monotonically with A, suggesting
that bad liars should reset A to zero and be honest on reporting their attributes. Therefore,
we set A = 0, re-evaluated all the objective functions and presented the results in Step 5 of
Table 5.6. Note that this step shows the situation where bad liars did not lie but banks still
27Bank’s increased in utility = 192−166166 ×100% = 16%
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Figure 5.15: The above plot showed the utility of the banks (in millions) versus different values
of η. We applied the parameters in Table 5.1, set A = 200, k = $20, and varied η from 0 to 1
with step size 0.001. For each values of η we calculated the corresponding UBK . This plot
suggested banks to set η to 1 to put full effort to check for lies in applicants’ attribute. The
maximum amount of utility that banks can obtained is 193MM.
put full effort to check for the accuracy of applicants’ attribute. All the objective functions
in Step 5 have the same value as in Step 4 except for UBlied and UT . This step stated that
banks can consider to permanently put full effort to check for lies in applicants’ attribute as a
precaution. Then banks’ utility will always maintain at 193MM and will never experience bad
liars’ shocked, in which case will lower the utility to 161MM as stated in Step 2. In addition,
if banks can further investigate different methods to detect specifically on the time that bad
liars added lies onto their attribute, they can put effort to check for lies only at those time that
bad liars did lied. Banks can then always generate maximum utility. As in Step 5, bad liars
did not add lies onto their attribute, banks can then minimize cost and remove the effort spend
on checking lies, this will then make all the objective functions to have the same value as in
Step 1. We specifically presented the numbers again in Step 6 to show the entire cycle in this
scenario.
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Figure 5.16: This plot showed the utility of bad liars (in millions) versus different values of
A in Step 5 of Scenario 2c. We applied the parameters in Table 5.1, set η = 1 and γ = 491,
assigned h to $1 and k to $20, and varied A from 0 to 200 with step size 0.01. For each values
of A we calculated UBlied. This plot showed that maximum utility of bad liars occurred at A
equals 0 , stating that bad liars should not carry on to lie, instead, they will be better of to report
their actual attribute.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we extended the idea presented in Chapter 4 to model a game theoretic setting
which banks and bad liars select their parameters in competition with each other. In particular,
we examined the strategic impact of the unit cost for banks to check for lies and the unit cost to
bad liars involved in adding lies to their attributes. We showed that if the unit cost of lying is too
high, bad liars will not be able to afford to lie and banks will obtain maximum utility. In cases
where the unit cost to lie is affordable, bad liars can choose a lie intensity which maximize
their utility, while banks can attempt to modify the classifier to avoid granting loans to bad
liars. However, this also lowered the number of loans granted to good borrowers, which in
turn decreased the utility of good borrowers and affects the profitability of the banks. A better
strategy for the banks is to directly exert effort to eliminate lies. Banks will then determine the
optimal amount of effort to spend on eliminating lies, which affects their cost and profit. The
amount of effort that banks can afford to check for lies depends on bad liars’ lie intensity and
the cost require to eliminate lies. In cases where it is too expensive to eliminate lies, banks
must live with bad liars. While in cases where banks can afford to eliminate lies, we showed
that it is possible for bad liars to continue to lie, while banks continue to eliminate lies, both
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parties will exhibit sub-optimal conditions. On the other hand, it is also possible that bad liars
add lies and banks eliminate lies in a periodic cycle. The time period over which bad liars
should lie and banks need to eliminate lies will be of interest in our further studies.
We plan to link our work to other related economic literature. First, the problem of optimal
auditing has been studied by Dionne et al. [41], who found the optimal time to audit an insur-
ance claim when some fraud indicators are observed. This could be applied to determine the
optimal time period to check for lies.
Second, dynamic adverse selection modeling methods as studied by Chatterjee and Ionescu
[42], where the impact of college students borrowed money to attend school but did not manage
to graduate, can be applied to study the impact of bad borrowers who lied, but were not able to
obtain loans.
In addition, it must be noted that in the model presented here, liars ‘acted first’ in that
they chose their effort level to which the banks then responded. In future work, it would
be interesting to see what happened if a different model, in which banks moved first, was
considered.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary
Nowadays everyone needs credit. The applications of credit scoring techniques can benefit
financial institutions and borrowers alike. Financial institutions employ credit scoring tech-
niques to make lending decisions, which contribute to higher efficiency, lower cost, minimum
risk, and maximum profit. Borrowers also benefit from quicker access to credit. They learn
about the methods and skills that analysts use to offer credits, which can increase the chance of
getting loans. They can acquire a better understanding about how their characteristics will be
gathered, analyzed and transformed into a credit score which can reflect their credit worthiness.
They can also seek ways to behave in such a way so as to maintain a good credit history.
Credit fraud, improperly handled, can cause inaccurate loan decisions which contribute to
suboptimal loan book profitability. In this thesis, we study the effect on consumer lending if
some borrowers strategically falsify one or more of their attributes on their application form.
We applied discriminant analysis, a well-known classification method that has been widely
used in credit scoring, to make granting decisions. Below is a brief summary of what we have
accomplished in the chapters containing the research dealt with in this thesis:
Chapter 2 (which is a review of existing techniques) explored different methods use in the
context of credit scoring. We specifically examined the background of discriminant analysis,
and analyzed the prediction power of this method by assuming the characteristics of borrowers
follows the normal distribution. In addition, we provided an overview of logistic regression
analysis, another well-known method used in credit scoring. We concluded that discriminant
analysis, a model-driven approach, is more suitable for the theoretical exploration of models in
our research and will be used as the modeling method throughout this thesis.
In Chapter 3 (also published as [1]), we studied the effect of credit fraud on model accu-
racy. Analysts believe that using more attributes to develop credit scoring models will always
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increase the model predictive power. We showed that if some borrowers fraudulently falsified
their attributes on their application form, using higher dimensional data to develop credit scor-
ing models may result in a more complex model with lower predictive power when compared
to a model built using a dataset with lower dimensions. This draws our interest in the study of
credit fraud in later chapters.
Chapter 4 (or the related paper [2]) presented a simple stylized model to investigate how
banks respond to bad borrowers’ lies. From the bank’s perspective our study shows that, while
there are cases in which huge lies are better left alone, intelligent effort spent on reducing lies
usually increases revenue. The increased amount of profit depends on the cost spent to reduce
lies and the lie intensity which bad borrowers added to their reported attributes. The example
discussed in the chapter suggests that, if eliminating lies is not expensive, banks should reduce
the impact of lies only until they are small enough that the classifier can take over and itself
distinguish good from bad borrowers. From the borrowers’ point of view, we showed that it is
possible for bad borrowers to lie cleverly to pass credit checks and obtain loans. In fact, liars
have a strong incentive to behave strategically, if bad liars know the attribute and the type of
model used to classify prospective borrowers, we showed that it is possible for clever bad liars
to select an optimal lie intensity which minimize their cost of lying but maximize their chance
of obtaining loans.
In Chapter 5, we extended the idea presented in Chapter 4 to model a game theoretic setting
which banks and bad liars select their parameters in competition with each other. In particular,
we examined the strategy impact of the unit cost for banks to check for lies and the unit cost
requires bad liars to add lies onto their attributes towards their choices on selecting their pa-
rameters. We showed that if the unit cost of lying is too high, bad liars will not be able to afford
to lie and banks will obtain maximum utility. In cases where the unit cost to lie is affordable,
bad liars can choose a lie intensity which maximize their utility, while banks can determine the
amount of effort to spend on eliminating lies, which indeed affects their cost and profit. The
amount of effort that banks can afford to check for lies, depends on bad liars’ lie intensity and
the cost require to eliminate lies. If the cost to eliminate lies is too high, banks can only live
with bad liars. While in cases where banks can afford to eliminate lies, we showed that it is
possible for bad liars to continue to lie, while banks continue to eliminate lies, both parties will
exhibit sub-optimal conditions. On the other hand, it is also possible that bad liars add lies and
banks eliminate lies in a periodic cycle. The time period over which bad liars should lie and
banks need to eliminate lies will be of interest in our further studies.
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6.2 Business Insights from this work
Credit scoring is used to provide a quick, effective, and unbiased way of granting loans to
applicants. Unfortunately, the questions used to elicit the numerical values of attributes can
be gamed by applicants who wish to obtain access to loans for which they would not qualify
if they supplied all answers truthfully. This thesis discusses some of the aspects of this game
between borrower and lender.
From the lenders point of view, efforts might be devoted to correcting the numerical value
of attributes, without penalizing borrowers for supplying incorrect attribute values. That is the
approach taken here. In this case there is a tradeoff between the improved decision enabled by
correcting attributes and the cost of correcting. One business insight here is that attributes that
are easy and cheap to verify might be a better basis for scoring than more information rich, yet
more costly to verify, attributes. Thus, for instance, the amount of salary earned by a waged
employee might be a better attribute than the value of collateral, which requires subjective
appraisal. This thesis discusses from the lenders point of view, the optimal effort to expend on
checking and correcting attributes. This in turn requires an estimate of the size of lies used (the
“A” parameter.) In addition, the cost required to check for lies is also a fact that lenders need
to consider.
However, now the game aspect arises. If the borrower knows the attribute being checked
and the model the lender is using for the size of lies added to the attribute by dishonest bor-
rowers and the cost of correcting the attribute, this thesis shows that the borrower can select
a different lie amount to minimize their cost of lying and maximize their profit. The conclu-
sion from this is that lenders should keep their methodology secret. This might mean asking
questions about attributes not being used in the credit model, and certainly keeping scoring al-
gorithms confidential. However, over time, this kind of information is bound to leak out. That
suggests changing scoring algorithms from time to time might be indicated. In the negotiation
to get credit, as in all negotiations, counterparties should avoid being too predictable.
Another approach, not used here, is to simply refuse to extend credit to applicants caught in
a lie. While at first appealing, this is actually problematic, as it requires careful consideration
of the difference between a simple error and a lie.
6.2.1 Further research directions
We can extend this research using real data to show that it is profitable to reduce lies in bor-
rower’s attributes. In real-world settings, the historical dataset used to build models contains
the borrower’s characteristics, the repayment performance of the borrower and also a binary
variable showing whether the borrower defaulted or repaid their loan. It does not contain any
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variable describing whether the borrowers purposely reported falsified attribute values. That is
to say, the dataset did not directly tell us whether the borrower lied. Therefore, we have to first
consider a method that distinguishes liars and honest borrowers. Furthermore, we understand
that using more borrower characteristics may increase the performance of the classification
model, if these new characteristics can be measured accurately enough [1]. We can enhance
our research by building a multivariate model which takes into account characteristics that pre-
dict the repayment behavior of borrowers. To apply discriminant analysis, we must find the
joint distribution of all the characteristics used in the model. In addition, our thesis assumed
the interest rate charged by the bank to be the same amongst all borrowers. In real-world set-
tings, loan amounts and interest rate will be set according to the credit quality of the borrower.
We did model, in a very stylized way, the complicated connection between attributes and loan
amounts: but this question deserves a much more methodical study.
As noted in this thesis, we only consider adding lies to the data using a Bernoulli random
variable. Furthermore we suppose that all customers who choose to lie will do so by adding the
same constant amount to their attributes. However, we can extend our studies by considering
different ways to add lies to the data. For example, we can conditionally add lies to the data
by looking at the value of the original data, and also set the amount of lies different for each
customer by introducing another random variable which determines the strength of lies. In
addition, it would be interesting to study how robust these results are in a model in which good
borrowers as well as bad ones lie, perhaps for reasons external to the loan-granting process.
Another alternative might be to attempt not to correct the attributes stated on forms as modeled
here but to identify liars and simply reject their applications.
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Appendix A
Data Simulation
We used simulated data in this thesis to test the accuracy of our models and present results.
Essentially unlimited quantities of synthetic data can be created at very low cost. Many re-
searchers use simulated data to build scientific models, so as to have full detail about the be-
havior of the data which allows them to identify problems easily. Maldonado and Paredes [2]
used synthetic data to predict how likely it would have been for a rejected applicant to have
repaid their loan if they had in fact received credit. Banasik et al. [1] used simulated data to
examine the predictive accuracy of credit scoring models that have been built on a sample of
only accepted applicants, and to investigate whether econometric sample selection techniques
would improve the accuracy of the model.
The statistical software R [3] has been used to generate our data and this appendix provides
the procedure on the way to simulate our dataset. We first simulated a Bernoulli random vari-
able GB to distinguish whether the borrower is a good or bad payer. Good borrowers repay
their loans on time, while bad borrowers default. The Bernoulli variable GB takes the value
one (indicating a good payer) with probability p, and value zero (indicating a bad payer) with
probability 1− p. If GB is one, we simulate from the corresponding ‘good’ characteristics X1G
and X2G, where X1G and X2G are normally distributed with mean µ1G and µ2G and standard
deviation σ1G and σ2G respectively. On the other hand, if GB is zero, we simulate from the
corresponding ‘bad’ characteristics X1B and X2B, where X1B and X2B are normally distributed
with mean µ1B and µ2B, and standard deviation σ1B and σ2B respectively. Since we believe
each individual borrower’s characteristics are related, we set the correlation between X1 and
X2 to be ρ. The procedure for simulating the entire dataset including X1 and X2 is described
below:
Step 1. GB, where GB ∼ Bern(p)
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Step 2. X1 = µ1 +σ1Z1, where Z1 ∼ N(0,1)
Step 3. Z3 = ρZ1 +
√
1−ρ2Z2, where Z2 ∼ N(0,1) and Z1 ⊥ Z2
Step 4. X2 = µ2 +σ2Z3
We repeat steps 1 to 4 for k times to generate a dataset with N borrowers.
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Appendix B
Lending Club
Traditional lending business can be described as institution-to-people, where a middlemen such
as a bank is usually involved. Banks obtained the supply of money from customers’ savings
account or other financial instruments such as the selling of bonds and stocks, and on the other
hand lend it out to a group of customers at a higher interest rate. Borrowers will then receive
their loans out of the money pool that the bank has available. Social lending can be described
as people-to-people or peer-to-peer (P2P) lending. The advance development on information
systems, e-commerce tools and high speed internet enhance the growth of P2P lending. It is an
emerging alternative online lending platform, where individuals lend and borrow money using
an online trading system without the help of official financial institutions. It connects people
with money to invest to people needing money. On one end, lenders can choose the borrowers
to whom she wants to lend money, and on the other end, borrowers can also choose the lenders
who provide them with the best interest rate and repayment terms.
Lending Club is a U.S. P2P lending company and was the first P2P lender to register its
offerings as securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It has the world’s largest
peer-to-peer lending platform and had been originating over $15.98 BN loans as of December
2015. Lending Club enables borrowers to create unsecured personal loans between $1,000
to $35,000, with a standard repayment period of three years. It provides an online trading
platform that connects borrowers to lenders, facilitates a series of transactions from transferring
money to borrowers account, collecting payments, imposing penalties, and up to handling
default through collection processes. Investors can search through the list of loan request on
Lending Clubs website to select loans that they wanted to invest and make money from interest
payments. Lending Club on the other hand makes money by charging borrowers an origination
fee and investors a service fee.
There are a lot of popular P2P lending platforms in todays world: U.S.- based Prosper 1
1http://www.prosper.com
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and Lending Club Corporate, UK-based Zopa Limited 2, and Germany-based Smava GmbH
3. The convenient use of these P2P lending platforms established an alternative investment
instrument, which allows investors to earn higher returns compared to savings and investment
products offered by banks. With the continued growth of computer systems and information
technology, P2P lending is expected to further develop in the future.
2http://www.zopa.com
3http://www.smava.de.
Appendix C
Glossary of Terms
Wikipedia [1] and Investopedia [2] define the following common loan and banking terms:
Borrower A person that has applied, met specific requirements, and received a mon-
etary loan from a lender. The individual initiating the request signs a promissory note agreeing
to pay the lien holder back during a specified timeframe for the entire loan amount plus any
additional fees. The borrower is legally responsible for repayment of the loan and is subject to
any penalties for not repaying the loan back based on the lending terms agreed upon.
Creditor A creditor is an entity (person or institution) that extends credit by giving an-
other entity permission to borrow money intended to be repaid in the future. A business who
provides supplies or services to a company or an individual and does not demand payment
immediately is also considered a creditor, based on the fact that the client owes the business
money for services already rendered.
Debtor A debtor is a company or individual who owes money. If the debt is in the form
of a loan from a financial institution, the debtor is referred to as a borrower, and if the debt is
in the form of securities, such as bonds, the debtor is referred to as an issuer. Legally, someone
who files a voluntary petition to declare bankruptcy is also considered a debtor.
Debt Debt is an amount of money borrowed by one party from another. Debt is used by
many corporations and individuals as a method of making large purchases that they could not
afford under normal circumstances. A debt arrangement gives the borrowing party permission
to borrow money under the condition that it is to be paid back at a later date, usually with
interest.
Lender A lender is an individual, a public group, a private group or a financial institution
that makes funds available to another with the expectation that the funds will be repaid, in
addition to any interest and/or fees, either in increments (as in a monthly mortgage payment)
or as a lump sum.
Fraud In law, fraud is deliberate deception to secure unfair or unlawful gain, or to deprive
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a victim of a legal right. Fraud itself can be a civil wrong (i.e., a fraud victim may sue the
fraud perpetrator to avoid the fraud and/or recover monetary compensation), a criminal wrong
(i.e., a fraud perpetrator may be prosecuted and imprisoned by governmental authorities) or
it may cause no loss of money, property or legal right but still be an element of another civil
or criminal wrong. The purpose of fraud may be monetary gain or other benefits, such as
obtaining a driver’s license or qualifying for a mortgage by way of false statements.
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